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CHAPTER ONE 
General Grounds for International Air 
Carrier's Liability 
1-1. Introductory note 
The Warsaw Convention 1929, officially referred to as the 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Transportation by Air, 1 established and elaborated, 
as one of its major tenets, the principle of the air carrier's 
liability for damage caused to passengers, baggage and goods, 
and also for damage caused by delay. 2 
The Warsaw Convention emerged in a world of differences 
among the countries engaging in all humanities as to the rules 
governing liability for accidents reflecting of the carriage of 
goods and passengers by air. 3 The parties to the Warsaw 
Convention desired to limit carriers' liability for catastrophic 
aircraft disasters which might otherwise threaten the financial 
security of the infant industry.4 Other objectives were to achieve 
uniformity in an air carrier's liability and documentation for 
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 
opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929,49 Stat.3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 449 U.S.C. § 1502 
(1998) (adherence of United States proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. 
The various instruments comprising the Warsaw Convention are reprinted and collected in the 
International Air Transport Association's Essential Documents on International Air Carrier 
Liability (1999) [hereinafter lATA, Aviation Documents]. 
2 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
3 See id. pmbl.; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the 
Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497-99 (1967). (noting the intention of the Warsaw 
fonvention to create, among other things, uniform regulations regarding liability of air carriers). 
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99 (discussing the relative youth of the 
~irline industry and the goal of the Warsaw Convention to limit air carrier liability in instances 
mvolving accidents). . 
2 
transportation, to avoid conflict involvement in the problems of 
the laws in order to protect the fledgling international 
transportation business, and to facilitate transactions between 
countries around the world.5 
The rules of the Warsaw Convention are being applied all 
over the world and have demonstrated their reliability and 
usefulness. The passenger knows that, wherever and whenever 
he flies, there is a certain degree of uniformity in the rules 
governing the carrier's liability, while the carrier, being aware of 
the extent of his liability, can make arrangements to insure 
himself against possible losses. It is therefore appropriate to 
examine the nature and the development of the legal grounds on 
which the air carrier's liability rests, and their impact on 
everyday practice. The following will be devoted to these 
important matters. 
As time went by and aviation began expanding on a large 
scale, the Warsaw Convention had to be amended or added to on 
a number of occasions in order to be kept up to date. The 
amendments and/or additions are the following: 
1. The Hague Protocol of 1955.6 It was added in order to adapt 
5 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, pmble. (relating the aims of the Warsaw Convention); see 
also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99 (discussing the goals of the Warsaw 
fonvention). 
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, Sept. 28,1955,478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter 
3 
the Warsaw Convention to the demands of modem transport. 
The Protocol entered into force on 1 August 1963, the ninetieth 
day after ratification by 30 countries. 
2. The Guadalajara Convention of 1961 for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air 
Performed by a Person other than the Contracting Carrier.7 This 
amendment took the form of a Supplementary Convention 
because it was concluded to deal with an entirely new 
subject-matter, namely chartering. It has been in force since 1 
May 1964. 
3. The Montreal Agreement of May 1966.8 This IS a private 
agreement concluded between lATA carrIers and the United 
States Civil Aeronautics Board, and the so-called 'Malta 
Agreement', which is a private agreement between a number of 
air carriers, mostly from Europe. 
4. The Guatemala Protocol of 8 March 1971.9 This Protocol 
was also meant to be an amendment to the Warsaw Convention. 
The Hague Protocol]. 
7 Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person other than the Contracting Carrier, 
puadalajara, 18 September 1961. [hereinafter cited as Guadalajara Convention]. 
Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol 
(1966), Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 18,900, approved by Exec. Order No. 23,680, 31 
Fed. Reg. 7,302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal Interim Agreement], reprinted in lATA, Aviation 
pocuments, supra note 1, at 139. 
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at the 
Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, Mar. 8, 1971 [hereinafter Guatemala Protocol], reprinted in lATA, 
Principal Instruments of the Warsaw System 3-47 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter Principal 
Instruments]. . 
4 
However, it has yet to come into force. 
5. Another four amending Protocols were concluded at Montreal 
on 25 September 1975.10 
Moreover, there have been unilateral efforts to modify the 
Warsaw liability scheme. These primarily include the Japanese 
Initiative of 1992, 11 the European Community Regulation, 12 
and the lATA lntercarrier Agreement. 13 These unilateral efforts 
10 Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, Sept. 25, 1975, 
reprinted in Principal Instruments, supra note 9, at 48-50; Additional Protocol No.2 to Amend the 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed 
at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, Sept. 
25,1975, reprinted in Principal Instruments, supra note 9, at 51-53; Additional Protocol No.3 to 
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by 
Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept. 
1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 Mar. 1971, Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in Principal Instruments, 
supra note 9, at 54-57; Additional Protocol No.4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929 as 
Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, Sept. 25, 1975 [hereinafter 
Montreal Protocol No.4), reprinted in Principal Instruments, supra note 9, at 2-47. 
11 See Nanaeen K. Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention, 61 1. Air L. & Com 
437,453-56 (1996). (discussing Japanese airliners' agreement to abandon liability limits imposed 
by the Warsaw Convention). This initiative preceded the modem IATAAgreements and the 
Montreal Convention of 1999. See id. It constitutes an agreement among ten Japanese carriers to 
establish a two-tiered liability scheme with absolute liability of up to 100,000 SDRs and presumed 
liability for damages in excess of this limit. See id. A major impetus behind this agreement was the 
1985 crash of a Japanese Airline, which killed five-hundred twenty-nine people. See id.; Bin 
Cheng, Air Carriers' Liability for Passenger Injury and Death: The Japanese Initiative and 
Response to the Recent EC Consultation Paper, 18 Air & Space L. 109 (1993) (discussing the 
importance and circumstances of the Japanese initiative). 
12 See Council Regulation 2027/97,40 OJ. (L 285) 1 [hereinafter EC Regulation); see also 
Berend Crans & Onno Rijsdijk, EC Aviation Scene, 21 Air & Space L. 193 (1996) (reviewing the 
EC Regulation in the context of the European Community). The EC Regulation resulted from the 
Commission of the European Union's concern over the voluntary nature of the lATA initiative. See 
Crans & Rijsdijk, supra. The EC Regulation not only set forth a two-tiered liability system like the 
IATA and Japanese initiative, but also provided that it was mandatory for all European Union 
countries and required up-front payments to the family of a victim in case of death. See EC 
Regulation, supra. In The Queen v. The Secretary of State For the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, the regulation was challenged before the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom as 
constituting an impermissible change to the Warsaw Convention without the consent of the 
signatory states. The Court held that the Regulation in suspense because it conflicts 'with the 
Warsaw Convention and impedes the performance by member states who are parties to it.' 1 
~loyd's Rep. 242 (Apr. 21, 1999). 
3 See IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (IIA), available at 
http://www.iata.org/legalllist_intercarrier.htrn [hereinafter lIA), reprinted in IATA, Aviation 
5 
finally led to the adoption of the Montreal Convention 1999/4 
which was spearheaded by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization ("ICAO") and signed by more than 50 countries at 
an International Conference on Air Law in Montreal, Canada in 
May 1999. With the ratification by the thirtieth signatory state, 
the United States, the Convention became effective as of 
November 4, 2003. This is a landmark movement of modem 
civil aviation law. Rather than amending the Warsaw 
Convention, the Montreal Convention replaces the system of 
liability established under the previous treaty regime. 15 
However, the entry into force of Montreal does not stop the 
development and further refinement of the Warsaw analysis, 
much of which still provides sound guidance on the 
development of the Montreal framework. This is especially true 
in the analysis of its coverage. 
The basic Convention of Warsaw and its subsequent 
amendments and the Montreal Convention will now be 
Documents, supra note 1, at 51; Agreement on Measures to Implement the lATA Intercarrier 
Agreement (MIA), available at http://www.iata.orgllegal!lisUntercarrier.htm. reprinted in lATA, 
Aviation Documents supra note 1 at 55 14 ' ,. 
Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, opened for 
signature on 28 May 1999, available at http://www.dot.gov/otlogc!Convention.pdf [hereinafter 
~ontreal Convention 1999J, reprinted in lATA, Aviation Documents, supra note 1, at 17. 
See Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 (2d Cir. 2004); Schopenhauer v. 
COmpagnie Nationale Air France, 255 F. Supp. 2d 81,87 (E.D.NY 2003); see also Modernization 
Qfthe Warsaw System - Montreal 1999, J.C. Bactra, 65 J. Air. L. & Com.429, 433 (2000); Letter 
.QfSubmittal of Strobe Talbott (June 23, 2000), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 
33292734. 
6 
considered in their chronological order. 
1-2. The Warsaw Convention 1929 
The Warsaw Convention was the product of international 
conferences held in 1925 and 1929.16 At the 1929 conference, 
the Comite International Technique d 'Experts Juridiques 
Aeriens (C.I.T.E.J.A.), a committee of government-selected 
experts previously appointed to establish a set of rules for 
international air carriage, presented a draft convention. 17 
Underlying this draft were the principles upon which the 
liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention were founded. 
According to the Rapporteur of the 1925 Conference: 
"The Commission asked itself which liability regime had to be adopted: risk or fault. 
The general feeling is that, whilst liability towards third parties must see the 
application of the risk theory, by contrast, in the matter of the carrier's liability in 
relation to passengers and goods, one must admit the fault theory.,,18 
Further, the Convention's formation involved the 
convergence of principles of carrier liability under both the civil 
and common law systems. Under common law, the carrier is 
subjected to a heightened duty of care. While not absolute, it 
16 
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498 (providing the background of the Warsaw 
Convention) 17 • 
~ee John J. Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of 
Aenal Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. Air L. & Com. 27, 32, 36 (1932) (describing the work of 
~e CITEJA on the Warsaw Convention) . 
See Georgette Miller, Liability in International Air Transport: The Warsaw System in Municipal 
C
6
°urts 63 (1977) (quoting Conference Intemationale (Paris, 1925) Rapport Pittard Annexes, p. 
0). 
7 
requires the carner 'to use the greatest amount of care and 
foresight which IS reasonably necessary' 19 under the 
circumstances. Thus, failure to exerCise this care is negligent. 
Carriers are not liable for the assaults or torts of third parties 
absent notice and failure to protect the injured passenger.20 In 
contrast, under the civil law system, a carrier's duty to 
passengers is a strict contractual duty to safely transport.21 The 
only exception to this contractual liability is if the damage or 
loss is due to a cause that is not attributable to the carrier.22 
Under the principle of force majeure, a carrier is not liable for 
loss or damage if the occurrence is unforeseeable, insuperable, 
and extraneous to the carrier's business and activities,23 and 
includes 'fait ou faute d'un tiers' (act or fault of a third party) so 
long as all three conditions are met. 24 
A primary and fundamental purpose of the Convention was 
to establish uniform rules governing claims arising out of 
19 Id. at 52. 
20 See Milone v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 91 F.3d 229,231 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
(quoting Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. O'Neill, 633 A.2d 834,840 (D.C. 1993)) 
(holding that a common carrier 'has a duty to protect its passengers from foreseeable harm arising 
from criminal conduct of others.'); see also Kelley v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 37 F. Supp. 2d 
233,240 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). (holding that a railroad is not liable for assault of a passenger by an 
employee unless it is proven that the railroad 'knew or should have known the assailant was the 
~e of person who might commit an assault.'). 
See Miller, supra note 18, at 54 (describing the presence of a contractual duty to transport 
f200ds ~nd passengers safely under French law). 
23 See Id. (describing the exception to contractual liability, 'cause etrangere,' under the civil code). 
See id. at 54-55 (listing instances where a carrier is not liable for failing to deliver passengers 
~rd goods safely under the concept of force majeure in French law) . 
. See id. at 55 n.41 (noting the requirement that all three conditions must be met in order for 
hability to be excluded in situations involving 'fait ou faute d'un tiers'). 
8 
international air transportation and limit the liability of air 
carriers.25 At the time, the air transportation industry was in its 
infancy,26 and there were substantial differences among the 
world's countries as to liability rules governing air transportation 
accidents. 27 Many countries' civil laws allowed carriers to 
contractually (i.e. by ticket) disclaim liability for injury or 
death.28 Importantly, while uniformity was an essential goal to 
the Convention, the objectives also included the desire to protect 
the fledgling air transportation business from disaster.
29 
The 
primary concern was air accidents, such as crashes or other 
large-scale incidents in the plane's operation, which could lead 
to disastrous financial consequences. 30 There was also the 
25 See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc ., 872 F.2d 1462, 1467 (11 th Cir. 1989). (discussing the 
background of the Warsaw Convention and its aims); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 
498-99 (outlining the drafter's goals for the Warsaw Convention). 
26 See 1 Lee S. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law sec. 10.01 [2], at 10- 6 (Blanca 1. Rodriguez ed., 
1996) (describing the state of the aviation industry in 1929); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 
3, at 498 (characterizing the aviation industry as being on the verge of becoming a conunon mode 
of transportation). 
27 See 1 Stuart M. Speiser & Charles F. Krause, Aviation Tort Law § 11.4, at 635-36 (1978 & Supp. 
1999) (stating the twin goals ofthe Convention to be establishing uniformity in law and limiting 
~~e liability of air carriers in accidents). 
See HUlbert Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law 1-11 (1954 ) (discussing 
~Ftations on liability in civil aviation law). 
See generally Jonathan L. Neville, The International Air Transportation Association's Attempt 
to Modify International Air Disaster Liability: An Admirable Effort with an Impossible Goal, 27 
Ga. 1. Int'l & Compo L. 571, 573-74 (1999). (citing Francis Lyall, The Warsaw Convention: 
Cutting the Gordian Knot and the 1995 Intercarrier Agreement, 22 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 67, 
68-69 (1996)) (noting the problem that liability posed to the relatively young airline industry in 
~e event of an airline disaster). 
See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971) (discussing the aims of the 
Warsaw Convention, particularly preventing liability claims from severely harming air carriers in 
the event of a disastrous accident); see also James N. Fincher, Watching Liability Limits Under the 
Warsaw Convention Fly Away, and the lATA Initiative, 10 Transnat'l Law 309,310 (1997) (noting 
the concerns surrounding the potential fmancial ramifications that an air disaster could have had 
~ the airline industry); cf. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 499 (observing that the 
arsaw Convention's aim of establishing liability ceilings was an effort to attract capital to the 
9 
concern that insurance would otherwise become too expensive 
for carriers, and tickets too costly for most passengers. At the 
time, the air carrier industry was financially weak and faced 
possible, if not inevitable, bankruptcy from a single disaster.31 It 
was crucial for the Convention to limit air carrier liability and 
allow the air transportation industry to grow and obtain the 
necessary capital by placing uniform limits on possible 
disastrous c1aims.32 This could be done by identifying, at the 
outset, what liability the carrier could incur. 33 
Also underlying the Convention's goal of limiting a 
carrier's liability was the understanding that liability of the air 
airline industry). 
31 See generally Kreindler, supra note 26, sec. 10.01[2], at 10-6 (citing Dunn v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc ., 589 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1978)) (discussing early issues and problems with 
the aviation industry). 
32 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-500 (maintaining that a central goal of the 
Convention was to uniformly restrict the potential liability of the airline in the event of passenger 
injuries or fatalities); see also D. Goedhuis, National Airlegislations and the Warsaw Convention 
136 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1937) (stressing that the airliners' motive to enter into the Convention 
was in limiting their own liability). Moreover, the airliners sought to exclude domestic flights, 
non-commercial flights, and 'carriages performed not for reward by individuals or groups' from 
the Convention altogether. Id. at 142; Kriendler, supra note 26, sec. 11.01[2] nA (citing Dunn, 589 
F.2d at 410-11). (providing the example of Dunn, a federal case in which the defendant airline was 
forced to pay a substantial penalty to an injured passenger). Airlines were fully aware of the 
possibility that a major lawsuit could destroy capital investment, and thus sought to limit their 
fotentialliability through the Convention. See Kriendler, supra note 26, sec. 11.01 [2] nA. 
3 See Id, supra note 17, at 30 (citing Report of 1925 International Conference of Private Air Law) 
(reporting the establishment of two commissions by the First International Conference of Private 
Air Law in 1925, created to report on general questions of private air law and the liability of air 
carriers); see also Andrea Buff, Reforming the Liability Provisions of the Warsaw Convention: 
Does the lATA Intercarrier Agreement Eliminate the Need to Amend the Convention?, 20 
Fordham Int'l L.J. 1768, 1774 nA2 (1997). (citing Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Message 
from the President of the U.S. Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, S. 
Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., at 3-4 (2d Sess. 1934), reprinted in 1934 U.S. Aviation Rep. 239, 
242) (contending that limited liability would attract investors and insurance underwriters to the 
airline industry); Goedhuis, supra note 32, at 243 (explaining that the purpose of the Warsaw 
Convention was to give carriers the advantage of knowing when and to what extent their liability 
would be engaged). 
10 
carrier would be 'less rigorous' than that for other carriers34 and 
that the carrier was not assuming responsibility for the safety of 
the passenger absent fault. It was also understood and intended 
that the carrier would not assume responsibility for risks 
associated with travel in genera1.35 Reduced to its essentials, the 
Convention's limited liability scheme imposed presumed 
liability upon the carrier for injury resulting from aviation 
accident, set monetary limits on any damage recovery, and 
allowed exoneration where the carrier exercised due diligence.36 
Since the Convention was imposing liability upon the carrier for 
aircraft accidents, it placed the burden of proof regarding due 
diligence on the carrier, as it was believed that, in most crashes 
or major incidents, the carrier would be the most knowledgeable 
as to cause.37 If the cause could not be determined, then the 
34 See Goedhuis, supra note 32, at 233,236 (stating that the '[t]he liability ofthe air carrier must 
be submitted to rules less rigorous than those imposed on other carriers.'). 
35 See id. (justifying the 'less rigorous' enforcement of airline liability with the belief among 
representatives at the Convention that airline passengers, unlike passengers traveling on the more 
traditional modes of transportation, accepted the increased risks accompanied with flying). The 
argument for decreased airline liability was further strengthened by the contention that an airline 
could not overcome a presumption of fault where the airplane is involved in an accident, or 
disappears in the sea. See id. at 237; Miller, supra note 18, at 63 (admitting that 'anyone using an 
aircraft does not ignore the risks inherent in a mode of transportation which has not yet reached 
~~e point of perfection that one hundred years have given to the railways.'). 
See Goedhuis, supra note 32, at 38 (explaining that 'a system of liability must be arrived to 
which the injured party is relieved from the burden of proof without this resulting in declaring the 
~;rrier liable when it has committed no fault.'). 
See International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions, Second International 
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes, Oct. 4- 12, Warsaw 1929, at 21,37,252 (R. 
Homer ed. & D. Legrez transI., 1975) [[hereinafter 1929 Warsaw Minutes] (noting that a showing 
of due diligence will lessen the extent to which the air carrier would be liable); Goedhuis, supra 
note 32, at 217-18, 230 (discussing the generally accepted rule of placing the burden of proof on 
the carrier). 
11 
carrier would be liable.38 Indeed, it was the placement of the 
burden of proof on the carrier that served as the justification for 
modest liability limits. 
Based on these notions, the Warsaw liability scheme that 
emerged in 1929 allowed a passenger to recover damages for 
any injury or death if the following were established: 
(a) the claimant was a passenger of an international flight;39 
(b) the claimant suffered an 'accident'; 40 
(c) the accident occurred aboard the international flight or in the 
course of embarking or disembarking the international flight;41 
(d) the accident caused the passenger to suffer 'death or 
wounding ... or any other bodily injury. ,42 
While the first one is rare in dispute, the other three are of 
primary concern to this dissertation. 
The two main defenses were contributory negligence on the 
part of the claimant and carrier exoneration where the carrier 
undertook 'all necessary measures' to avoid the accident. 43 
Finally, the monetary limit could be broken by showing that the 
38 
See Lawrence B. Goldhirsch, The Warsaw Convention Annotated: A Legal Handbook (Kluwer 
~9000) (providing a translation and analytical connnentary for the Warsaw Convention). 
40 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 17. 
See id. art. 17. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. 
43 S 'd ee 1 . art. 20(1). 
12 
carrier engaged in 'willful misconduct,'44 or where the carrier 
failed to deliver the ticket.45 The monetary limit was 125,000 
francS (approximately U.S. $8,300).46 Although the Convention 
barred carriers from undermining the Convention rules by 
exculpatory contract language, carriers could agree to a higher 
limit of liability with the passenger 'by special contract.,47 
1-3. The Hague Protocol 1955 
In 1955, a Diplomatic Conference at the Hague proposed 
the adoption of a Protocol to amend the Warsaw Convention of 
1929. Although the Convention was, at the time, considered to 
be one of the best agreements dealing with matters of private 
intemationallaw, some practical and legal problems had become 
evident as aviation expanded rapidly between 1929 and 1955, 
necessitating a number of improvements in the original text. 
The most conspicuous of all amendments, however, was 
that the limit of liability for passengers was increased twofold, 
bringing the ceiling limit for compensation up to 250,000 francs 
(approximately U.S. $16,600).48 It also added a provision 
44 S . 
45 ee Id. art. 25. 
46 See id. art. 22. 
See id. 
47 S ·d 48 ee 1 . art. 22(1). 
See The Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. Xl. . 
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allowing recovery of litigation expenses according to local 
49 law. 
A very important modification was made in Article 25. In 
the original version of the Warsaw Convention, Article 25 
stipulated that the carrier cannot have recourse to the provisions 
limiting or excluding his liability in the event of damage 
resulting from "willful misconduct or by such default on his part 
as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is 
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct". 
The authentic text of the Convention is in the French 
language, where the words 'dol' and 'faute ... equivalente au dol' 
are used. The English and French texts, however, do not cover 
exactly the same concept considering that 'dol' is characterized 
by the intention to inflict a specific injury on another person, 
whereas in the case of "willful misconduct" the perpetrator must 
be aware of his misbehaviour and the potential damage which 
may ensue without having necessarily intended to inflict a 
specific injury. The definition of "willful misconduct" is wider 
than that of 'dol', since it may include cases where no wrong 
has intentionally been committed. 
49 S ·d 
ee 1 . art. XIII. The United States did not adopt The Hague Protocol due to its continued 
dissatisfaction with the amount of the Protocol's limits. See Matthew R. Pickelman, Draft 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air: The Warsaw 
Convention Revisited for the Last Time, 64 J. Air L. & Comm. 274,284 (1998). 
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In civil law countries there is a strong tradition to treat 
'gross negligence' as equivalent to 'dol'.50 In France, however, 
the prevailing attitude since 1957 is that the fault equivalent to 
'dol 'is the 'jaute inexcusable '(inexcusable fault).51 
In common law countries the courts have emphasized the 
specific character of "willful misconduct", which is entirely 
different from negligence and goes far beyond it, however gross 
or culpable the negligence may have been. 52 
It should be noted that the term of "willful misconduct" has 
caused a confusion of terminology which in turn has led to 
varying interpretations by a number of national courts. In the 
case of Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines 53 willful 
misconduct has been defined as follow: 
"Willful misconduct, as the court correctly charged, 
depends upon the facts of a particular case, but in order that an 
act may be characterized as willful there must be on the part of 
the person or persons sought to be charged, a conscious intent to 
do or to omit doing the act from which harm results to another, 
50 
See H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law, thesis Leiden (the Netherlands, 
1(54), para. 179. 
See, e.g., Sontag et al. v. Air France et al. Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (Ire Ch.), 8 
January 1971; [1971] RFDA 176; IATA CALR, No.391. cf. Bornier v. Air-Inter, Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Paris (Ire Ch., 2me Sect.), 27 April 1979; [1979] RFDA 340; Air Law, Vol. IV P 979), p. 168. 
5~ See G Miller, Liability in International Air Transport (1977), at p. 194 et seq. 
Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (1 st Dep.), 
16 December 1952; [1952] USAvR 486; IATAACLR, No.12. 
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or intentional omISSIon of a manifest duty. There must be a 
realization of the probability of injury from the conduct, and a 
disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct. The 
burden of establishing willful misconduct rests upon plaintiff." 
In Hennessy v. Air France54 it was observed that the pilot's 
excessive confidence in his own competence and the soundness 
of his equipment must in no way be considered as constituting 
gross negligence. 
In the case of Gallais v. Aero-Maritime55 the French court 
found that flying too close to the earth's surface was the cause of 
the accident and that this low flying constituted "willful 
misconduct" according to Anglo-Saxon law, the more so 
because the fault was equivalent to 'dol' in French law. On that 
ground the carrier was held liable for damages to the heirs of the 
deceased in accordance with Article 25 of the Warsaw 
Convention. 
A recent Spanish case centering on willful misconduct is 
Quimica v. Danzas.56 Here one of the Parcels to be transported 
from Barcelona to Moscow had gone missing. The carrier 
54 
Hennessy v. Air France, Tribunal Civil de la Seine (Ire Ch.), 24 April 1952; [1952] RFDA 199. 
AffIrmed: Cour d'Appel de Paris (Ire Ch.), 25 February 1954; (1954) RFDA 45; lATA ACLR, 
No.21. 
55 
56 Gallais v. Aero-Maritime, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, 28 April 1954; [1954] RFDA 184 [1955] JALC 99. 
Esteve Quimica SA v. Danzas SA Espanola, Tribunal Supremo (Sala do Civil), 6 June 1998, 
NO.625/1998. . 
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invoked the limitation of his liability; the consignee tried to 
break the limits by alleging willful misconduct of the carrier. 
The Supreme Court held that the lower court had rightfully ruled 
that in this case there had been no willful misconduct by the 
carrier. It was only a matter of negligence, as Danzas had not 
actively caused the loss, nor had the actual loss been foreseeable 
considering the material facts. 
In view of all these varying interpretations the Hague 
Protocol 1955 replaced Article 25 by a new Article stating that 
the limits laid down in the Warsaw Convention will not apply if 
it is proved "that the damage resulted from an act or omission of 
the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause 
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would 
probably result".57 
The advantage of this new rule is that the elements of both 
'dol' and 'willful misconduct' are included, while at the same 
time 'omission' has been included as a ground for unlimited 
liability. In the event of such negligence the claimant is required 
to prove that the employee has committed the act within the 
scope of his employment. 
57 ~~~ also Bin Cheng, "Willful Misconduct: from Warsaw to the Hague and from Brussels to 
Pans , Annals of Air and Space Law (1977), Vol. II, pp. 55-102. 
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1-4. The Guadalajara Convention 1961 
When the Warsaw Convention was drafted in 1929, charter 
flights played a relatively small part in international air traffic. 
No definition of the term 'carrier' was adopted in the 
Convention, because it was considered undesirable to hamper 
the development of aviation by doing so. 
After the Second World War, the number of charter 
arrangements increased significantly, which made it urgent to 
draw up new rules designed specifically for the purpose. These 
rules were laid down in this Supplementary Convention
58 
rather 
than in a protocol, since it was not a matter of revising old rules; 
they extended into an entirely new area not covered by the 
Warsaw Convention. 
This convention distinguishes between the carner who 
concludes the agreement, and the carrier who actually carries it 
out wholly or partly, each with his own obligations of liability. 
From an analysis of Article III, para. 2, it may be conclude that 
the carrier who actually performs the carriage is not liable to the 
same extent as the carrier who concludes it. The carrier who 
actually performs the carriage can never be held liable for an 
S8 See J.w.F. Sundberg, 'The Guadalajara Convention Live from Cyprus', Air Law, Vol. I (1976), 
pp.83-98. . 
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unlimited sum; his liability is restricted to the limits specified in 
the Warsaw Convention. On the other hand, his acts, and those 
of his employees, may result in unlimited liability for the 
contracting carrier. 
1-5. The Montreal Agreement 1966 
The Montreal Agreement was concluded between a number 
of airline companies and the Civil Aeronautics Board of the 
United States. It heralded the beginning of a revolutionary 
movement aimed at changing the fault liability of the carrier into 
a risk liability, a development which eventually led to the 
adoption of the Guatemala Protocol of 1971; the four Montreal 
Protocols of 1975; and more recently the new Montreal 
Convention of 1999. 
The Montreal Agreement was intended as a temporary 
solution to the impasse caused by the American denunciation of 
the Warsaw Convention on 15 November 1965. The Chief cause 
of the American move was the 125,000 francs limit, prescribed 
for the benefit of the carrier. The United States did not consider 
this sum to be commensurate with the compensation paid in 
cases involving domestic transport within the USA, where 
19 
unlimited liability is usually applied. The Hague Protocol had 
not been ratified by the USA because even its limits were not 
thought to be satisfactory. 
According to Article 39, paragraph 2 of the Warsaw 
Convention the denunciation would become effective six 
months after notification, which would have been on 15 May 
1966.59 The ICAO had already called a meeting to discuss a 
revision of the liability limits. This meeting, which took place in 
February 1966, produced a resolution requesting the ICAO 
Council to convene a diplomatic conference for the purpose of 
discussing various proposals concerning maximum liability. In 
the meantime, however, lATA carriers had drafted the Montreal 
Agreement, which was approved by the United States 
Government. Consequently, on 4 May 1966, the United States 
requested that its notification of denunciation of the Warsaw 
Convention be cancelled.60 
The Montreal Agreement is applicable to all international 
flights in which a point within the United States is an agreed 
stopping place, point of departure or destination, but only 
59 
See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 39 (allowing for any of the High Contracting Parties 
to denounce the Convention by giving notice to the Polish Government). Denunciation is to take 
fJace six months thereafter. See id. 
See Nicolas M. Matte, Treatise on Air-Aeronautical Law (1981), pp. 454-471, and D. Cohen, 
'Happy Birthday: Agreement CAB 18900: A Critical Review of the Montreal Interim Agreement 
and the Authority for its Implementation', Air Law, Vol, VII (1982), pp. 74-91. 
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insofar as passengers are concerned. 61 It is not a Protocol 
attached to the Warsaw Convention, but a private agreement 
between the air carriers and the US Civil Aeronautics Board, as 
explained earlier. The United States sought limits of $100,000 
per passenger, an amount that other countries believed was 
excessive.62 The two sides finally reached a compromise: the 
maximum liability of the carrier has been fixed at US$75,OOO 
(US$58,OOO excluding legal fees and costS)63; it is up to the 
passengers to take out additional insurance. 
Furthermore, in case of death or injury of a passenger, the 
carrier can no longer avail himself of the liability limitation 
clauses contained in Article 20, para. 1 of the Warsaw 
Convention stating that the carrier will not be liable if it proves 
that it and its agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid 
the damage or that it was impossible to take such measures. The 
plaintiff no longer has to prove that the carrier was at fault, but 
only the extent of the injury sustained. 64 Article 25 of the 
Warsaw Convention concerning unlimited liability in cases of 
willful misconduct or gross negligence remains applicable. 
61 
62 See Waiver of Warsaw Convention Liability Limits and Defenses, 14 C.F.R. sec. 203 (1999). 
63 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 586-87. 
See J.C. Batra, Modernization of the Warsaw System--Montreall999, 65 J. Air L. & Com. 429, 
430 (2000). (noting that the compromise is not a convention nor a protocol to the Warsaw 
~nvention, but a bilateral agreement). 
See Special Notice of Limited Liability for Death or Injury under the Warsaw Convention, 14 
C.F.R. sec. 221.175 (1999). ' 
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1-6. The Guatemala Protocol 1971 
The Guatemala Protocol of 197165 was signed on 8 March 
1971, by 21 nations, including the United States. It is further 
addition to the Warsaw system. 
However, few states have ratified the Protocol to date. The 
Protocol has not yet entered into force 66 because (1) the 
ratifications of 30 nations are required and, (2) the scheduled air 
traffic of five ratifying states, on aggregate and expressed in 
passenger-kilometers, must represent at least 40 per cent of the 
1970 total of international scheduled air traffic of the ICAO 
member States. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Guatemala 
Protocol deserve our close attention because they would have 
meant a definite step forward. 
The Guatemala Protocol contains some fundamental 
modifications, but they affect only the rules of transportation of 
passengers and their baggage. Its main feature is a shift of 
principle, in that the fault liability at present attaching to the 
65 
66 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 9. 
See Id, art. 14. In order for the protocol to take effect, it needed ratification from thirty 
countries, five of which would have to comprise forty percent of international air travel ofICAO 
member nations. See id. art. 20(1); see also Frederico Ortino & Gideon R.E. Jurgens, The lATA 
Ag~eements and the European Regulation: The Latest Attempts in the Pursuit of a Fair and 
Umform Liability Regime forInternational Air Transportation, 64 J. Air L. Com. 377, 384 (1999). 
~xPlaining how the U. S. failure to ratify the Protocol effectively defeated the Protocol, given the 
. S. share of the market). . 
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carrier will be changed into a risk liability. Accordingly, the 
carrier will be liable also in cases where he bears no fault or 
blame, for instance in the event of death or injury resulting from 
hijacking 0 sabotage. There is, however, an important provision: 
carrier liability with regard to passengers and baggage can never 
exceed the sum of 1,500,000 francs (about US$100,000)67, not 
even when it is proved 'that the damage resulted from an act or 
omission of the carrier, his servants, employees or agents, done 
with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge 
that damage would probably result' .68 This limit has been made 
mandatory: the 1,500,000 francs are a maximum limit, a limit 
not to be exceeded. 69 This amount is, however, subject to 
periodical review. 
The case for the introduction of fixed limits in the Warsaw 
System becomes apparent if one considers the enormous 
increase in the risks run by air carriers. Not only has the volume 
of air traffic increased sharply, entailing more likelihood of 
collisions especially around airports, but also the size of the 
aircraft, so that the number of passengers involved in accidents 
IS now many times higher than was ever dreamt of in 1929. 
67 . 
68 See Id. art. 8. 
Seeid.art 10 69 .. 
M.For a different point of view, see W.J. Hickey Jr., 'Breaking the Limit - Liability for Willful 
Isconduct under the Guatemala protocol' [1976] JALC 603-622. 
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Finally, another innovation to be introduced by the Protocol 
needs mentioning: Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention is to be 
amended in such a way that it will become possible to file a suit 
in the state of domicile or permanent residence of the claimant if 
the defendant carrier has a place of business in that state and is 
subject to its jurisdiction.7o 
1-7. The Four Montreal protocols 1975 
Four' Additional Protocols' amending the Warsaw System 
were adopted by a Diplomatic Conference held in Montreal in 
1975.71 
Montreal Protocols No.1, 2, 3 & 4 emerged primarily due 
to unstable gold prices in United States dollars.
72 
The French 
franc was replaced by Special Drawing Rights (,SDR,).73 In 
addition, The Hague and Guatemala provisions (absolute 
liability with an unbreakable limit, a settlement inducement 
clause, and a supplemental compensation plan) were 
mcorporated. Although Protocol No.4 primarily concerned the 
70 
71 See supra note 9, art. 12. 
72 See supra note 10 . 
. S~e David I. Sheinfeld, From Warsaw to Terrific: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability 
Lmutations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 451. Air L & Comm. 653, 677-78 
~}980). 
F The SDR w~s created by the International Monetary Fund and is based on the currencies of ~ance, the Umted Sta~es, Germany, England, and Japan. See Learning Network, Special Drawing 
ghts, at http://www.mfoplease.comlCe6/bus/A0846206.html. 
24 
simplification of rules pertaining to cargo liability, it changed 
Article 25's willful misconduct term to an 'act or omission' of the 
carrier or its agents committed 'with intent to cause damage or 
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would result' as the 
proof needed to escape the liability limit. 74 Moreover, it 
amended Article 24 by clarifying how the Convention precluded 
passengers from bringing actions under local law when they 
could not establish air carrier liability under the Treaty.75 
After the thirtieth ratification, Montreal Protocol No.4 at 
last entered into force on 14 June 1998 (i.e., 23 years after its 
initial conclusion). Shortly before, on 15 February 1996, 
Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 had also become effective. Thus 
Protocol No.3 is the only one of the four not to have this status; 
it is very questionable whether it will ever enter into force. 
1-8. The Montreal Convention 1999 
The complicated situation ansmg from the numerous 
Protocols caused the Montreal Diplomatic Conference to adopt a 
resolution requesting the ICAO Legal Committee to prepare a 
consolidated text covering the whole area of the Warsaw System, 
74 
75 See Montreal protocol No.4, supra note 10, art. 25. 
See Guatemala Protocol, supra note 9, art. 24. 
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so as to create a measure of uniformity between the Warsaw 
Convention and its amendments. 76 This consolidated text 
eventually turned out as the Montreal Convention of 1999, 
which became effective as of November 4, 2003 and will 
replace the Warsaw Convention System among the contracting 
states. 
Under the Montreal Convention, the carrier is strictly liable 
for the first 100,000 SDR77 , but which can be wholly or partly 
exonerated by the contributory negligence of the passenger;78 
The carrier is not liable for damages in excess of 100,000 SDR 
if the carrier proves that the damage was not caused by its 
negligence or other wrongful act or omission or that the damage 
was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of a third party.79 For damages above 100,000 SDR (if 
approved), there is no monetary limit on the amount of 
recoverable compensatory damages for passenger bodily injury 
or death. 
Other notable provisions include: automatic review of the 
SDR limit every five years;80 the passenger's option of filing 
76 See the Minutes and Documents of the International Conference on Air Law (Montreal, 1975); 
~fAO Doc. 9154-LCI174-1 and 174-2. See supra note 14, art. 21 (1) (describing the system of compensation for death and injury under 
~~e 1999 Convention). 
79 See id. art. 20 (allowing defendants to assert affmnative defenses). 
80 See id. art. 21(2)(a)-(b). 
See id. art. 24(1) (listing term limits of liability review). 
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suit where he or she has a principal place of business and 
permanent residence;81 mandatory advance payment obligation 
upon carrier in a sum to meet the passengers' 'immediate 
economical need'; 82 preemption over claims arising out of 
international air travel;83 inflationary adjustment based on the 
Consumer Price Index (,CP!'); the right of carriers to stipulate to 
higher limits;84 and the right of carriers to have recourse against 
third parties.85 
The centerpieces of all these reform efforts have been the 
low liability limits, the time consuming and expensive litigation 
surrounding claimants' attempts to break the liability limits by 
showing willful misconduct on the part of the carrier, and the 
belief that the compensatory scheme should allow a passenger to 
be compensated according to his or her own country's laws. 
However, interestingly, the crucial Article 17 (also the most 
concern of the present dissertation, will be discussed in length of 
the following Chapters), which governing personal injury claims 
under the Warsaw System and the new Montreal Convention 
1999 remains the same as it did when the Warsaw Convention 
was originally enacted in 1929. 
81 . 82 See Id. art. 33(2) (providing jurisdictional requirements for actions to bring damages). 
83 See id. art. 28. 
84 See id. art. 29 (setting forth the Montreal Convention as a basis for air carriage claim). 
8S See id. art. 25. 
See id. art. 37. 
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1-9. But remember insurance 
Insurance provides relief for a whole range of liability risks 
currently associated with modem society. The purchase of 
adequate insurance is a major element in risk management of the 
air carriers, since the high market value of aircraft and the great 
financial risks involved in aviation. One new wide body aircraft 
may cost in the area of US$200,OOO,OOO. The aggregate 
liabilities arising out of a major air carrier's liability can be 
heavy. Liability reserves for accidents can be in the area of 
US$750,OOO,OOO or more. 
Ivamy in his Dictionary of Insurance Law defines aviation 
insurance as "a type of insurance" covering: 
(i) Loss of or damage to an aircraft; 
(ii) Third party liability; 
(iii) Liability to passengers. 
While several important aviation insurance centers exist in 
USA, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland; London is 
the most important center of the market. "London Aircraft 
Insurance Policy,,86 is a world wide standard policy of aviation 
86 AVN 1e, 21.12.98. (AVN and its number denotes a specific standard clause used in the London 
market which may be included in the contract. Various market policy forms, endorsements and 
28 
insurance. Most law mentioned thereafter in this chapter comes 
from UK law, which applies, to much of the activity of the 
market. 
In the UK the market consists of: 
(i) Incorporated insurance companies which may be 
owned by: 
(a) various shareholders or holding companies; 
(b) a State or other authority. 
(ii) Pools or groupS of insurers trading together under 
the same manager. 
(iii) Lloyd's syndicates. 
The insurance industry in the UK is regulated by the 
Insurance Companies Act 1982 (,,1982 Act") and the Lloyd's 
Acts 1871-1982. 
The 1982 Act applies mainly to companIes although the 
Lloyd's syndicates must also comply with certain of its 
provisions. It requires companies and Lloyd's syndicates to 
comply with rules on maintenance of solvency margins, auditing 
and filing of accounts and other regulatory requirements. It also 
applies certain EC Directives. 
Subject to the 1982 Act, the Lloyd's Acts 1871-1982 
~~ and other clauses are found in Lloyd's Aviation Underwriters Association book Standard 
OIICY Forms, Proposal Forms and Clauses Etc. "LAUA Book". The Association expressly makes 
no recommendation as to whether or when use of the forms and clauses is appropriate.) 
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currently control Lloyd's including the functioning of its council 
and the Syndicates. The 1982 Act also regulates insurance 
companies whose principal places of business are in other States 
both within and outside the EU, and who carryon business in 
the UK. Schedule 2 to the 1982 Act classifies four types if 
insurance business as falling within "aviation" business: 
accident, aircraft, goods in transit and aircraft liability. 
The last question is whether insurance is compulsory III 
aviation. The answer is that there is no direct obligation III 
aviation insurance law to arrange for adequate insurance. It 
would clearly be unreasonable, however, for an air carrier to fail 
to maintain adequate insurance. The Montreal Convention 
199987 regulates that airlines must maintain adequate insurance. 
1-10. The definition of insurance 
In order to understand the law of insurance it is necessary 
to distinguish it from other contracts. A contract of insurance is 
any contract whereby one party assumes the risk of an uncertain 
event,88 which is not within his control, happening at a future 
87 
88 See supra note 14. 
th It IS c1~ar that the uncertain event need not be adverse to the other party, though in cases other 
an certam endowment and annuity policies, such as aviation insurance, it will be. See Gould v. 
;urtis [1913] 3 K.B. 84, qualifying the defmition given in the leading case of Prudential 
nsurance Co. v. I.R.C. [1904] 2 K.B. 658. 
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time, in which event the other party has an interest, and under 
which contract the first party is bound to pay money or provide 
its equivalent if the uncertain event occurs. Several aspects of 
this definition merit closer attention: 
First, legal entitlement. There must clearly be a binding contract, 
and the insurer must be legally bound to compensate the other 
party. A right to be considered for a benefit which is truly only 
discretionary is not enough.
89 
Secondly, uncertainty. Uncertainty IS a necessary feature of 
insurance. In most cases, the question is whether or not the 
event insured against will occur. If it is bound to happen, then 
when will it happen? 
Thirdly, insurable interest. Insurable interest is a basic 
requirement of any contract of insurance unless it can be, and is, 
lawfully waived. As a general level, this means that the party to 
the insurance contract who is the insured or policyholder must 
have a particular relationship with the subj~ct-matter of the 
msurance, whether that be a life or property or a liability to 
which he might be exposed. The absence of the required 
relationship will render the contract illegal, void or simply 
unenforceable, depending on the type of insurance. This 
89 Medical Defence Union v. Department of Trade [1979] 2 All E.R. 42l. 
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principle was brought several hundred years ago to stop abuse 
and/or gambling. 
For example, in the case of property insurance such as an 
aircraft hull, the insured must show he has a present right to a 
legal or equitable interest in the aircraft or right under a contract. 
A hirer (bailee) of an aircraft has an insurable interest in his 
liability to the person who hires out the aircraft (bailor) for its 
loss or damage. 
Fourthly, control. It seems essential that the event insured 
against be outside the control of the party assuming the risk. 
However, no case law has been directly considered on this point. 
Fifthly, provision of money s worth. There seems no reason in 
principle why it should be necessary for the insurer to have to 
undertake to pay money on the occurrence of the uncertain event, 
and there is clear authority that the provision of something other 
than money is enough, provided that it is of money's worth.9o 
1-11. Proper law of insurance contract 
In the English marine hull insurance case of Amin Rasheed 
90 
Department o/Trade and Industry v. St Christopher s Motorists' Association Ltd. [1974] 1 All 
E.R.395. 
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Shipping Corp v. Kuwait Ins Co, 91 Lord Diplock said: 
"Contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum. They are 
mere pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless they were 
made by reference to some system of private law which defines 
obligations assumed by the parties to the contract." 
In respect of direct insurance of aviation risks, choice of 
law is left to the parties. In reinsurance the parties are also free 
to choose their law under the UK Contracts Act 1990, or the 
underlying governing law if not the UK law. 
In the absence of choice by the parties the court seised of 
the case will have to decide according to its own rules as to the 
proper law of the contract. 
1-12. Law and practice in the London market 
As we already know, aviation risks are substantial. Liability 
insurance can be offered to major airlines by the market 
sometimes in the area of "US$2,000,000,000, Combined Single 
Limit anyone accident". This means that insurance cover is 
provided up to that figure in respect of all liabilities arising out 
of one accident, thus covering passenger, cargo and third party 





liability. Liability insurance has to provide for the possibility of 
a mid-air collision between wide-bodied aircraft full of 
passengers over an urban area or installation such as a nuclear 
power station. 
Therefore, most aviation risks are shared by insurers. In 
some States 100 per cent of a major risk may be insured within 
that State, for example where the insured is a State enterprise 
and the insurer is a State insurance company; however, a 
substantial part of such risk will probably be reinsured on the 
market. A few risks can be insured with one insurer in one State 
which will require no reinsurance, for example certain minor 
general aviation risks. 
Insurers working in the market both insure and reinsure. 
One important role should bear in mind is "insurance brokers". 
Risks may only be placed with Lloyd's underwriters by 
approved Lloyd's brokers. Brokers who are not 
Lloyd's-approved brokers are restricted to placing risks with 
msurance companies only. The insurance broker is an 
intermediary used to place business in the market. Whether the 
broker is the agent of the insured or of the insurer is determined 
by domestic law. In the UK the broker is generally the agent of 
the insured. 
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English law on insurance contract/policy interpretation and 
contractual validity is mostly established by case law. While the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 applies to marine insurance only, it 
codifies many common law principles also applicable to other 
types of insurance including aviation.92 
1-13. Duty of disclosure 
In English law a contract of insurance is classified as a 
contract of "utmost good faith". The Latin phrase "uberrima 
fides" is used to describe the relationship between the insurer 
and the insured. This means that the proposer seeking insurance 
must disclose all facts relevant to the risk to the prospective 
insurers. Such disclosure may be done on the slip, in a proposal, 
or by some other document. 
Section 18( 1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides 
that: "The assured must disclose to the insurer, before the 
contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is 
known to the insured, and the insured is deemed to know every 
cIrcumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to 
be known by him." 
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Scrutton LJ stated in the English case of Rozanes v. 
Bowen93 that "It is the duty of the assured ... to make a full 
disclosure to the underwriters without being asked of all the 
material circumstances ... that is expressed by saying that it is a 
contract of the utmost good faith---uberrima fides". In simple 
words, this means that "it is the insured's duty to disclose, not 
the insurer's duty to ask". 
A material fact is "one which would influence the 
judgement of a prudent insurer in deciding whether to assume 
the risk, and if so at what premium and on what terms and 
conditions" .94 
In Lambert v. Co-operative Ins Soc Ltd,95 the English 
Court of Appeal held that the duty of disclosure on renewal was 
the same as when applying for the original policy; and that the 
rules on disclosure in marine insurance were the same as rules in 
other forms of insurance. 
There are four situations which the insured need not 
disclose to the insurer: 
(1) Any fact that reduces the risk (only in legal theory). 
(2) Any fact that the insurer already knows or can be 
93 
94 [1928] 32 L1 L R 98. 
r Container Transport International Inc v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Assoc (Bermuda) Ltd 
~I984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 476, CA. 
[1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 485. 
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presumed to know: 
(i) public knowledge; 
(ii) common notoriety or knowledge in that particular 
type of insurance; 
(iii) previous claims in the same insurer (English law is 
open to doubt as to this point, the author's view is 
that the insured does not have to disclose the 
previous claims to the same insurer). 
(3) Any fact regarding which the insurer waives knowledge. 
For instance, the insured tells the insurer there is a problem, 
but the insurer did not ask for more details, then the court 
will assume the insurer did not want to know the fact. 
(4) Any fact which deal with by a term/clause in the insurance 
policy. For aviation insurance policy there is an implied 
warranty that the aircraft is airworthy when it aviates. In 
this circumstance, the insurer does not need the insured to 
disclose the aircraft is not airworthy, because if so, the 
warranty has been breached, and there is no insurance 
covered at all. 
Failure under English law to disclose material facts which 
could have been ascertained by reasonable inquiry will render 
the policy voidable by the insurers. Should an insurer decided to 
37 
end the insurance contract/policy, the end is from the beginning. 
Margo points out that while the duty of disclosure usually 
terminates when the contract is made, the policy may include a 
continuing obligation on the insured during the policy period to 
notify any material change in the circumstances or nature of the 
risks which are the basis of the contract, though it is always a 
difficult task to define the meaning of "the change of the nature 
of the risks". 
There are different approaches of disclosure around the 
world, the main ones as the follows: 
(1) USA. Nearly all US states adopt that there is only 
non-disclosure if it is fraudulent non-disclosure. The 
burden of proving that it was fraudulent is only on the 
insurer. In practice, it was very difficult to prove 
fraudulent, so most cases in the US there is no duty of 
disclosure. 
Australia and Belgium. The insured only has to disclose 
what a reasonable insured would concern to be a material 
fact. 
France, Switzerland, Finland and Spain. The insured's 
obligation is to answer the questions be asked by the 







insurance policy period, the insured has to disclose any 
increase of the risks to the insurer, which is the only rule 
around the world harder than the UK "change of nature of 
the risks" rule. 
(4) France, Denmark, Finland and Ontario (Canada). These 
countries adopt the Proportionality Rule. For example, if 
innocent non-disclosure of x% information, then the 
insured will lose x% claim. 
(5) South Africa. In Mutual and Federal Ins Co Ltd v. 
Oudtshoohorn Municipality,96 the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court of South Africa held that while 
affirming the basic duty on the part of the insurer and 
insured to disclose facts material to the risk, the term 
uberrima fides (utmost good faith) is an "alien, vague and 
useless expression without any particular meaning in 
South African law". 
1-14. Misrepresentation under English law 
Section 24 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that 
"if the insured has made a false or inaccurate representation as 
96 [1985] (1) SA419, 433A, cited by Margo. 
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to material fact and which induced the insurers to enter into the 
contract, the policy will be voidable at the instance of the 
insurers. The insurer may waive the requirement to disclose 
material circumstances and misrepresentation by the insured. 
The non-disclosure or misrepresentation must induce the 
insurer to enter into the contract; if it does, the insurer may elect 
to avoid the policy and return the premium and until him so 
elects, the policy remains in effect, but is voidable.
97 
1-15. Policy, "the slip" and "cover note" 
In present dissertation, "Policy" means a written policy of 
insurance, when prepared, which constitutes the contract and 
replaces any other written document such as the slip. 
"The slip" means a piece of paper which a broker writes 
down the details of the risk and the principal terms and 
conditions of the insurance cover required by the prospective 
insured. These terms and conditions include the risk to be 
insured, period of cover, fleet details, the identity of the insured, 
the standard clauses, and a reference to the wording to be used 
in the policy, premium and commission. In a simple case, the 
97 P . 
an AtlantiC Insurance Co Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 3 All ER 581, HL. 
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broker selects the insurer and offers the risk to him. When the 
termS have been negotiated the contract is concluded and the 
policy is issued. 
Once the contract has been concluded, the broker may issue 
a "cover note" to the insured with details of the insurance which 
should reflect what is shown on the slip. The slip is the contract, 
the cover note is not. 
Where, for whatever reason, there is a conflict between 
policy and slip, then it may be necessary to apply to the court for 
rectification of the policy. 
1-16. Reinsurance 
The insurer often "lays off' the risk of insurance by 
reinsuring part or sometimes all of the risk with other insurers 
("reinsurers"). Reinsurers are either Lloyd's underwriters or 
special reinsurance companies, two best known reinsurance 
companies are Munich RI and Swiss RI. 
In practice, such as most aviation insurance, if an insurer 
cannot arrange the reinsurance, he will not take the original 
Insurance since the high value nature of the business. 






(1) Reinsurance of a single direct insurance, known as 
facultativelback to back/one off reinsurance; 
(2) Reinsurance of a series of risks, known as Treaty 
Reinsurance, which made In advance, cover a certain 
period of time for certain types of risks or certain amount 
of money or combined together; 
(3) Reinsurance of reinsurers, known as a retrocession 
agreement. 98 
Other forms of laying off the risk include "excess of loss", 
being the loss reinsured from a bundle of insurance contracts 
above a certain aggregate sum retained by the insurer. Excess of 
loss can also relate to only one underlying contract of insurance. 
The contract of insurance and the contract of reinsurance are 
separate contracts between separate _parties. The reinsurance 
may apply the same proper law as the original insurance or its 
own proper law. While the London market applies English 
contractual rules to an insurance contract, reinsurance contracts 
concluded in the market may nevertheless apply the law of the 
underlying policy, thus possibly raising a conflict of law 
question. 
Sometimes in the case of aircraft financing, the underlying 
-----------------98 H' 
19h1ands Ins Co v. Continental Ins Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 109. 
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policy may contain a "cut through" clause which in tum should 
be reflected in the reinsurance policy. This requires hull 
reinsurers to pay direct the original insured finance company 
their entitlement of the hull moneys. Without this arrangement 
the finance company as assured would be entitled to claim only 
against the original insurers. However, cut-through clauses are 
usually subj ect to the domestic law of the original insurance 
which sometimes forbids such clauses. 
In the case of facultative reinsurance it is quite possible to 
have a full insurance policy and then a full form reinsurance 
policy. However, often reinsurance is done by way of use the 
"same terms and conditions clause", which means make 
reinsurance contract subject to same terms and conditions of the 
original contract. Are there any limits to operate this clause? The 
answer is yes. First, a clause should not be brought down if 
which will cause conflicts with the reinsurance contract; 99 
second, a clause should not be brought down if which is not 
appropriate for reinsurance. 100 
Subject to any express provision in the contract, English 
law imposes on the reinsured the burden of proving that the 
reinsurer is liable to indemnify him. 
99--------
100 Australian Widows Fund v. National Mutual Life of Australasia [1914] AC 634. 





In reinsurance the alternative claims handling procedures 
are: 
(1) Follow the fortunes/settlements clause, also referred to as 
"Full RI". Which leaves the original insurer free to handle 
the claims of the original insured subject to any contractual 
obligations imposed by the reinsurance contract. There are 
three limits to this clause: 101 
(i) this clause applies as long as the case was settled In 
honest and business like way; 
(ii) the reinsurer does not have to pay "ex gratia" payment 
(payout of the policy); 
(iii)if the insurer settled the claim and the reinsurer followed 
the settlement, then later on turns out that the 
insured is guilty of fraud, but the insurer acted in 
honest and business like way, the reinsurer has to try 
to recover the money from the insured, not the 
Insurer. 
(2) Claims cooperation clause (used by EU countries). This 
provides that it is a condition precedent to reinsurers' 
liability that: 
(i) the insured shall upon knowledge of any loss which may 
101-------
Insurance Co. of Africa v. Scar [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 541. 
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gIve nse to a claim under this policy advise 
reinsurers within seven days; and 
(ii) the reinsured shall furnish reinsurers with all information 
available and shall cooperate with reinsurers in any 
adjustment and settlement (AVN 21). 
(3) Claims control clause (used by non-EU countries). It is a 
condition precedent to reinsurers' liability that: 
(i) the reinsured shall, upon knowledge of any loss or losses 
which may give rise to a claim, advise reinsurers 
within 72 hours; and 
(ii) furnish reinsurers with all information available and the 
reinsurers shall have the right to appoint adjusters, 
assessors and/or surveyors and to control all 
negotiations, adjustments and settlements m 
connection with such loss or losses (AVN 25). 
(4) Reinsurance and underwriting claims control clause. This 
has more stringent provISIOns additionally gIVIng 
reinsurers the sole right to appoint adjusters, assessors, or 
surveyors and/or lawyers and to control all negotiations, 
adjustments and settlements in connection with the loss. 
No amendment of the original policy shall be binding on 
reinsurers without their prior agreement (A VN 41). 
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But the question of which clause has priority has no easy 
answer. In the Scar 102 case, both "Follow the 
fortunes/settlements clause" and "Claims cooperation clause" 
are in the reinsurance contract, the English Court of Appeal held 
that "Claims cooperation clause" is more powerful than "Follow 
the fortunes/settlements clause". But why? The Court did not 
give any persuasive reason, the result can be easily on the 
contrary. A hint can be traced that Fox LJ stated: "that does least 
violence to the language", the true meaning of his statement is 
that, in simple words, "it is a nightmare!" 
In practice, which clause should be adopted in the 
reinsurance contract depends on the reinsurance premium and 
the market conditions. 
1-17. Deductible 
The deductible is that part of the liability or hull risk which 
is retained and paid for by the insured with the insurance cover 
being provided only when the liability or loss has reached a 
certain amount. Deductibles on hulls can be substantial and the 
prospective insured can buy insurance cover for this deductible 
102 
See note 15, supra. 
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exposure. 
1-18. Premium and commission 
The price paid by the insured for insurance is called the 
premium. The amount of the premium should normally be 
included in the contract of insurance. It may be included on the 
slip. Sometimes the premium may remain "TBA", i.e. "to be 
agreed". 
Method of payment depends on the terms of the contract 
and market practice. The effect of late or non-payment of the 
premium will be dealt with expressly in the insurance contract 
or by the governing domestic law. 
Premiums for hull insurance are calculated often as a fixed 
sum or percentage of the total value of the aircraft. In the case of 
passenger liability, the premium can be assessed on an amount 
per passenger seat or in the case of airlines on the basis of the 
revenue passenger miles flown by the airline. The policy may 
require an additional premium to be paid on increase of risk or 
for reduction of the premium on certain occasions. 
Where the broker is the agent of the insured, his 






it is paid. In the London market a Lloyd's broker is liable to the 
syndicates for the payment of premium on default by the 
insured. 
1-19. Subrogation 
Subrogation based on the concepts of equity and fairness, 
stop the insured to get double indemnity. It is now an implied 
term of an insurance contract. This doctrine is widely 
recognized and applied in the international community, each 
State has its own domestic law on subrogation. 
Subrogation in the English law of insurance is "a doctrine 
in favour of underwriters or insurers in order to prevent the 
insured from recovering more than a full indemnity; it has been 
adopted solely for that reason". 
It was stated in Castellain v. Preston 103: "Once the insurers 
have indemnified the insured under the policy they step into his 
shoes in relation to any rights of recovery which may be 
available to the insured against third parties." 
The English common law doctrine of subrogation applies 
to indemnity insurance which includes hull and liability 
103--------
[1883] 11 QBD 380. 
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insurance. It does not apply in the case of personal accident or 
life insurance. 
Subrogation takes place automatically when insurers have 
admitted and paid the insured's claim. The right is exercisable in 
the name of the insured. Conceptually, an insurer cannot bring a 
legal action against a third party in his own name because no 
legal connection between the insurer and the third party. For 
example, if insurers indemnify an airline against passenger 
liability claims, they will take over the right of the airline and by 
use of the airline's name to make a claim against a third party 
such as a manufacturer. 
However, if there has been an express assignment of rights 
by the insured to insurers then it is very likely that any action 
will have to be started by insurers in their own names, since a 
fierce and arduous subrogation action in the name of the insured 
against a defendant with whom it does business regularly is not 
always welcome to the insured. 
The insured has an implied duty to assist insurers and not 
to prejudice their position. An insured should not take any step 
III respect of a third party which would prejudice the insurer's 
subrogation rights. 
The principles of subrogation may cover not only the 
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insurer stepping into the shoes of the insured to make a recovery 
against a third party, but also the exercise of the insurer of a 
right to recover from the insured moneys received by the latter 
from the third party in respect of an insured loss already paid by 
insurers. In the latter case in English common law the moneys 
would be held on trust for the insurers. 
Aviation insurance policies often contain a clause setting 
out the insurer's rights of subrogation. The court concerned 
must apply the applicable domestic law rules of construction in 
interpreting an express subrogation clause when the question of 
subrogation is already regulated either by the Civil Code, as in 
the civi11aw countries, or by legal precedent, as in the common 
law countries. 
In the case of a major hull subrogation the duties of the 
insured to assist its insurers may be extensive and costly, for 
example the provision of witnesses, and the production of 
evidence and technical information. It may save both 
misunderstanding and time if these questions are dealt with 
expressly in the policy. 
1-20. London Aircraft Insurance Policy AVN 1 C 
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The London Aircraft Insurance Policy A VN 1 C is a world 
wide standard policy. This policy has four Sections which list 
below: 
Section I, Loss of or damage to aircraft; 
Section II, Legal liability to third parties (other than passengers); 
Section III, Legal liability to passengers; 
Section IV, (A) General Exclusions applicable to all sections, (B) 
Conditions Precedent applicable to all sections, (C) General 
Conditions applicable to all sections, and (D) Definitions. 
Section III, Paragraph 1, is the most concern of the present 
dissertation (Chapter 3, section 3-7, infra), which provides: 
"The Insurers will indemnify the Insured in respect of all sums which the Insured 
shall become legally liable to pay, and shall pay, as compensatory damages (including 
costs awarded against the Insured) in respect of 
(a) accidental bodily injury (fatal or otherwise) to passengers whilst entering, on 
board, or alighting from the Aircraft and 
(b) loss of or damage to baggage and personal articles of passengers arising out of an 
Accident to the Aircraft. 
Provided Always that (i) before a passenger boards the Aircraft the insured shall take 
such measures as are necessary to exclude or limit liability for claims under (a) and (b) 
above to the extent permitted by law; (ii) if such measures include the issue of a 
passenger ticketlbaggage check, the same shall be delivered correctly completed to 
the passenger a reasonable time before the passenger boards the Aircraft. 
In the event of failure to comply with these documentary precautions in proviso (i) or 
(ii), the liability of insurers under this section shall not exceed the amount of legal 
liability which would gave existed had the proviso been complied with." 
Some issues within this Section merit closer examination: 
First, if "entering" and "alighting" are more limited than "the 
COurse of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking" 
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, questions may arise on 
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the extent of cover if a passenger is injured when crossing the 
apron. Furthermore the proviso to paragraph 1 uses the words 
"boards the Aircraft". It is hoped that any arbitrator will take a 
realistic approach. 
Secondly, with regard to baggage and personal articles 
referred to in paragraph 1 (b) an accident to aircraft is required 
while it is not so in the case of the passenger injury cover. In the 
policy definitions, "accident" is defined as meaning "anyone 
accident or series of accidents arising out of one event". 
However, what are the criteria to be an "accident"? In one early 
English case104 it was held that an accident is "an unlooked for 
mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed". 
The wording suggests that if a passenger entering an aircraft 
stumbles on defective embarkation steps, breaking his ankle and 
his spectacles, the insured's liability for the ankle but not for the 
spectacles will be covered, unless the breaking of the ankle can 
be construed as an accident to the aircraft, which is unlikely. 
Thirdly, the Policy provides no cargo liability cover which 
can be added by agreement. 
Fourthly, the proviso requiring Issue of tickets/baggage 
checks covers two situations: (a) where the Warsaw Convention 
104 
Fenton v. J Thorlev & Co Ltd [1903] AC 443. 
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or similar provisions in respect to "non-international" carriage 
apply; (b) where the Warsaw Convention or such provisions do 
not apply. The need to issue a passenger ticket/baggage check 
for Warsaw Convention carriage in order to limit liability (the 
Montreal Convention gets rid of this prerequisite). To the extent 
that a special contract has removed limits of liability for death or 
injury then this provision ceases to be of significance as no 
doubt the insured will have advised the insurers of the special 
contract concerned. However, failure to issue a ticket where 
death or injury liability limits have been waived may still result 
in an unintentional unlimited liability in respect of baggage or 
delay. This could prove expensive for the insured where the 
baggage of the oil-rig worker includes an essential drilling 
component. 
One arbitration case105 concerns not only failure to issue a 
ticket where a similar policy requirement applied but also the 
question of insurer's agreement by way of policy endorsement 
to an increased limit of liability by way of special contract. Such 
Increase would have been dealt with in the ticket which was not 
issued. The arbitrator held that the insurer's liability extended to 
the increased limit. 
~--------------
N Re Keenair Services Ltd and Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd (Arbitration Re Policy 
oA. 8203/218, 29 July 1983). ' 
53 
In respect of non-Warsaw Convention situations, there may 
be some States where it is still possible to limit or exclude 
liability in respect of death or bodily injury by contract. 
However, this is a diminishing possibility. 
Fifthly, the exclusions apply to directors or employees 
acting in the course of their employment. Thus the insured is 
unlikely to be covered in respect of the death of an in-house 
accountant when traveling as a passenger from London to Paris 
for a meeting with insured's local handling agents. 106 The 
transport of corporate employees is an element in distinguishing 
"public transport" and "aerial work" under the ANO.107 
Sixthly, Section III is not subject to the Noise and Pollution 
and other Perils Exclusion Clause. 
1-21. The legal reality in China 
Finally, for the concern of the author, in China, aviation 
insurance law is very new. Frankly, this area is almost blank. 
China is a civil law system country, there is no statute named as 
"aviation insurance law" or any other similar title; even in the 
106 See Fellowes (or Herd) and Another v. Clyde Helicopters Ltd (HL, 1997). 
107 
UK Air Navigation (No 2) Order 1995 or replacement Order. 
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general insurance law, "aviation insurance" contains no mention 
at all; in the Chinese Civil Aviation law, there is only one 
reference to Article 184, which provides: "Chinese courts should 
apply international conventions which China has ratified." From 
the perspective of this dissertation, however, which provides no 
means to interpret an international convention. The only thing 
we have in practice is the "Regulations" issued by the Civil 
Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), which is the 
governmental authority for civil aviation in China. However, 
still, this is no contribution as to interpret an international 
convention such as the Warsaw Convention or the Montreal 
Convention. This situation creates uncertainty, for Chinese 
courts, airlines, lawyers, no one is clear what exactly the law is. 
To clarify the uncertainty, the proposed dissertation will 
concentrate on a comparative analysis of the different 
approaches to interpret a multinational convention, especially 
the different versions of the crucial Article 17 which governing 
personal injury claims. And which version China could 
appropriately adopt having regard to Chinese legal reality. By 
studying this, the author hopes to be able to make a meaningful 




What Constitutes "ACCIDENT" Under the 
Warsaw - Montreal System 
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2-1. Introduction 
Since 1929, an international aIr carrier's liability for 
personal injury and cargo damage has been governed by the 
Warsaw Convention. After the Convention's inception, various 
issues have emerged regarding the scope and interpretation of 
the Convention, especially in light of the modernization and 
expansion of air travel. As a result, the Convention has recently 
undergone significant changes and reform efforts aimed at 
modernizing the liability scheme. The traditionally low liability 
limits have been raised, converted into an international market 
standard, and tied to inflation. The concept of willful 
misconduct to break the monetary limits has been eliminated 
with an essentially no-fault based system in place for damage 
claims under the new and higher limits, with a pure fault based 
system for claims over the established limits. The reforms also 
have introduced notions of up-front payments, arbitration, and 
mandatory insurance as well as expanded the possible forums to 
assert claims. 
Despite these changes, however, the fundamental standard 
of liability for death and injury claims under the crucial Article 
17 remains unchanged, which provides: 
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"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or 
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the 
accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in 
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." 
Accordingly, if a passenger would process a personal injury 
claim against an international air carrier, the very first thing the 
passenger has to establish is there was an "accident" within the 
meaning of the Article 17. But what exactly the word "accident" 
means, the Warsaw Convention and the new Montreal 
Convention do not define. 
It is fairly universal that the goal in the interpretation of 
any instrument is to effectuate the intent of the parties.
108 
Treaty 
interpretation IS no different. According to the Vienna 
Convention,109 'a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its obj ect and purpose.' 110 The basic 
rules include the need to uphold the purposes of the treaty and 
give meaningful effect to the signature or intent behind the 
108 See Choctaw Nation ofIndians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423,431-32 (1943) (describing the 
~ourt's reliance on facts surrounding the treaty, along with parties' understanding and intent, as 
~po~ant factors in treaty interpretation). VIenna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. The United States has never ratified the Vienna Convention. See Chubb & 
~ons v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2000). It nonetheless is used as a guide to 
mtemational treaty interpretation as it is a codification of customary international law. Id. (citing 
Maria Fran Kowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 
~I~ Va: J. Int'l L. 281,286 (1988). VIenna Convention, supra note 109, art. 32; see Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (emphasizing that interpretation of a treaty requires one to commence 'with the text of the treaty 
and the context in which the words are used.'). In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 
534 (1991), the Court interpreted Article 17's 'bodily injury' requirement and held that it does not 
encompass mental injuries. . 
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treaty. 111 Upon examination of the treaty's text and the context 
in which the words are used,112 particularly with respect to 
uncertain or ambiguous areas, one can resort to the 'history of 
the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction 
adopted by the parties.' 113 Notions of liberality and good 
faith 114 are also commonly invoked, as is the interpretation of 
sister signatories' courtS. 115 According to the U. S. Supreme 
Court, as the 'travaux preparatoires' of the Warsaw Convention 
are published and are generally available to litigants, courts will 
frequently refer to these materials to resolve ambiguities in the 
text. 116 With Article 17, III particular, the 'travaux 
preparatoires,' context, and post-ratification conduct are crucial, 
given that the article is 'stark and undefined.' 117 
Notably, the draft convention initially presented to the 
Warsaw delegation by CITEJA made air carriers liable 'in the 
case of death, wounding or any other bodily injury suffered by a 
traveler,' 'in the case of loss, damage or destruction of goods or 
baggage,' or 'the case of delay suffered by a traveler, goods, or 
111 
See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 531 (describing the need to consider signatory conduct in interpreting 
parties' intent) 112 . 
113 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 397 (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1963)). 
114 See Choctaw, 318 U.S. at 432. 
115 See Vienna Convention, supra note 109, art. 32. 
. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 404 (emphasizing the importance of opinions and the conduct of 
~}~atories in interpreting treaties). 
117 See id. at 400. 
S J~ice Cousins, Note, Warsaw Convention--Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Injuries 
ustamed Within a Terminal, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 369, 388 (1976). 
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baggage.' The liability scheme did not textually include any 
requirement of causation and made no mention or reference to 
'accident.' Liability was likewise the same for personal injuries 
and damage to goods or baggage.118 Pursuant to this initial draft, 
Article 22 permitted the carrier to avoid liability by proving it 
had taken reasonable measures to avoid the damage. 119 
The minutes to the Convention establish that the term 
'accident' itself was never discussed, but simply appeared in 
final form as revised by the drafting committee at the 
Convention. 120 While there is no information as to why or when 
this occurred, the wording remains exactly the same today as it 
was then. Notably, the term 'accident' previously appeared in an 
early draft convention prepared by CITEJA directed toward 
liability of carriers for damage or injury caused to 'person or 
objects' on the ground. 121 Under this draft, liability was imposed 
118 See International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions, Second International 
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes, Oct. 4- 12, Warsaw 1929, at 264-265 (R. 
Homer ed. & D. Legrez transl., 1975) [[hereinafter 1929 Warsaw Minutes], (listing liability of the 
~~er as adopted by CITEJA in May 1928). 
120 See Warsaw Convention, art. 22. 
. See 1929 Warsaw Minutes, supra note 118, at 267 (using the term 'accident' in discussing the 
l~~bility of third party carriers). 
See John 1. Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee 
of Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), at 46,31. Air L. & Com. 27, 32, 36 (1932) (describing the 
work of the CITEJA on the Warsaw Convention). CITElA was charged with writing a draft 
convention, which would then be addressed at the international conference. See id. at 31 . At the 
First Session of CITElA on May of 1926, members identified and divided a set of problems to 
~tudy among four Commissions within the CITEJA group. See id. at 32 . The problems were 
Identified as follows: 
First COmmission: (1) Nationality of aircraft; (2) aeronautical register; (3) ownership, 
~o-ownership, construction, and transfer; (4) vested rights, mortgages, privileges and seizure. 
1 ec~nd Commission: (1) Category of transport (commercial transport, touring, etc.); (2) bill of 
oadmg; (3) liability of carrier towards consignors of goods and towards passengers; (4) jettison of 
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where the injury or damage was 'caused by aircraft,,122 which is 
referenced in the draft as an 'accident' .123 Further, liability was 
limited to the value of the aircraft, and the carrier could not be 
held liable where the damage was caused 'by any person on 
board the aircraft' who acted 'intentionally by some act which 
had nothing to do with the operation of the aircraft and without 
the operator or his staff being able to prevent the damage.,124 
Finally, the draft allowed the monetary limits to be exceeded if 
the 'damage was caused by his fault.,125 This history is 
informative, as the use of 'accident' by CITEJA was limited, tied 
to aircraft operation and modified by concepts of fault. 
One can hardly disagree with the U. S. Supreme Court's 
description of Article 17 as 'stark and undefined.,126 The plain or 
ordinary meaning of 'accident' or, 'l'accident', is certainly similar 
under both English and French usage, and references an 
unexpected, fortuitous, or untoward event or happening. What it 
includes within its ambit, however, remains in question, as the 
cargo and general damage; and (5) renting of aircraft. Third Commission: (1) Damage and liability 
toward third parties (landing, collision, and jettison); (2) limits of liability (contractual limitation, 
abandonment); and (3) insurance. Fourth Commission: (1) Legal status of commanding officer 
and crew; (2) accidents to the crew and insurance; (3) status of passengers; (4) law governing acts 
~~mrnitted aboard aircraft. Id. at 33. 
123 Id. at 46, art. 1. 
124 Id. at 47, arts. 5-6. 
125 Id. at 46, art. 2(b). 
126 Id. at 47, art. 8. 




context in which it is used is what gives the term meaning.
127 
Since the initial elimination of the international carrier's due 
diligence defense, beginning in 1966, the meaning and intent of 
'accident' has been under great strain. Moreover, it is now clear 
that the Convention provides the exclusive remedy for claims 
arising out of international air travel. This has further intensified 
the debate over the scope and meaning of Article 17, especially 
as to disturbances or incidents arising out of modern air travel. 
2-2. "Accident" is an "unexpected or unusual event or 
happening external to passenger" 
Then how to define the word "accident" in the Warsaw 
Convention Article 17. The leading US case is Air France v 
Saks,128 which also has a world-wide effect. In this landmark 
case, the US Supreme Court defined "accident" as an 
"unexpected or unusual event or happening external to 
passenger", and this definition has been readily adopted by other 
countries with virtually no analysis. 
Air France v Sak/29 
127 See Maximov, 373 U.S. at 53-54 (commenting that words used in treaties are to be interpreted 
?2~sed on the context in which they are used). 









Ms. Saks was a passenger on an international flight 
between France and Los Angeles, California.13o As the aircraft 
descended, Ms. Saks felt extreme pressure and pain in her left 
ear 131 and suffered permanent deafness as a result. 132 It is 
important to note, however, that she did not base her claim on 
abnormal operation of the aircraft, but conceded that the cabin 
depressurization was functioning properly at the time. 133 
Despite this fact, Ms. Saks claimed that the normal 
pressurization changes during descent caused her deafness and 
constituted an accident under Article 17. 134 She argued that 
"accident" should be defined as a "hazard of air travel," and that 
her injury had indeed been caused by such a hazard. 
The District Court ruled that Ms. Saks could not recover 
under Article 17, as she could not demonstrate some 
malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's operation. 135 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 136 The Court held that a 
showing of a malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's 
operation was not a prerequisite to liability under the 
130 
131 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 394. 
See id 
132 Id. . 
133 See id. (stating that 'all the available evidence, including the post flight report, affidavits, and 
passenger testimony, indicated that the aircraft's pressurization system had operated in the usual 
manner') 
134 ' .. 
135 See Id, at 395. 
Id. 
136 
See Saks, 724 F.2d at 1384. 
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Convention.137 According to the Ninth Circuit, an accident is 
defined as 'an occurrence associated with the operation of 
aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards 
the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have 
disembarked ... ,138 Thus, under this definition, a normal cabin 
depressurization qualifies as an accident. Central to the Ninth 
Circuit's analysis was its reliance on the 'history and policy' of 
Annex 13 to the Convention on International Aviation and the 
Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966, which, according to the 
Court, allowed 'accident' to be equated with 'occurrence.,139 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth 
Circuit's decision. The court stated that Air France is liable to 
the passenger under the terms of the Warsaw Convention only if 
the passenger proves that an "accident" was the cause of her 
injury.140 The narrow issue presented is whether respondent can 
meet this burden by showing that her injury was caused by the 
normal operation of the aircraft's pressurization system. The 
proper answer turns on interpretation of a clause in an 
137 See id. at 1396 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit based its decision on the Montreal 
~greement's view, which imposes absolute liability on airlines for injuries proximately caused by jWerent risks in travel). 
139 Id, at 1385. 
Id. 
140 
I See MacDonald v. Air Canada. 439 F.2d 1402 (CAl 1971); Mathias v. Pan Am World Airways, 
~ 53 F.R.D. 447 (WD Pa.1971). See also Shawcross & K. Beaumont, Air Law VII(147) (4th ed. 
84); D. Goedhuis, National Airlegislations and the Warsaw Convention 199 (1937). 
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international treaty to which the United States is a party.141 The 
general rule is a court should rely on the text of the Convention, 
the negotiating history of the Convention, the conduct of the 
parties to the Convention, and the weight of precedent in foreign 
and American courts. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that Article 17 imposes 
liability for injuries to passengers caused by an "accident," 
whereas Article 18 imposes liability for destruction or loss of 
baggage caused by an "occurrence." This difference in the 
parallel language of Articles 17 and 18 implies that the drafters 
of the Convention understood the word "accident" to mean 
something different than the word "occurrence," for they 
otherwise logically would have used the same word in each 
artic1e. 142 And the text of Article 17 refers to an accident which 
caused the passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the 
passenger's injury. In Article 17, the drafters of the Warsaw 
Convention apparently did make an attempt to discriminate 
between "the cause and the effect"; they specified that air 
carriers would be liable if an accident caused the passenger's 
141 See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States. 318 U.S. 423, 431-432, 63 S.Ct. 672, 677-678, 
87 L.Ed. 877 (1943). (Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to 
ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the 
~~gotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.) 
In See. Goedhuis, supra note 139, at 200-201; M. Milde, The Problems of Liabilities in 
temational Carriage by Air 62 (Caroline UniV.l963). 
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injury. The text of the Convention thus implies that, however we 
define "accident," it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy 
the definition rather than the occurrence of the injury alone. 143 
Finally, the court concluded that liability under Article 17 
of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a passenger's injury is 
caused by "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is 
external to the passenger." Thus, when the injury indisputably 
results from the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, 
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been 
caused by an accident, and Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 
cannot apply. The court admonished that this definition should 
be flexibly applied after assessment of all the circumstances 
surrounding a passenger's injuries, that the inquiry should 
address 'the nature of the event which caused the injury rather 
than the care taken by the airline to avert the injury;' and that the 
passenger need only prove 'that some link in the chain was an 
unusual and unexpected event external to the passenger.' 144 
Further, the Court considered the inquiry to be 'an objective one, 
which does not focus on the perspective of the person 
experiencing the injury.d45 
143 American jurisprudence has long recognized this distinction between an accident that is the 
cause of an injury and an injury that is itself an accident. See Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. 
~ 291 U.S. 491, 54 S.Ct. 461, 78 L.Ed. 934 (1934). 
145 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 393. 
Id, at 392. 
66 
]§eng v El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. 146 
Recognizing the Supreme Court m Saks, the appellate 
court in Tseng stated that not every identifiable incident or 
occurrence during a flight is an accident within the meaning of 
Article 17 even if the incident or occurrence gives rise to an 
injury. The appellate court thus declared, "accident" does not 
include the normal operation of the aircraft or the procedures 
followed by the airline personnel in the normal course of air 
travel, although they may cause illness in a passenger, noting the 
Supreme Court's statement in Saks that an injury has not been 
caused by an accident when indisputably results from the 
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and 
expected operation of the aircraft. The court explained that the 
drafters of the Warsaw Convention did not aim to impose close 
to absolute liability for an individual's personal reaction to 
routine operating procedures, measures that, although 
inconvenient and embarrassing, are the price passengers pay for 
airline safety. 
Australia followed the US Supreme Court's interpretation 
of "accident" in the Warsaw Convention Article 17. In the case 
146 C 122 F.3d 99, 147 A.L.R. Fed. 783 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 155, 119 S. 
t. 662, 142 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1999). . 
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of povey v Qantas Airways Ltd 147, the High Court of Australia 
held that "accident" is a concept which invites two questions: 
first, what happened on board (or during embarking or 
disembarking) that caused the injury of which complaint is 
made, and secondly, was what happened unusual or unexpected. 
The UK also agrees the US definition of "accident". In the 
case of Chaudhari v British Airways plC,148 the UK Court of 
Appeal determined that a passenger, who was already suffering 
from a left-sided paralysis and who was injured when he fell as 
he tried to leave his seat, did not suffer an "accident" that fell 
within Article 1 7 of the Convention. Leggatt LJ emphasized that 
the word "accident" focused attention on the cause, rather than 
the effect of the accident, and should be contrasted with Article 
18 of the Convention (covering loss and damage to baggage) 
which refers to the "occurrence" which caused the damage. The 
word "accident" was not to be construed by reference to the 
passenger's peculiar condition, but was properly to be defined as 
something external to the passenger. 
Canada also followed this approach, in the case of Quinn v. 
Canadian Airlines Int'l Ltd.149, Canadian court relying on Saks' 
147 20 2005 WL 1460709 (RCA 2005), affinning QANTAS Ltd v. Povey, 2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 
~3), Special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (RCA 2004) and Affirmed by, 2005 
148 1460709 (RCA 2005). 
149 [1997] Times 7 May 1997 (Apr. 16, 1997). [1994] 18 O.R.3d 326. 
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holding that turbulence was not considered an accident under 
the Warsaw Convention. 
The only doubt as to this worldwide standard interpretation 
of "accident" in the Warsaw Convention is the "external" 
requirement. Prior to the decision of the US Supreme Court in 
Saks, a number of courts expressed the view that an "accident," 
as that term is used in Article 17, must be an unexpected or 
unusual happening without requiring the event to be external to 
the passenger. 150 And the Australia Povey case expressed this 
concern as well. The concurring opinion in Povey noted that the 
US Supreme Court insisted that the "accident" must be external, 
however, there is not a lot of textual support in the Warsaw 
Convention for this conclusion. On the contrary, the text of 
Article 17 uses the word "accident" as the necessary cause of the 
"damage so sustained." Thus, arguably, if such "damage" were 
sustained by an internal "accident" (should that be possible) so 
long as it happened "on board the aircraft" or "in the course of' 
the specified "operations," that would be enough. In the 
concurring opinion's view, the happening or event in such 
special and temporal circumstances would be sufficient to attract 
the liability of the carrier. 
~---------------
R See Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see also 
-.!!l!man v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 142 Misc. 2d 445, 471 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup 1983). 
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Even in the Saks, why an event must be "external" to 
qualify as an "accident" has not been clearly reasoned. For the 
author's view, this prerequisite of Article 17 accident arises from 
the court's desire to reduce the trouble of proof, since under the 
modem science, it is extremely difficult to prove "internal 
accident" which connects to the air travel, such as the DVT 
cases, infra. 
2-3. Interpret "accident" under the pressure of the Warsaw 
Convention's exclusivity 
After the US Supreme Court In Saks, provided a rather 
narrow definition of "accident,,,151 the plaintiffs were able to 
bring state law claims separate from a Warsaw Convention 
claim. As a result, the plaintiffs often argued for a narrow 
definition of "accident" so as to avoid the dollar limits on a 
carrier's liability as well as the two-year limitations period under 
the Warsaw Convention and, conversely, carriers generally 
argued for a broad definition of accident to take advantage of the 
Warsaw Convention's limits on liability. When the Supreme 
151 fi See McCarthy, 56 F.3d at 316, (this restraint is entirely understandable as Article 17 provides 
or strict liability and there are sound policy reasons to confme that liability to the letter of the text, 
narrowly construed.) 
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Court decided EI Al Israel Airlines v Tsengl52, which made the 
Warsaw Convention's exclusivity significant, the parties traded 
arguments. Airlines typically argue for a narrow definition of 
"accident" because if an incident is not an accident, there is no 
other basis for recovery. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, try to get a 
broader definition of accident applied to encompass their 
particular situation.153 Since recovery for personal injury if not 
allowed under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, is not 
available at all, 154 courts usually interpret the meaning of 
"accident" in a broad fashion after Tseng. 
Given that the fundamental purpose of the Warsaw 
Convention was to provide a uniform system of rules, the 
delegates certainly believed the Convention would have a 
substantial preemptive scope. The issue was to what extent the 
Convention would have preemptive power, given that the 
Convention incorporated express reference to local law in many 
of its provisions.155 Indeed, the Convention expressly provided 
for resort to local law, based on the forum's choice of law rules, 
on such issues as recoverable damages,156 contributory or 
152 52 
153 5 u.s. 155. 
154 See Louie v. British Airways, Ltd., 2003 WL 22769110 (D. Alaska 2003). 
155 See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161. 
See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516 U.S. 217, 227 (1996) (holding that Article 17 of 
the Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm recognized under domestic 
law). 
156 
See Warsaw Convention, arts. 17-19 (prQviding carrier liability for damages relating to 
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. l' 157 d comparatIve neg 1gence, awar 
procedure, 159 calculation of the 
definition of willful misconduct.161 
of costs, 158 Issues of 
limitation period, 160 and 
The original text of Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention 
provides as follows: 
"1. In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however 
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this 
Convention. 
2. In cases covered by article 17, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also 
apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the right 
to bring suit and what are their respective rights." 
The Montreal Convention 1999, Article 29 provides: 
"In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however 
founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only 
be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this 
Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the 
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, 
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable." 
By adding ' ... whether under this Convention or in contract 
or in tort or otherwise ... [and] .. .In any such action, punitive, 
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be 
recoverable.' the drafters made the preemptive scope of the 
pgsonal. injury, checked baggage, and transportation delay). 
See Id. art. 21 (stating that the court to which a claim was submitted may exempt carriers from 
liability in accordance with their own law where a carrier proves that damage was caused in whole 
?5rg in par: by the injured party). 
See Id. art. 22 (setting forth maximum amounts of liability for recoverable damages, and 
providing that the form of payments be governed by the law of the court to which the claim was 
submitted) 159 . 
. See id. art. 28 (establishing that procedural questions be determined by the law of the court to 
~~ch the claim was submitted). 
See id. art. 29 (providing a two year statute of limitations to be calculated according to the law 
?6~the court to which the claim was submitted). 
r ~~e Warsaw Convention, art. 25 (stating that provisions which exempt or limit a carrier's 
lIabIlity are not available to carriers who have demonstrated willful misconduct as defined by the 
aw of the court to which a claim was submitted). 
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Conventions expressly clear that the Conventions preclude 
passengers from bringing actions for bodily injury, delay in 
cargo or baggage damages under local law, provide an exclusive 
remedy even in instances where the international passenger 
could not establish liability under the Conventions. 
Before the adoption of the Montreal Protocol No.4 (came 
into force in 1998 world widely, and became effective in the US 
in March of 1999), which similar to the Montreal Convention 
1999 Article 29, Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention created a 
court split on whether the language and/or purpose of the 
Convention precluded a claimant from resorting to local law 
remedies. 162 The debate was resolved in January 1999 by the 
Supreme Court in EI Al Israel Airlines, Inc. v. Tseng163 and the 
U. S. Senate's adoption of the Montreal Protocol No.4 in March 
of 1999.164 
Prior to Tseng, courts in both the United Kingdom and 
162 
See Krvs v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515,1518 n.8 (11th Cir. 1997)(recognizing 
a circuit split on whether the Warsaw Convention preempts state law). Compare Abramson v. 
Japan Airlines, 739 F.2d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that the Warsaw Convention does not 
preclude passengers unable to recover under the Warsaw Convention from pursuing state law 
remedies), and Beaudet v. British Airways, PLC, 853 F. Supp. 1062, 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(en~merating the number of cases which exemplify the divergence of views over whether a 
clalffiant's failure to satisfy terms under the Convention precludes a claimant's recovery under state 
law), with Fishman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that all state 
law claims falling within provisions of the Warsaw Convention are preempted by the Convention), 
and Potter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Warsaw 
Convention created an exclusive remedy for claims resulting from personal injury accidents 
~~oard an aircraft, precluding resort to state claims). 
164 See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161. 
S See 144 Congo Rec. S11059 (Sept. 28, 1998). The Protocol entered into force in the United 
tates on March 4, 1999. 
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Canada found the Warsaw Convention to be exclusive. In the 
case of Sindu v. British Airways, PLC,165 the English court 
stated that the purpose of Article 17 is 'to prescribe the 
circumstances, that is to say the only circumstances, in which a 
carrier will be liable in damages to the passenger for claims 
arising out of his international carriage by air.' In the case of 
Naval-Torres v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 166, the Canadian court 
stated that claims under the Warsaw Convention are exclusive. 
The court read Article 24's reference to 'cases covered under 
Article 17' to mean those cases within the Convention not 
covered by Article 18 (baggage) and Article 19 (delay), rather 
than distinguish between incidents of personal injury that are or 
are not within the provisions of the Convention. 
El Al Israel Airlines. Inc. v. Tseng167 
In Tseng, the US Supreme Court made it clear that recovery 
for personal injury suffered 'on board an aircraft or in the course 
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking,' if not 
allowed under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, is not 
available at al1. 168 The Court's emphasis on the Convention's 
'comprehensive scheme of liability rules' and goals of 
165 
166 [1997] 1 A.c. 193,207. 
167 [1998] 159 D.L.R. 4th 67, 76. 
168 See Supra note 163. 
See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161. 
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uniformity169 enabled it to conclude that allowing air carriers to 
be subject to 'distinct, non-uniform liability rules of the 
individual signatory nations' would be an unreasonable 
construction of the Convention. 170 The Court also based its 
opinion on the consideration that a nonexclusive interpretation 
of liability under the Convention might encourage plaintiffs to 
attempt to opt out of the Convention's liability scheme where 
local laws provided maximum limits of liability above those 
available under the Convention. l71 
The Supreme Court made clear, however, that the exclusive 
effect of the Convention was not all-encompassing, by stating 
that 'the Convention's preemptive effect on local law extends no 
further than the Convention's own substantive scope.' 172 As 
such, a carrier is subject to liability under local law for injuries 
arising outside of the air transportation or 'any of the operations 
of embarking' or 'disembarking.' 
Then Warsaw Convention Articles 17 and 24 have a 
symbiotic relationship. That is, whether or not an event is an 
accident can conclusively determine whether the claimant will 
169 
. See id. at 169, (stating that it would be difficult to conclude that delegates to the Convention 
mt~nded to subject air carriers to non-uniform local laws, given the textual emphasis on 
~lformity and the vast scope of the Conventions liability rules). 
171 Id, at 171. 
172 Id. 
See id. at 172 (citing Brief for the United Sta~es as Amicus Curiae 16). 
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have any remedy at all. 173 After Tseng, and the adoption of the 
Montreal Protocol No.4, only a limited number of courts have 
addressed the parameters of the Convention's exclusivity. Under 
the instruction of Tseng and the terms of the Convention, the 
Convention precludes any resort to alternative law, where the 
injury arose out of the international flight or out of any of the 
operations of embarking or disembarking, regardless of whether 
the event constitutes an accident. 174 The few courts that have 
addressed the scope of the Convention's exclusivity since Tseng 
generally have done so in a relatively broad fashion. 
Courts have been mindful of Tseng's admonition that to 
allow parties to pursue claims covered by the Convention would 
'encourage artful pleading by plaintiffs seeking to opt out of the 
Convention's liability scheme when local law promised recovery 
in excess of that prescribed by the Convention.' So long as the 
underlying event arises out of or occurred during the aIr 
transportation or process of embarking or disembarking, the 
courts were careful not to allow the Convention to be 
circumvented. 175 As two recent decisions held in separate 
17~3 --------
See Asher v. United Airlines, 70 F. Supp. 2d 614,617 (D. Md. 1999) (asserting that plaintiffs 
W'~t establish the incident as an 'accident' in order to recover damages under the Convention). 
C See .id, (noting that the Supreme Court found that 'the cardinal purpose of the Warsaw 
tr onvention ... is to achieve uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international air 
I7~Sportation). 
See Laor, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 347. 
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scenanos, 'the precipitating cause of 'the accident' cannot be 
artificially separated from its results in order to avoid the 
Warsaw Convention.' 176 In Choukroun v. American Airlines 
Inc./77 for instance, various state claims such as false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negligence arose 
out of the diversion of the flight and the plaintiffs removal as a 
result of a purported smoking incident. The event at issue took 
place during the flight and, regardless of whether it constituted 
an 'accident' or the fact that the arrest and prosecution came later, 
was not sufficient to elude the Convention's exclusivity. 178 
Courts have found a wide range of claims to be preempted, 
including claims for breach of contract, negligence, false arrest, 
false imprisonment, civil rights, malicious prosecution, 
defamation, deceit, assault, and battery. 179 Even federal 
statutory claims of discrimination have been found 
preempted.180 Contract claims found preempted include those 
176 
See Laor, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 347; Cruz, 193 F.3d at 531 (holding that fraud and deceit claims 
were preempted, as 'the relationship between the occurrence that [caused the] injuries is so closely 
related to the loss of luggage itself as to be, in a sense, indistinguishable from it.'). In Choukroun, 
the issue was whether the incident was an 'accident', as plaintiff did not assert a claim under the 
Convention and any such claim was barred by the two year statute of limitations under the 
Convention. See Choukroun v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 98-12557-NG (D. Mass. Aug. 2,2000) 
~~fder granting defendant's motion for summary judgment). 
178 See id. 
179 
Id. 
See Asher, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 619 (preempting claims for defamation, false arrest and assault 
under state law, based on disturbances over seat assignments and detention by airline service 
employees); Herrnano, 1999 WL 1269187, at *5-6 (holding that defamation and other willful or 
~~gk1ess acts were preempted under Warsaw). 
(h S~e Turturro v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
olding that a discrimination claim under Air Carrier Access Act was preempted). 
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arising out of damages for delays, 181 loss of luggage,182 or 
failure to transport due to removal or diversion. 183 The only 
means of escaping the Convention's preemptive scope is to 
establish that the claim arises out of an event that did not take 
place during the transportation or the process of embarking or 
d· b k· 184 1sem ar mg. 
The US Supreme Court's decision in Tseng, the adoption of 
Montreal Protocol No.4, and the came into force of the Montreal 
Convention of 1999 all expressly indicate that the 
Warsaw-Montreal system provides an exclusive remedy 
supplanting resort to local law remedies. The issue that emerges 
is what effect the exclusivity will play in the Court's 
interpretation of the liability rules of the Convention, 
particularly Article 17.185 Given that claimants will have no 
lSI See Perralta v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. C 98-1252, 1999 WL 193393, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 30, 1999) (stating that a breach of contract claim for delay resulting in the loss of a business 
deal was governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention); Minhas v. Birnan Bangladesh Airlines, 
1999 WL 447445, at **2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999) (stating that claims arising from delay due to 
'bumping' were governed by the Warsaw Convention); Daniel v. Virgin At!. Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 
986,989 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (concluding that passengers' inconvenience as a resulting delay was a 
legally cognizable harm under the Convention); Obuzor v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, No. 98 
~IV: ?224, 1999 WL 223162, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,1999) (holding that the Convention imposes 
~~b111ty upon carriers for damages caused by delay in transportation of passengers). 
See Spanner v. United Airlines, Inc., No. C 97-2972, 1998 WL 196466, at **2-3 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 22, 1998) (holding that the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable to a loss of luggage because 
of the liability provision, Article 18( 1), which requires that a loss of baggage take place during air 
transport); see also Cruz, 193 F.3d at 530 (stating that a common law claim for fraudulent denial 
?s;lost luggage was preempted by the Warsaw Convention). 
1 See Donkor, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (describing a passenger's detainment and deportation during 
I~rover). 
See id. at 968 (holding that plaintiffs causes of action are governed by Articles 17, 18, and 19, 
~d must be established to support preemption under the Convention). 
Noteworthy is the remaining question of whether a state law claim can be asserted where there 
was no accident, but the injury was caused by the willful or intentional conduct of the carrier. See 
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remedy for personal injuries suffered during international flights, 
or in the course of operations of embarking or disembarking, if 
they cannot establish an 'accident' or 'bodily injury,' courts may 
be more inclined to broadly apply the Convention's liability 
prerequisites. Indeed, the Court in Tseng could have arguably 
foreshadowed such a result when it stated, in dicta, that it 
disagreed with the lower court's conclusion, which was not 
before the Supreme Court, that the routine security search to 
which Ms. Tseng was subjected was likely an 'accident.,186 
Loryn B. Zerner, Tseng v. EI Al Israel Airlines and Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, 14 Am. 
U. Int'l L. Rev. 1245, 1273 (1999) (arguing that 'in light of the unequal positions between air 
carriers and passengers, an injured party denied recovery under Article 17 should be allowed 
recovery under the willful misconduct exception set forth in Article 25.'). Virtually all lower courts 
that have addressed this issue have found that Article 25 only comes into play if an Article 17 
accident is established. See EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 122 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(stating that Tseng mistakenly asserts that EI AI's conduct is 'willful misconduct' under Article 25 
and, therefore, constitutes an 'accident' as defmed under Article 17); Brandt v. American Airlines, 
Inc., No. C 98- 2089 SI, 2000 WL 288393, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2000) (holding that Article 
25 does not provide an independent cause of action under local law when willful misconduct is 
alleged); McDowell v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
(stating that the Eleventh Circuit previously held that Article 25 does not create a separate cause of 
action from Article 17); Carey v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (D. Or. 1999) 
(concluding that plaintiff must assert a valid Article 17 claim before reaching a claim under Article 
25); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that 'Article 25 is 
most reasonably interpreted as an exception to the Convention's limitations on the recovery of 
compensatory damages, not as authority for a form of damages not permitted elsewhere in the 
Convention.'). Further, the concern that, without such a reading of Article 25, carriers cannot be 
held accountable for intentional torts such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment, is simply 
ill-founded; accidents cover both negligent and intentional conduct of the carrier. See Laor v. Air 
~rance, 31 F. Supp. 2d 247, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that an 'accident' can occur from an 
mappropriate or unintended happenstance' during aircraft operation). If the carrier's agent 
cOmmits an intentional tort, then the conduct would clearly be an abnormal aircraft operation and 
~expected event rendering the carrier liable. 
See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 166 n.9. (defining 'accident' under Article 17 as an 'unexpected or 
~us~al event or happening that is external to the passenger'). Apparently, Ms. Tseng gave 
IllogIcal' responses to routine questions during screening and was classified as a 'high risk' 
passenger. See Tseng, 122 F.3d at 101. She was thus subjected to a security search pursuant to the 
carrier's security procedures, taken to a private room, and searched. See id. at 163, 164. She was 
required to remove her jacket and sweater, and lower her blue jeans. See id. A female security 
gtlard searched her entire body, including her breasts and her groin area. See id. The search was 
f.ur~~ant to standard procedures and, thus, was not an abnormal operation necessary for Article 17 
labIlity. See id. Of course, if the claimed 'illogical' answers that formed the basis for the search 
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The aftermath of Tseng clearly show the effect, only very a 
few cases have interpreted an incident was not an "accident" 
after Tseng. Some scholars heavily criticize this broad approach 
to interpret Article 17's "accident", say that this approach failed 
to include Article 17 within its purview and contrary to the 
drafters' intention, which render international air carriers nearly 
as virtual insurers to air travel passengers. However, for the 
author's view, the Warsaw-Montreal system is intended to 
provide uniform rules of international air carriers' liability that 
are suitable to modern civil aviation, and the advantages of the 
Conventions' exclusivity are commonly understood. Meanwhile, 
in the event of an unfortunate occurrence that contributes to the 
injury of a passenger, international air carriers are in the best 
positions to manage (through insurance) and/or prevent 
unfortunate occurrences. Accordingly, in the light of the 
Conventions' exclusivity, the author concerns with the courts' 
broad interpretation of the meaning of Article 17's "accident", 
so long as this interpretation does not render air carriers as real 
insurers. Finally, no matter which side you stand for, the strong 
suggestion is the readers of this Chapter should pay close 
attention to the cases which after the 1999 Tseng case, since 
Were false, then an accident would exist, as it would constitute an abnormal operation and 
deviation from standard procedures. See id. at 158 (stating that a security search of a passenger 
based solely on 'suspicion of circumstances' subjects the carrier to liability under Article 17). 
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those cases show the up-to-date trend of worldwide 
interpretation of Warsaw-Montreal system's "accident". 
2-4. Relation of event to inherent risks of air travel or 
aircraft operations 
It IS comparatively easy understanding and less 
controversial that an event is a Warsaw-Montreal system 
"accident" when such an event arising out of risk characteristic 
of air travel and aircraft operations. However, more 
controversially is that when accident has no relation to risk 
characteristic of air travel but connect with aircraft operations. 
Furthermore, the most debated ones are the cases which accident 
arising out of neither the inherent risks of air travel nor to 
aircraft operations, as discussed infra. 
Whether a Warsaw Convention Article ITs "accident" 
must involve a 'risk inherent or characteristic to air travel'? 
While the exact origins of this debate are not particularly clear, 
including whether it is meant to be synonymous with aircraft 
operation, it is derivative of the drafters' intent to have the 
Convention pertain to aviation accidents. Interestingly, the Court 
in Saks made no express reference to any risk allocation and, in 
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fact, rejected the notion that the Montreal Interim Agreement of 
1966 affected Article 17's intention of establishing absolute 
liability.187 Moreover, while the Court in Saks did not make 
express reference to any notion of risks characteristic to air 
travel, it did reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision referencing the 
normal depressurization on an aircraft as a 'hazard of air 
travel.,188 As a result, one could argue that the Supreme Court 
was rejecting 'a risk inherent to air travel' view, especially when 
Ms. Saks had expressed such a view in her Supreme Court brief. 
On the other hand, by holding that injuries resulting from 
normal, as opposed to abnormal, aircraft operations are not 
recoverable, the Court was equating abnormal operations with 
air risks assumed by the carrier. If the injury did not result from 
aircraft operations outside the normal and routine, it did not 
result from the type of risks for which the carrier should be 
liable. 
As to whether a Warsaw Convention Article 17 's 
"accident" must involve some aircraft operations, a large portion 
(but not all) of the decisional law to date has either expressly or 
implicitly referenced a causal connection or relationship 
between the unusual event and the aircraft's operation or 
187 
188 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 393. 
Id at 395. 
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procedures. 189 For instance, where a passenger is injured as a 
result of abnormal pressurization changes, a sudden dive,190 
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aircraft operation element IS obviously present and 
understandable. Nevertheless, this IS not the end of the story, 
there are some cases do hold that the Article 17's "accident" is 
not limited to events that are related to the operation of an 
aircraft (section 2-4-3, infra). 
2-4-1. Event connected to both inherent risks of air travel and 
aircraft operations 
Maxwell v Aer Lingus Ltd. 194 
Remarking that the Warsaw Convention does not impose a 
per se rule of liability on an air carrier for every occurrence that 
results in an injury to a passenger, the court held that the 
189 See Levy v. American Airlines, 1993 WL 205857, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1993), affd, 22 F.3d 
1092 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that some relationship between the accident and the operation of the 
~~craft is required under Article 17). 
See Weintraub v. Capital Int'l Airways, Inc., 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,0858 (N.Y. 1980) (holding 
~~t an aircraft's sudden steep dive and swerve to the right constituted an accident). 
See Tavarez v. American Airlines, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17507, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
1997); Sanna v. Delta Airlines, 132 F.RD. 47, 48-49 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Hinds v. Philippine 
~~r1ines, Inc., 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10638, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1979). 
See Mathias v. Pan-Am. World Airways, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 447, 448- 49 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Weaver 
f§peltaAirlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190,1191-92 (D. Mont. 1999). 
See Manion v. American Airlines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1,5 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that whether 
~.}!gine noise is unusual for purposes of Article 17 is a question offact). 
122 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 2000). 
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convention reaches only those injurious happenings that result 
from risks that are characteristic of air travel in the sense of 
having some relationship to the operation of the airplane. 195 The 
court explained that at one end of the spectrum are cases in 
which liability is always found, where airline personnel have 
either facilitated a passenger's tort or have themselves 
committed a tort in connection with a flight. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the court continued, are cases where the injury is 
caused by the passenger's internal reaction to the ordinary 
operation of the aircraft in which liability is almost never found 
because such accidents involve events or conditions outside the 
airline's purview or control. In the middle of the spectrum, the 
court added, are hijacking and terrorism cases where liability is 
imposed because terroristic acts are held to be a risk 
characteristic of modem day air travel which is allocated to the 
airline because the airline is in a far superior position than the 
passengers are to institute protective safeguards. The unexpected 
event, the court concluded, while not fully within the carrier's 
control, is not wholly beyond the ability of the carrier to 
influence. 
195 
See id. at 211 (stating that 'while a reasonable passenger would expect some shifting of the 
con~ents of an overhead bin, particularly during a turbulent flight, she would not expect, as an 
:dm.ary incident of the operation of the aircraft, to be struck on the head by a falling object when 
e bm above her seat is opened by a fellow passenger.'). 
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"A I I l.I, • A· I· 196 Eulop V. lVia ev nungarzan zr znes 
The court finding the reasoning in cases requiring some 
causal relationship between a claimed accident within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and the 
operation of an aircraft or an airline or the conduct of a carrier's 
employees more persuasive, declared that (1) it is to some 
"operation of the aircraft" that a passenger's injury should relate 
and it is only the unusual, abnormal, and unexpected operation 
of an aircraft that would constitute an Article 17 accident, and (2) 
an unusual and unexpected happening arising in the course of air 
travel need not rest on any notion of negligence or fault to be 
actionable, as long as the element of abnormality relates in some 
discernible way to the inappropriate or unintended happening 
arising in connection with or during the course of operation of 
the aircraft or airline. 
2-4-2. Event not connected to inherent risks of air travel but to 
aircraft operations 
G· d A . A· I· T 197 zrar v merzcan zr znes, inc. 
196 175 
197 F. Supp. 2d 651 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). 
2003 WL 21989978 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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The court held that it is not necessary that the injury be 
related to those risks characteristic of air travel. Whether an 
"accident" under Article 17 has occurred depends, the court 
thought, on the extent to which the circumstances giving rise to 
the claimed accident fall within the causal purview or control of 
the carrier. The court said that careful analysis of the post-Saks 
cases demonstrated that the causal link necessary for Article 17 
liability may be satisfied, the court said, by any act of judgment, 
exercise of control or application of carrier operation that, 
regardless of fault, implicated the airline in some abnormal, 
unusual or unexpected role as a causal agent of the injury. 
Alternatively, the court continued, the accident may arise from 
any risk reasonably associated with aviation which, if known, 
the carrier could reasonably assume and insure against. 
Adopting an "inherent risk of air travel" definition would restrict 
awards under the Warsaw Convention to only the narrow subset 
of accidents that are unusual and unexpected but not so outside 
the ordinary that they cannot be deemed risks characteristic of 
air travel, the court thought, would be a far-reaching curtailment 
of liability that clearly was not the intention of the Warsaw 
Convention. Moreover, the court reasoned, to constrain the 
definition of "accident" would eviscerate the careful balance 
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achieved by the original Warsaw Convention, especially given 
the Supreme Court's recognition that the Warsaw Convention 
provides passengers the exclusive means of recovery for injuries 
incurred on board an aircraft or in the course of any of the 
operations of embarking or disembarking under Tseng. The 
court saw no indication that the Warsaw Convention intended to 
insulate an airline from all liability stemming from ordinary 
negligence or recklessness in the operation of its business. 
Barratt v Trinidad & Tobago (BWIA Intern.) Airways Corp.198 
Rejecting a passenger's contention that a trip and fall within 
an airline terminal can never come within the scope of Article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention because such an accident is not 
caused by a risk inherent in aviation, the court stated that the 
definition of "accident" as an injury caused by an unexpected or 
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger 
under Saks is in no way limited to those injuries resulting from 
dangers exclusive to aviation. The court noted that Article 17 
specifically limits liability for accidents, not by reference to 
risks inherent in aviation, but by whether they occur "on board 
198 --------
1990 WL 127590 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
87 
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking or disembarking." 
2-4-3. Event neither connected to inherent risks of air travel nor 
to aircraft operations 
Gezzi v British Airways prc 199 
In which the court of appeals commented on the defendant 
carrier's contention that water on the staircase to its aircraft 
could not be an "accident" for purposes of Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention because it had no relation to the operation 
of the aircraft, stating that it was not clear whether an event's 
relationship to the operation of an aircraft is relevant to whether 
the event is an accident, since the Supreme Court's definition of 
accident in Saks did not indicate that an accident must relate to 
the operation of an aircraft. 
Morris v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. 200 (UK case) 
The English court referring to the U.S. Supreme Court's 
definition of "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention in Saks held that there was nothing in Saks that 
199--------
200 991 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1993). 
2001 WL 483072 (CA (Civ Div) 2001). 
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justifies the requirement that an "accident" must have some 
relationship with the operation of an aircraft or carriage by air. 
Nor, the court added, did it consider that a purposive approach 
to interpretation requires that gloss on the word. Stating that 
liability under Article 17 only arises in relation to an accident 
that occurs on board an aircraft or in the course of embarking or 
disembarking, the court thought that the accident will occur at a 
time when the passenger is in charge of the carrier. In those 
circumstances, the court opined, it seemed a logical and 
reasonable scheme of liability that, whatever the nature of the 
accident, a passenger should be entitled to be compensated for 
its consequences. 
2-5. Intentional misconduct as "accident" 
Can intentional misconduct constitute an "accident" within 
the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention? The 
global cases said yes, according to the inter-relationship of the 
Article 17 and Article 25201 , intentional misconduct will fall in 
the scope of Article 17's "accident". 
20'--------
" 1 Warsaw ~onvention 1929, Article 25 provides: 
( ) The carner shall not be entitle to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which 
89 
I . A' U' 202 o ympzc zrways v. nUsazn 
The U.S. Supreme Court observing that Article 25 of the 
Warsaw Convention removes the cap on carrier liability when an 
injury is caused by the air carrier's willful misconduct and 
stating that because there can be no liability for passenger death 
or bodily injury under the Convention in the absence of an 
Article 17 "accident," such willful misconduct is best read to be 
included in the realm of conduct that may constitute an 
"accident" under Article 17. The court referred to its prior 
decision in Saks, contemplating that intentional conduct could 
fall within the "accident" definition under Article 17 and, as 
such, the court stated, Saks correctly characterized the term 
"accident" as encompassing more than unintentional conduct. 
The term "accident," the court acknowledged, has at least two 
plausible yet distinct definitions: (1) accident may refer to an 
unintended event or (2) accident may be defined as an event that 
IS unusual or unexpected, whether the result was intentional or 
not, adding that Saks discerned the meaning of accident under 
excl~de or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default 
~n:ls p~ as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered 
o e eqUIValent to willful misconduct· ~2) Similarly the carrier shall not be e~tit1ed to avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage 
IS caUsed under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his 
~loyment." 
540 U.S. 644, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004). 
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Article 1 7 as an unexpected or unusual event or happening that 
is external to the passenger. 
EI Al Israel Airlines v Tseng203 
With respect to the apparent assertion that a carrier's 
conduct was willful misconduct covered by Article 25 of the 
Warsaw Convention and therefore could not constitute an 
accident under Article 17, the US Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court, held that the finding of an accident under Article 17 
is a prerequisite to the imposition of any liability for the 
personal injuries of a passenger and Article 25 simply describes 
a subset of accidents that are more egregious and to which a 
greater degree of culpability attaches. The two articles of the 
Warsaw Convention are not mutually exclusive, the court 
explained; rather, the finding of an accident under Article 17 is a 
prerequisite to the imposition of any liability for the personal 
injuries of a passenger. 
C T T • d A· I· 204 arey v u nile zr znes 
The Ninth Circuit held that an "accident," as that term is 
defined for purposes of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 
203 
204 525 u.s. 155, 119 s. Ct. 662,142 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1999). 
255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001). . 
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can include intentional misconduct. Noting the Supreme Court's 
definition of accident in Saks, as including any unexpected or 
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger, the 
court saw nothing in that definition suggesting that an accident 
includes only negligent or reckless conduct as opposed to 
intentional misconduct. In fact, the court continued, there is no 
mention of the carrier's motive or mental state whatsoever and 
the Saks court cautioned that its definition should be applied 
flexibly. A deeper look into the rationale behind the Supreme 
Court's decision in Tseng, supported the conclusion that the 
Warsaw Convention applies to claims arising out of intentional 
misconduct, the court remarked. If intentional misconduct 
claims were outside the Warsaw Convention, the court reasoned, 
then international air carriers would face two sources of liability, 
the Warsaw Convention and local law, depending on the nature 
of their actions, a scenario that the Tseng court rejected. Given 
the cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention to achieve 
uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international 
aIr transportation, the Tseng court ruled, it would be hard put to 
conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject carriers 
to the distinct, nonuniform liability rules of the individual 
signatory nations. Moreover, the court found nothing in Article 
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25, eliminating the Convention's limitation on liability for 
damage caused by willful misconduct, suggesting that the 
Convention does not apply to claims arising out of intentional 
misconduct, pointing out that Article 25 does not state that the 
entire Warsaw Convention is inapplicable to damage caused by 
willful misconduct. 
Qantas Ltd. v Pavel05 (Australian case) 
The Australian Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria held that cases show that there may be an accident 
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 
despite the event consisting of intentional, even criminal, 
conduct by one passenger towards another passenger or towards 
all passengers.206 Those cases, Ashley, AJA continued, make 
the point that the focus is on whether an event is unexpected or 
unusual and not on whether it is, for example, inadvertent, 
careless, intentional, or criminal. 
205 2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 2003), special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (RCA 
~04) and affIrmed on other grounds by, 2005 WL 1460709 (RCA 2005). 
The court cited Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); ~ 
Y:....Briti.sh Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (abrogated on other 
grounds by, Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 113 L. Ed. 2d 569 
~91)); Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc., Av. Cas. (CCR) 18,283 (D. Md. 1983); and 
~ace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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Naval-Torres v Northwest Airlines inc. 207 (Canadian case) 
Stating that the word "accident" in Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention is a term of art with a meaning particular to 
the Warsaw Convention, the Canadian Ontario Court of Justice, 
General Division held that, reading the Warsaw Convention as a 
whole, it is apparent that "accident" in Article 17 must be 
interpreted to embrace intentional acts of wrongdoing. Since 
Article 17 is the sole source of liability imposed on a carrier by 
the Warsaw Convention for bodily injury to passengers, the 
court reasoned, it followed that if "accident" were interpreted to 
include only inadvertent or negligent acts by a carrier, it would 
lead to the extraordinary result that the Warsaw Convention 
provides a remedy for inadvertence or negligence but fails to 
provide any remedy for deliberate wrongdoing. In the court's 
view, the fact that Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention limits 
defenses or limits on liability where a carrier is guilty of willful 
misconduct plainly indicated that deliberate wrongdoing is 
actionable under the Warsaw Convention. 
Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, Re. 208 
(UK case) 
207 
20g 1998 WL 1717959 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1998). 
2002 WL 31784484 u.K. QBD 2002). 
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The English court held that "accident" under Article 17 of 
the Warsaw Convention cannot bear its natural meaning as it is 
clear that it is intended to cover intentional or reckless acts 
committed with intent to cause injury, even though a dictionary 
definition could not possibly include such a meaning, finding 
support for its statement in Article 25, common sense, and the 
decision in Naval-Torres supra. 
2-6. Whether "inaction" could be an "accident" 
Whether inaction may constitute an "accident" within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention? The US 
courts said yes, however, the Australian and English courts 
denied pure inaction could be an "accident". 
01 . A· l.I.. 209 ympzc zrways v nusazn 
The US Supreme Court observing its definition of 
"accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention in Saks 
as an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external 
to the passenger and not a passenger's own internal reaction to 
the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, held 
;;--------
540 U.S. 644, 124 S. Ct. 1221,157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004). 
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that the term accident is not limited to affirmative acts. Under 
the circumstances of the instant case, the court rejected the 
defendant airline's argument that a flight attendant's failure to 
act, by refusing to assist a passenger sensitive to second-hand 
cigarette smoke in moving farther from the smoking section, 
could not constitute an "accident" because it was not an 
affirmative act. The court declared that the relevant "accident" 
inquiry was whether there was an unexpected or unusual event 
or happening and the rejection of an explicit request for 
assistance would be an event or happening under the ordinary 
and usual meaning of those terms. Moreover, the court thought 
that Article 25, providing that Article 22's liability cap does not 
apply in the event of willful misconduct or such default 
[emphasis added by the court] on the carrier's part that may be 
the equivalent of willful misconduct, suggested that an airline's 
inaction could be the basis of liability. 
Qantas Ltd. v Pave/ fO (Australian case) 
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria held 
that mere nonaction or any failure to act, however egregious the 
negligence involved, should not in itself be characterized as an 
210 
2 2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 2003), Special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (HCA 
004) and Affrrmed on other grounds by, 2005 WL 1460709 (HCA 2005). 
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"accident" within the meanIng of Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention. Finding no need to incorporate into the undefined 
word "accident" concepts that are alien to the required 
precondition of an event or an occurrence of the requisite kind, 
the court observed the connotation of accident as "that which 
befalls one." One may concede, the court remarked, that usage 
in the English language tends to become less precise, dependent 
on the whims and usages of the day, but the same could not be 
said of the French language where the word "accident" means a 
fortuitous and unfortunate event, causing physical injury or 
material damage. The court conceded that inaction sometimes 
may lead to an event which may be characterized as an accident, 
but that is quite a different thing, the court reasoned, from mere 
inaction or any negligent failure to act, however serious. 
Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, Re.211 
(UK case) 
Noting that a critical issue in the instant case was whether a 
failure to act or an omission can constitute an accident for 
purposes of Article 17, the United Kingdom court held that it 
was unable to see how inaction itself can ever properly be 
,~-------
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described as an accident. Inaction, the court added, is not an 
event, but rather a nonevent and the antithesis of an accident. 
The court recognized that often a failure to act results in an 
accident or forms part of a series of acts and omission which 
together constitute an accident, remarking that in such 
circumstances it may not be easy to distinguish between acts and 
omissions. Where a passenger's allegations do no more than 
state a failure to do something, that cannot be characterized as 
an event or happening, whatever the concomitant background of 
that failure to warn or advise, the court said. Acknowledging 
that a failure to take a specific required step in the course of 
flying an aircraft can lead to an event or happening of the 
requisite unusual or unexpected kind and, thus, be an accident 
for the purpose of Article 17, the court reasoned that a failure by 
a pilot to use some device in the expected and correct manner 
may lead an accident contemplated by Article 17 but, the court 
suggested, it would not be the failure to take the step which is 
properly characterized as an accident but rather its immediate 
unexpected and dangerous result. It is a slide in reasoning, the 
court thought, to say that every failure to do that which a carrier 
ought to do necessarily amounts to an accident, although it may 
frequently lead to such an event or occurrence of the required 
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kind. The court concluded that the question In each case, 
nevertheless, still is whether there has been an accident. 
Having discussed the general issues of the meaning of the 
Warsaw Convention Article 17's "accident", the following of 
this Chapter will concentrate on detailed events which may, by 
analyzing the decisions around the world, or may not constitute 
a Warsaw Convention's "accident". Those cases fall basically 
into three categories: (1) interaction between carrier's personnel 
and passengers; (2) events related to passenger's health; (3) 
other events. 
2-7. Inter-action between carrier's personnel and passengers 
2-7-1. Will service offood or beverages be an "accident" 
Whether service of food or beverages could be an 
"accident"? Normally, courts said yes. However, in one case212, 
the court held serving food or beverages, under certain 
circumstances, insufficient to establish, or support a finding of, a 
Warsaw Convention Article 17's "accident". 
212 . 
PadIlla v Olympic Airways, 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), infra. 
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d· A . A' Z' T 213 Langa mas v. merzcan lr mes, inc. 
Reversing the district court's order granting a carrier's 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can 
be granted, the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs allegation 
that a carrier served alcohol to a fellow passenger just prior to 
that passenger's assault of the plaintiff, knowing that the 
passenger was intoxicated and that his behavior was erratic and 
aggressive, sufficiently alleged a violation of Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention and that the Supreme Court's definition of 
"accident" in Saks was broad enough to permit recovery for torts 
committed by fellow passengers. According to the plaintiff, he 
was waiting in line to use a lavatory when the fellow passenger 
forcefully grabbed the plaintiffs testicles, causing excruciating 
pain, and then grabbed the plaintiffs hand and pulled it to the 
fellow passenger's own groin. Although the plaintiff reported the 
assault to the flight crew, he was unsatisfied with their response. 
The court conceded that not every tort committed by a fellow 
passenger is a Warsaw Convention accident, noting that where 
airline personnel play no causal role, the courts have found no 
Warsaw accident/14 but where airline personnel play a causal 
role in a passenger-on-passenger tort, the courts have found 
213 
214 199 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000). 
C J?e court cited Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 1996), and Stone v. 
-Jm....tinentalAirlines, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995). 
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Warsaw accidents.215 In the instant case, the court determined, 
the plaintiffs claim survived under those standards. It was 
alleged that the fellow passenger appeared intoxicated, 
aggressive, and erratic, that the carrier was aware of such 
behavior, and that despite its awareness, the carrier continued to 
serve him alcohol. Serving alcohol to an intoxicated passenger 
may, in some instances, create a foreseeable risk that the 
passenger will cause injury to others, the court stated. The court 
agreed with the carrier's argument that the complaint could not 
survive without a properly pled allegation of over-serving, but 
disagreed with the carrier's further argument that the charge of 
over-serving was pled defectively in that it relied on conclusory 
words and phrases like "erratic," "aggressive," and "diminished 
capacity." The carrier, the court declared, demanded more from 
the plaintiff than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require, 
opining that the plaintiff put the carrier on notice that it was 
accused of serving alcohol to an aggressive, erratic, and 
incapacitated passenger even though it knew he was intoxicated. 
Finally, the court was not persuaded by the carrier's point that 
the plaintiff only alleged over-serving of alcohol in his amended 
complaint on the basis of information and belief, remarking that 
215 
The court cited Schneider v. Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd., 686 F. Supp. 15 (D. Me. 1988). 
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the plaintiffs attorney was entitled to include such information 
and believe allegations in the complaint as long as there was a 
good faith basis for doing so based on the reasonable inquiry 
required under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11 (b). 
D' LA' A' Z' T 216 zaz ugo v. merzcan lr mes, .lnc. 
Denying a carrier's motion for summary judgment in a suit 
by a passenger and her husband for bums she suffered when a 
cup of coffee spilled over her while aboard a flight to the 
Dominican Republic, the court held that the spill was an unusual 
or unexpected event external to the passenger and, thus, an 
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention. In response to the passenger's request for a cup of 
coffee, a stewardess placed the cup on the passenger's tray. The 
coffee spilled on the passenger's lap, causing bums in her pelvic 
and gluteal areas. The court explained that, when a passenger 
boards a plane, it is not expected that a cup of coffee will spill 
Over the passenger's lap, noting that the usual operation of an 
airplane does not require that hot coffee be spilled on passengers. 
The passenger's injuries did not result from her internal reaction 
to normal airplane operations, the court continued; rather, her 
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injuries were caused by the unexpected event external to her of 
coffee spilling over her body. The carrier urged the court to go 
back in the chain of causes resulting in the spill, to find, as a 
matter of fact, that the plane's inclination caused the spill, and to 
hold that the inclination was not an Article 17 "accident." The 
court determined, however, that the inquiry need not go that far 
back in the chain, declaring that any injury is the product of a 
chain of causes, and that a passenger is only required to prove 
that some link in the chain was an unusual or unexpected event 
external to the passenger. The spill, the court concluded, was 
such a link. 
S / A . A' /. 217 ca a v. merzcan zr znes 
Denying a carrier's motion to dismiss an action under the 
Warsaw Convention by a passenger who alleged that he suffered 
a physical injury to his heart when he requested cranberry juice 
from a flight attendant as part of the carrier's in-flight beverage 
service but instead was served and consumed cranberry juice 
with alcohol, the court held that the event which happened to the 
passenger qualified as an accident within the meaning of Article 
17. The mistaken substitution of beverages in the instant case 
217--------
249 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Conn. 2003). 
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was an unexpected and perhaps unusual event, the court ruled, 
because the passenger expected to receive the beverage he 
ordered and it was presumably not common for the carrier to 
mistakenly provide alcoholic beverages to those who do not 
desire them. Moreover, the court found that the substitution of 
an alcoholic beverage for the beverage ordered by the passenger 
was external to the passenger in the sense that it was a mix-up 
presumably done by the flight attendant. Acknowledging that 
the passenger's internal reaction to the event was obviously 
wholly internal, the court stated that the accident was the drink 
substitution, not the passenger's pre-existing heart ailment. 
Rejecting the carrier's argument that the event did not qualify as 
an "accident" because it did not arise out of a risk that was 
peculiar to air travel, the court noted that whether an event's 
relationship to the operation of an aircraft is relevant to whether 
the event is an "accident" was an open question in the Second 
Circuie18 and declared that even under the restrictive standard 
of "characteristic risk of air travel", the drink substitution was a 
characteristic risk of air travel in that it increased the passenger's 
vulnerability to a mistaken drink substitution. Commenting that 
passengers on airplane flights are not free to move about the 
218 --------
The court cited Wallace v. Korean Air, 214F:.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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cabin to prepare their own drinks but must rely on flight 
attendants to accurately take their beverage order and prepare 
the appropriate drink, the court said that no passenger would 
expect to have to supervise preparation of his or her requested 
beverage. The court compared the circumstances of the instant 
case to those in Wallace,219 where it was found that a sexual 
assault was an accident even though, like a drink substitution, it 
could have easily occurred in other contexts. 
Bousso v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espnan220 
The court held that an injury suffered by a passenger on an 
international flight, a cracked tooth that occurred while eating a 
meal, was caused by an accident as that term is defined by the 
Supreme Court in Saks and the Second Circuit in Fishman by 
Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,221 and was therefore covered 
by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Since the passenger's 
action was commenced more than two years after the flight 
landed, the court granted the carrier's motion to dismiss on the 
ground that the passenger's claim was time-barred under Article 
29(1). 
219 
220 See id. 
221 1998 WL 148422 (S.D. N.Y. 1998). 
132 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998). 
105 
Gonzalez v. TA CA Intern. Airlinei22 
In a suit by a passenger under the Warsaw Convention for 
pain suffered during an angina attack allegedly caused by 
actions of a carrier's personnel in spilling a tray of food on him 
and serving him a beverage containing a small piece of plastic, 
the court found that the incidents in question constituted 
accidents under Article 17 since they were unusual and 
unexpected events during air travel. Determining that the 
passenger suffered an angina attack in flight, causing him 
increased anxiety, the court awarded damages to the passenger 
in the amount of $5,000. 
Price v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines223 
Where an international airline passenger asserted a claim 
against a carrier under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 
based on an injury to her knees which occurred when she was 
struck by a food cart, the court referring to the Supreme Court's 
definition of "accident" under Article 17 in Saks, held that it was 
beyond dispute that being struck by a trolley was an unexpected 
event which is external to the passenger and constituted an 
accident. The court denied the passenger's motion for summary 
222 
223 1992 WL 142399 (E.D. La. 1992). 
107 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
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judgment, however, since she still had to prove that an accident 
caused her injury. 
Padilla v Olympic Airways224 
Concluding that a passenger failed to sustain his burden of 
proving that he was injured as the result of an "accident" within 
the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the court 
entered judgment in favor of the carrier as to the passenger's 
claim that his injury from a fall in a lavatory during a flight from 
Athens, Greece to New York City, was caused by a violation of 
the carrier's rules by employees who served him between seven 
and nine beers. The court explained that in order to succeed on 
his theory, the passenger was required to prove that the 
continued service of alcohol to him during the flight was an 
"unusual or unexpected event" , noting Second Circuit 
authority225 for the proposition that the consumption of alcohol 
during travel, in and of itself, is not an unusual occurrence. 
Although the passenger argued that his injuries did not occur 
during the course of a routine or normal flight because 
permitting or causing him to become intoxicated was an obvious 
deviation from the norm, the court found no evidence that the 
224 
225 See Supra note 212. 
The court cited German-Bey v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 703 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1983). 
107 
carrier was aware of the passenger's alleged intoxication. The 
passenger did not establish that he requested the seven to nine 
beers from one flight attendant or that when he spoke to any of 
the flight attendants serving his section, if he spoke to them at 
all, he appeared so intoxicated that he should have been refused 
further alcohol. Moreover, the court pointed out, the flight 
attendant in charge of the passenger's section testified that he 
observed nothing abnormal in the passenger's gait or carriage. 
Given these circumstances, the court ruled, the passenger did 
not establish that the carrier's employees knew or should have 
known that to continue to serve the passenger alcoholic 
beverages was to expose him to danger or that the carrier's 
service of alcohol to him was anything but normal and routine; 
no unusual or unexpected event occurred before the passenger 
collapsed in the lavatory, and the evidence suggested that the 
injury sustained by the passenger was caused by his own 
internal reaction to his voluntary intoxication. 
2-7-2. Will detention or search a/passenger be an "accident" 
Can detention or search of a passenger be an "accident"? 
Probably yes. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision of Tseng,226 
226 
525 U.S. 155 (1999). 
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courts are divided for the outcomes, however, after Tseng, 
notice that there has no case particularly concerned this issue, 
the reasonable expect is that courts will interpret detention or 
search of passenger as a Warsaw Convention Article 17' s 
"accident" as long as the detention or search is unexpected or 
unusual. 
El Al Israel Airlines v Tseng227 
The Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that it disagreed with 
the lower court's conclusion, which was not before the Supreme 
Court, by concluding the routine security search to which Ms. 
Tseng was subjected was likely an 'accident.' Apparently, Ms. 
Tseng gave 'illogical' responses to routine questions during 
screening and was classified as a 'high risk' passenger.228 She 
was thus subjected to a security search pursuant to the carrier's 
security procedures, taken to a private room, and searched.229 
She was required to remove her jacket and sweater, and lower 
her blue jeans.230 A female security guard searched her entire 
body, including her breasts and her groin area.231 Of course, if 
the claimed 'illogical' answers that formed the basis for the 
227 S 
228 ee id. 
229 See Tseng, 122 F.3d at 10 l. 
230 See id. at 163, 164. 
231 See id. 
Id. 
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search were false, then an accident would exist, as it would 
constitute an abnormal operation and deviation from standard 
procedures. Stating that a security search of a passenger based 
solely on 'suspicion of circumstances' subjects the carrier to 
liability under Article 17.232 
Shen v. Japan Airlinei33 
Noting the Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning 
of "accident" in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention as a 
passenger's injury caused by an unexpected or unusual event or 
happening that is external to the passenger in Saks, a definition 
which the Supreme Court said should be flexibly applied after 
assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's 
injuries, the court found that the passengers' injuries, as 
described in their complaint, appeared to have been caused by 
unusual events, prolonged detention without food as well as 
search and seizure. Specifically, the complaint stated that the 
carrier, a Japanese airline, and another defendant falsely arrested 
and maliciously prosecuted the passengers by keeping them in a 
jail in Tokyo for over 15 hours without any food, illegally 
searched them and seized their passports and luggage, and then 
232 
233 See id, at 158. 
918 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. N.Y. 1994), aff'd without opinion, 43 F.3d 1459 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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forced them back to Shanghai, China. The passengers claimed 
that they were delayed in returning to the United States, suffered 
great pain of body and mind, and incurred expenses for traveling 
and medical attention as well as loss of time from work as a 
result of the defendants' actions. The court thus determined that 
all of the passengers' claims were governed by the Warsaw 
Convention. 
Thach v. China Airlines, Ltd. 234 
An action was brought against a carrIer for injuries 
allegedly suffered when a passenger was not allowed to board 
the carrier's flight from Taiwan to New York due to the mistaken 
belief of an employee of the carrier that the passenger held a 
fraudulent passport, which resulted in the passenger's detention 
by Taiwanese police, and the court stated that the weight of 
authority in the Southern District of New York was contrary to 
the passenger's argument that the incident giving rise to the 
action did not constitute an "accident" under the terms of Article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention. The court concluded, however, 
that since the plaintiffs did not suffer any physical injury, no 
recovery was available under Article 17 for any of their claims. 
234 




Curley v. American Airlines Inc. 235 
This case is a good example of different decisions, most 
likely, would be held if the case happened after Tseng. It was a 
diversity action against a carrier alleging negligence and false 
imprisonment brought by a passenger who claimed that he 
suffered psychological injury when Mexican customs authorities 
detained and searched him after an aircraft captain falsely 
identified him as having smoked marijuana in the aircraft 
lavatory, the court denied the carrier's motion for summary 
judgment in which the carrier contended that the passenger's 
causes of action for negligence and false imprisonment were 
preempted by the Warsaw Convention. In the instant case, the 
passenger alleged that the captain had been informed by the 
flight attendants of the passenger's suspected activity during 
descent and, on landing, advised the carrier's ground crew, 
which in tum informed Mexican customs authorities who 
detained and searched the passenger. Observing that the 
applicability of the Warsaw Convention to the passenger's 
claims turned on whether his injuries were caused by an 
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17, the court 
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determined that the captain's unfounded SUSpICIOn that the 
passenger had been smoking marijuana in the aircraft and the 
relaying after the landing of this suspicion to the carrier's ground 
crew did not constitute an accident within the contemplation of 
the signers of the Warsaw Convention. 
2-7-3. Will removal of passenger from aircraft be an "accident" 
Can removal of passenger from aircraft be an accident 
under Warsaw Convention Article l7? Some courts said yes, 
while others said no, depending on the particular circumstances 
of each case. 
S· . B' . h A . P'LC 236 Inca v. ntIs Irways . 
With respect to an airline passenger's claim under Article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention for the injuries she allegedly 
sustained when she was removed from the carrier's airplane by 
London, England Metropolitan Police, the court denied the 
carrier's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was a 
triable issue as to whether an accident within the meaning of 
Article 17 occurred. Agreeing that if the passenger refused an 
order to leave the aircraft, then that refusal and not the actions of 
236 




the carrier would be the proximate cause of her injury, the court 
found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
passenger, she did not refuse to voluntarily disembark the 
aircraft. As to the carrier's contention that it should not be held 
liable for the actions of the police, the court also found a triable 
issue of fact. If the passenger's version of the incident was found 
accurate by a jury and the carrier's employees gave police false 
information that led to the plaintiffs violent arrest, the court was 
of the opinion that the carrier could be liable for InjUrieS 
sustained by the passenger at the hands of the police. 
Cush v. B WI Intern. Airways, Ltd. 237 
Where a passenger brought an action under Article 17 of 
the Warsaw convention based on injuries allegedly sustained 
when Guyana immigration officials forcibly removed him from 
an international flight after he had boarded the aircraft and 
refused to deplane, the court granted the carrier's motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the passenger's injuries were 
not the result of an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17. 
It was alleged that the passenger was surrounded by five or six 
Immigration officials after he had taken a seat on the aircraft, 
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that the officials did not wear uniforms or badges and did not 
identify themselves, and that after he refused to leave 
voluntarily the immigration officials punched him, placed him in 
a choke hold, handcuffed him, and pushed him down the stairs 
to the tarmac. 
Noting that under Saks, a passenger need only prove that 
some link in the chain of causes of an injury was an unusual or 
unexpected event external to the passenger as long as that link is 
attributable to the cause of the incident and not merely to the 
occurrence itself, the court determined that it was not the 
unusual circumstances of the passenger's boarding that caused 
the altercation but rather the passenger's refusal to leave the 
plane after he was informed that he was not permitted to travel. 
Accepting that the passenger was not made aware that the 
individuals who sought to remove him were immigration 
officials, the court nevertheless found that the passenger should 
have been aware that the carrier had approved his removal since 
the carrier's representatives onboard did not intervene, thereby 
indicating their approval. The court opined that once the 
passenger was aware that his removal was officially sanctioned, 
he was obligated to depart the aircraft, adding that if the 
passenger had complied with that obligation he would not have 
115 
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been forcibly removed. In other words, the court said, when a 
passenger is forcibly removed after refusing to disembark at the 
request of airline officials or at the request of those authorized 
and accompanied by airline officials, the passenger's refusal to 
disembark, not the decision to remove the passenger, is the 
proximate cause of the passenger's injury. Furthermore, the court 
pointed out that the instant case involved a passenger who 
caused a disturbance because he refused to disembark at the 
request of immigration officials seeking relief based on the 
premise that the altercation that he himself instigated was an 
"unusual" occurrence. Were relief available to a disruptive 
passenger based on the proposition that the forcible removal was 
"unusual" or "unexpected," the court reasoned, disruptive 
passengers would be rewarded for their disruptions. 
Grimes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 238 
The court held that the removal of an international airline 
passenger from an aircraft by airport police after the passenger 
refused to comply with a request of the carrier's employee to 
move from his seat in an exit row because another passenger 
had been assigned the same seat, an event in which the 
~--------------
1999 WL 562244 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aft'd without opinion, 216 F.3d 1076 (3d Cir. 2000). 
116 
passenger allegedly was injured, was not an "accident" under 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Noting the Supreme 
Court's definition of that term as an unexpected or unusual event 
that is external to the passenger in Saks, the court found that 
whatever injuries the passenger suffered occurred because he 
was arrested, and he was arrested only because he refused to 
leave the aircraft voluntarily. 
Reasoning that the passenger would not have been 
handcuffed and taken off the aircraft had he left the aircraft 
when ordered to do so by the captain, the court stated that it did 
not matter if it was the captain's decision that initiated the chain 
of events leading to the passenger's arrest because the fact 
remained that it was entirely within the passenger's control 
whether he was arrested. The passenger's decision interrupted 
the captain's causal connection to the alleged injuries, the court 
remarked. Under Saks, the court said, it was necessary to look at 
the circumstances surrounding the incident and the passenger's 
behavior and decisions plainly were among the factors to be 
considered. Having precipitated the result, neither the Warsaw 
Convention nor equity permitted the passenger to recover from 





2-8. Events related to passenger's health 
2-8-1. Will passenger's pre-existing medical condition be an 
"accident" 
Can a passenger's pre-existing medical condition be an 
accident under Warsaw Convention Article 17? Usually the 
cases about this issue concerned passengers' heart attack, and 
the courts said "no", it is not a Warsaw Convention "accident". 
Rajcooar v. Air India Ltd. 239 
In an action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 
the court held that the death of a passenger, who suffered a heart 
attack during layover in an airport transit lounge utilized by 
several carriers and restricted to passengers who cleared 
customs and security checks, was not the result of an "accident" 
under Article 1 7 because a heart attack, under the definition of 
that term by the Supreme Court in Saks, was not an event 
external to the passenger. 
Rullman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 240 
239 89 F 
240 • Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. NY 2000). 





The court held that an airline passenger's fainting 
approximately 10 feet from the door of the aircraft on the jet 
way connecting the terminal and the plane did not constitute an 
"accident" under the Warsaw Convention, and declared that an 
event or occurrence is not an accident if it results solely from the 
stated health of a passenger and is unconnected with the carrier's 
flight. The passenger was on a flight from Rome to New York 
with a scheduled one-hour stopover in Ireland. The first leg of 
the flight was delayed by eight hours, during which time the 
passenger became ill, allegedly due to the crowded and 
unsanitary conditions in the terminal waiting room. She tried 
unsuccessfully to obtain medical treatment during the stopover. 
After approximately a three-hour delay in Ireland, the 
passengers were informed that their plane was disabled and that 
they would not continue their flight to New York until the 
following day; the passengers were told to retrieve their 
personal belongings from the plane, after which they would be 
taken into a hotel for the night. The passenger sustained injuries 
when she fainted while walking to the plane to retrieve her 
possessions. The court quoted with approval the definition of the 
district court in Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,241 that 
241 442 F. SUpp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
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an occurrence must be an unusual or unexpected happening to 
constitute an accident, and in the present case, it is not. 
2-8-2. Will carrier's personnel response to passenger's medical 
emergency be an "accident" 
Can a carrier's personnel response to passenger's medical 
emergency be an accident under Warsaw Convention Article l7? 
The courts are divided for the outcomes. The following cases 
are held to be "accident". 
01 . A' H' 242 ympzc zrways v usazn 
Holding that the requirement of an "accident" under Article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention was a condition precedent to an 
airline's liability for personal injury of a passenger is satisfied 
when the airline's unusual and unexpected refusal to assist a 
passenger is a link in a chain of causation resulting in 
aggravation of the passenger's pre-existing medical condition by 
exposure to a normal condition in the aircraft cabin, the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed an award of damages for the death of 
an asthmatic passenger after a flight attendant refused on three 
occasions the passenger's request to move to a seat further from 
242 
540 u.s. 644 (2004). 
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the smoking section. Under the facts of the case, the decedent, 
who was sensitive to second-hand smoke, and his spouse 
requested and obtained seats away from the smoking section on 
the airline's international flight. After boarding the flight, the 
decedent's spouse discovered that their seats were only three 
rows in front of the smoking section and asked a flight attendant 
to move the decedent, but was told to "have a seat." Prior to 
takeoff, after all passengers had boarded, the decedent's spouse 
again asked the flight attendant to move the decedent and 
explained that the decedent was allergic to smoke, but the flight 
attendant refused because the plane was totally full and that she 
was too busy to help. After takeoff, the decedent was 
surrounded by ambient cigarette smoke, and the flight attendant 
refused to move the decedent, stating erroneously that the plane 
was full, that the decedent could exchange seats with another 
passenger, but that the decedent's spouse would have to ask 
other passengers without assistance from the crew. The decedent 
died about two hours into the flight after moving toward the 
front of the plane to get some fresher air. Affirming the Ninth 
Circuit's ruling243 that the flight attendant's refusal to reseat the 
decedent was an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 
243 
Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 538 U.S. 1056, 123 S. 
Ct. 2215,155 L. Ed. 2d 1105 (2003) and affd, 540 U.S. 644,124 S. Ct. 1221, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1146, 
4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004). 
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because the flight attendant's refusal to reseat the decedent was 
clearly external to the decedent and was an unexpected and 
unusual in light of industry standards, the court noted that the 
airline did not challenge the district court's ruling244 that the 
flight attendant's conduct was unusual or unexpected in light of 
the relevant industry standard or the airline's own company 
policy. The court rejected the airline's contention that the flight 
attendant's conduct was irrelevant for purposes of the "accident" 
inquiry and that the only relevant event was the presence of 
ambient cigarette smoke in the aircraft's cabin. Acknowledging 
that the presence of ambient cigarette smoke during an 
international flight might have been "normal" at the time of the 
flight in question, the court said that the airline's argument that 
the "injury producing event" inquiry, which looks to the precise 
factual event that caused the injury, neglected the reality that 
there are often multiple interrelated factual events that combine 
to cause any injury. The court stated that anyone factual event 
may thus be a link in the chain of causes and, so long as it is 
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Fishman by Fishman v Delta Airlines, Inc. 245 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that 
both the scalding of a child by a stewardess attempting to 
alleviate the passenger's earache and the emotional injuries 
alleged by the child's mother were caused by an "accident" 
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. On 
the defendant carrier's international flight from Tel Aviv, Israel 
to New York City, the child, who had a cold, suffered from the 
change of air pressure. The stewardess suggested that a cup 
containing a warm cloth be placed over the ear and, when the 
poultice was applied to the child's ear, scalding water in the cup 
dripped on the child's neck and shoulder, causing bums. 
In an effort to take their claim outside the Warsaw 
Convention and avoid the result of the district court's ruling, 
dismissal of the claims because the two-year limitations period 
for bringing suit under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention 
had expired, the plaintiffs attempted to cast their claims chiefly 
in terms of the tortious refusal of medical care that happened 
afterward and argued that the claims did not arise out of the 
normal operation of aircraft, and in any event were not 
accidental in nature. The appellate court approved the district 
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court's reasoning that the underpinning of both claims was the 
scalding of the child by the flight attendant, an unexpected event 
that was external to both plaintiffs. Although the plaintiffs 
contended that the child suffered serial colds and ear infections 
and had narrow eustachian tubes, all of which predisposed her to 
earaches caused by a change of pressure on the aircraft, the 
appellate court agreed with the district court's reasoning that the 
injury in the instant case was not the child's earache, but rather 
the application of scalding water to treat it. The appellate court 
thus found that, although the earache was caused by a change in 
air pressure, which was part of the normal operation of the 
aircraft and not an accident, all the harm alleged by the plaintiffs 
flowed from the scalding, which was easily seen as accidental. 
Turturro v Continental Airlinei46 
The court held that an airline passenger's allegations that 
the carrier falsely imprisoned her, defamed her, and caused her 
to suffer emotional distress in connection with her request to 
deplane prior to departure because of anxiety she experienced 
on realizing that her anti-anxiety medication had been stolen at 
the airport were within broad definition of "accident" under 
246 
128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D. NY 2001). 
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Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Specifically, the court 
found, the accident included the carrier's act of delaying the 
return to the gate and its employees' comments directed to the 
passenger and her fellow passengers. 
McCaskey v Continental Airlines. Inc. 247 
An action brought against a carrier under the Warsaw 
Convention on behalf of a passenger who allegedly suffered a 
stroke onboard an aircraft during a domestic leg of an 
international flight and subsequently died, the court denied the 
carrier's motion for summary judgment, holding that a 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that an "accident" within 
the meaning of Article 17 occurred based any or all of three 
types of events alleged by the plaintiff: (1) rude treatment of the 
plaintiff and the passenger by the carrier's gate attendant prior to 
boarding, (2) a malfunction of the aircraft which caused the 
cabin temperature to rise uncomfortably and delayed the flight's 
departure, and (3) the flight crew's inappropriate response to the 
passenger's stroke. The plaintiff alleged that after the passenger's 
stroke symptoms appeared, a fellow passenger who was a 
registered nurse took control of the situation and the carrier's 
247 
159 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
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personnel contacted a contractor which provided medical advice 
during in-flight medical emergencies. Oxygen was administered 
to the passenger, but because of concerns about supply, the flow 
was reduced below 100%. A physician employed by the 
contractor expressed the opinion, based on an inaccurate belief 
that the aircraft was closer to its destination than it was, that the 
flight need not be diverted. Stating that it was inclined to agree 
that a failure to divert is not ipso facto an accident under Article 
17, the court nevertheless said it was unwilling to hold that a 
failure to divert can never present a jury question, particularly in 
view of the Supreme Court's mandate in Saks, that courts 
flexibly apply the definition of an accident after an assessment 
of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's injury. 
G A . A' z· 248 upta v ustrzan lr mes 
The court denied the defendant carrier's motion for 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim under the Warsaw 
Convention for the death of their decedent who suffered a heart 
attack on a the carrier's international flight, holding that it could 
not be said, as a matter of law, that in the context of all the 
CIrcumstances surrounding the decedent's death, the carrier's 
248 
211 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
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allegedly inadequate procedures in rendering medical assistance 
did not constitute an "accident" under Article 17. 
Kemelman v Delta Air Lines, Inc. 249 
Reversing the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant carrier on the plaintiffs 
claim under the Warsaw Convention for the death of an airline 
passenger who suffered a heart attack on an international flight, 
the court held that, contrary to the carrier's contention, the 
plaintiffs response to the carrier's summary judgment motion 
raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the passenger's demise 
was caused by an accident under Article 17. Based on 
deposition testimony and affidavits submitted by the plaintiff in 
opposition to the carrier's motion, the court found that it could 
not be said, as a matter of law, that the routine procedures which 
the carrier's employees followed in response to the passenger's 
medical situation were carried out in a reasonable manner. The 
court pointed out that an injury resulting from routine 
procedures in the operation of an aircraft can be an accident if 
the procedures or operations are carried out in an unreasonable 
manner.250 
249 
250 293 A.D. 2d 576, 740 N.Y.S.2d 434 (2d Dep't 2002). 




The courts held, under the circumstances of the following 
cases, that the alleged failure of a carrier's personnel to properly 
respond to the medical emergency of a passenger on an 
international flight was insufficient to show or support an 
allegation as to the occurrence of an accident as that term is used 
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. 
Horvath v. Deutsche Lufthansa, Ag251 
The court held that an airline passenger did not suffer an 
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention when, after ingesting salmon served by the 
defendant carrier and experiencing an allergic reaction, a fellow 
passenger-physician administered the drug "Tiaphlin" which 
caused the passenger further difficulty. In view of the 
passenger's concessions that the carrier acted properly in 
eliciting the assistance of the physician-passenger and the 
physician's response was entirely within the best tradition of the 
profession, the court ruled that the administration of Tiaphlin or 
any other drug to a passenger who was experiencing an allergic 
reaction was not an "accident" separate and independent from 
251 




ingestion of the salmon under the definition of that term by the 
Supreme Court in Saks, as an unusual or unexpected event 
external to the passenger. The court recognized that under 
certain circumstances, a carrier's response to and treatment or 
lack thereof of a passenger's in-flight medical emergency may 
constitute an accident, but explained that without a claim that 
the carrier departed from ordinary procedures with respect to the 
passenger's treatment and in light of the passenger's admissions 
to the contrary, no reasonable jury could conclude that the 
administration of a drug by a physician-passenger constituted an 
accident under the Warsaw Convention. 
Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlinei52 
The behavior of a carrier's personnel m response to a 
passenger's in-flight chest pain, specifically, the failure to divert 
the flight in order to provide the passenger medical care did not 
qualify as an "accident" as defined under Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention, the court held. The passenger contended 
that the carrier's failure to act caused permanent damage to his 
heart that would not have occurred if the carrier had diverted the 
flight so that proper medical treatment could have been obtained 
252--------
244 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 
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sooner. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the 
passenger experienced chest pains shortly after the flight 
departed Budapest, Hungary for New York, and requested 
assistance from the carrier's crew. The crew located a 
passenger-physician who injected a painkiller and checked the 
passenger's vital signs on several occasions, observing no 
change. After administering the injection, the physician 
informed the pilot that although the passenger appeared to be 
feeling better, he could not predict how the passenger would feel 
during the remainder of the flight. The pilot decided not to 
divert the flight to England so that the passenger could receive 
medical treatment based on consultation with the 
physician-passenger. The passenger claimed at trial that he 
asked a crew member to divert the flight to England, but in 
contrast the carrier claimed that both the passenger and the 
physician-passenger felt diversion was unnecessary. The court 
found, on the basis of the trial testimony and the corresponding 
record that the passenger did not meet the burden of proving a 
violation of operational standards by the carrier's personnel. 
According to the carrier's procedures for tending to sick 
passengers, the absolute decision-making authority to divert the 
plane was left to the captain, who was required to endeavor to 
130 
obtain a medical opinion from a passenger, determine whether 
the sick passenger required urgent medical assistance, and if so, 
contact the nearest suitable airport and make preparations for an 
emergency landing. The court regarded the carrier's procedures 
substantially similar to industry standards. According to the 
court, the pilot's decision to continue with the flight was a 
decision made after taking into account, in addition to all other 
considerations of safety and convenience of other persons on 
board, the overall thrust of the physician's advice that the 
passenger appeared stable and that his condition did not warrant 
diversion of the flight. The court was unpersuaded that the 
passenger proved that the pilot gathered insufficient information 
to make his decision Regardless of whether the physician 
conveyed the passenger's medical history to the pilot, the court 
pointed out, there was no evidence that the pilot's decision 
would have been any different, especially since the physician 
was not a cardiac specialist and may not have known the 
necessary implications of the passenger's prior medical history. 
The court was also unpersuaded that even if the passenger 
actually made a request to divert the flight, the request was 
demonstrative enough to indicate that his medical condition was 
so severe as to warrant an emergency diversion. The passenger's 
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single request to one crew member, not specifically adopted or 
endorsed by the physician who assessed his medical condition, 
was not sufficient to establish an urgent matter, the court 
reasoned, and his failure to repeat himself could have been 
reasonably interpreted by others on board either as a change of 
mind or as a signal that his condition had improved or was not 
sufficiently severe in the first place. Consequently, the court was 
unable to conclude that the carrier ignored the passenger's 
requests for a diversion in a manner that violated its own 
policies or procedures or any relevant industry standard. 
Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co.! Ltd. 253 
The Third Circuit court held that the alleged acts and 
omissions of an airline and its employees in responding to a 
passenger's attack from a preexisting hiatal hernia during a 
routine flight did not constitute an "accident" for which the 
Warsaw Convention imposed liability on the carrier. The 
passenger and his wife testified that the passenger could 
alleviate an attack by a "self-help" remedy and by lying down, 
and that the wife asked a flight attendant for a place where he 
could lie down and employ his remedy, but he was advised that 
253-------
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there were no empty seats. Discovery revealed, however, that 
there were nine empty seats in the first-class section. The 
passenger alleged that without the opportunity to employ 
self-help his condition worsened, and he was hospitalized on 
arriving at his destination. The court of appeals reiterated the 
definition of "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 set 
forth in DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,254 as an 
event, a physical circumstance, which unexpectedly takes place 
not according to the usual course of things; if the event on board 
an airplane is an ordinary, expected, and usual occurrence, then 
it cannot be termed an accident; to constitute an accident, the 
occurrence on board the aircraft must be unusual, or unexpected, 
an unusual or unexpected happening. 
The appellate court rejected the passenger's argument that, 
although the airline did not cause his hiatal hernia injury, the 
alleged aggravation of the injury by the airline employees' acts 
and omissions constituted an unusual or unexpected happening 
within the definition. Emphasizing that the injury was suffered 
during the course of a routine and normal flight, the appellate 
court stated that, in the absence of proof of abnormal external 
factors, aggravation of a preexisting injury during the course of 
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a routine and normal flight should not be considered an accident 
within the meaning of Article 17. The appellate court stated 
further that the injury the passenger suffered was not a risk 
either associated with or inherent in aircraft operation. Although 
affirming the entry of summary judgment for the airline on the 
Warsaw Convention claim, the court of appeals vacated the 
entry of summary judgment for the airline on the passenger's 
state law claims and remanded the action. 
Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlinei55 
Rejecting a carrier's claim that a passenger's state law claim 
of negligence, based on the failure of the crew of an aircraft on 
an international flight to make an unscheduled landing to treat 
the passenger's heart attack, was preempted by the Warsaw 
Convention because the incident was an "accident" within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the Eleventh 
Circuit stated that if, in the instant case, the aggravating event 
was the continuation of the flight from its scheduled point of 
departure to its scheduled point of arrival, then it seemed clear 
that the aggravation injury arose not from an unexpected or 
unusual happening, but rather from the passenger's own internal 
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reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the 
aircraft. 
The appellate court identified the relevant event by asking 
what precise event or events allegedly caused the damage 
sustained by the passenger and found it clear that, if the 
passenger in the instant case suffered damage as a result of any 
external event, that event was the continuation of the flight and 
the resultant delay in hospitalization. Acknowledging that the 
question was close, the appellate court was convinced that the 
proper approach was indeed to look at a purely factual 
description of the events that allegedly caused the aggravation 
injury suffered by the passenger. The appellate court stated that 
such an approach was in accord with the plain meaning of the 
phrase "event or happening" as used in the definition of 
"accident" in Saks. In addition, the appellate court thought that 
looking at the factual events, as opposed to an assertion of "crew 
negligence," was in accord with the design of the Warsaw 
Convention, which provides carriers a "due care" defense.256 
Having provided for a defense turning on the absence of 
256 Under Article 20( 1) of the Warsaw Convention, carriers may defend claims on the grounds that 
they took all necessary measures to avoid a passenger's injury or that it was impossible to take 
su~h measures. The appellate court noted that the Montreal Agreement requires carriers to waive 
~s "d~e care" defense for international flights that originate, terminate, or have stopping points in 
fe Umted States, but found that waiver immaterial to its rationale with respect to the occurrence 
o an accident. . 
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negligence, the appellate court thought it unlikely that the 
drafters of the Warsaw Convention intended that the initial 
"accident" inquiry be resolved by reference to negligence, both 
because the word "accident" is located in a separate article and 
because determining the occurrence of an accident involves an 
inquiry into the nature of the event that caused the injury rather 
than the care taken by the airline to avert the injury. The court of 
appeals thus concluded that looking solely to a factual 
description of the aggravating event in the instant case, the 
continuation of the flight to its scheduled point of arrival, 
compelled a conclusion that the aggravation injury was not 
caused by an unusual or unexpected event or happening that was 
external to the passenger. 
2-8-3. Will health risks of international flights be an "accident" 
Approximately 30,000 people a year succumb to 
pulmonary emboli triggered by blood clots, and 100/0 of victims 
are alleged to have developed Deep vein thrombosis (DVT) 
following a long haul flight. DVT is an abnormal formation of 
blood clots that may travel through the blood stream to the heart 
or lungs and cause serious injury. Medical evidence is currently 





studies suggest that there is no connection at all, nevertheless, 
whatever it is, DVT already be the subject of lawsuits 
worldwide and fast becoming a major issue in aviation litigation. 
Courts have suddenly had to classify this ailment under existing 
rules, the main issue is whether DVT is an "accident" per 
Warsaw-Montreal System. The cases below led to widespread 
press coverage of "economy class syndrome", which is 
something of a misnomer as the condition has also occurred 
amongst first-class travelers. 
Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia Ltd. 257 
The court held that an airline passenger's development of 
deep vein thrombosis (DVT) during an international flight 
resulted from the passenger's own internal reaction to the 
aircraft's usual, normal, and expected operation, rather than from 
an unexpected or unusual event, and thus was not caused by an 
"accident" within the meaning of the provision of the Warsaw 
Convention addressing air carrier liability for harm to 
passengers, notwithstanding the passenger's lack of a 
pre-existing condition when she boarded the airplane. 
257 
383 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1665 (U.S. 2005), affmning Rodriguez v. 
ADsett Australia Ltd., 2002 WL 32153953 (C.D: Cal. 2002). 
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In an action under the Warsaw Convention by an airline 
passenger who suffered a stroke after taking an international 
flight that he alleged was caused by a deep vein thrombosis that 
was the result of an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17, 
specifically, that the design of the seat's leg rest restricted blood 
flow to his legs and that his business class seat was so 
comfortable that he did not want to get up, the court granted the 
carriers' motion for summary judgment, holding that a 
comfortable seat with a leg rest was not an unexpected or 
unusual event in business class and thus could not qualify as an 
accident. 
Miller v. Continental Airlinei59 
Where international airline passengers asserted, in their 
actions against carriers under the Warsaw Convention, that as a 
result of the carriers' seating configurations, the passengers 
developed Deep Vein Thrombosis either during or after the 
flight, the court granted the carriers' motion to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b )(6) for failure to state a claim on 
which relief can be granted, holding that the allegations that the 
258 
259 2003 WL 22769110 (D. Alaska 2003). 




passengers' injuries resulted from an "accident" under Article 17 
were unacceptably vague and conclusory. At most, the court 
observed, the passengers made only passing and conclusory 
reference to the carriers' negligent design, construction, and 
transportation. Nevertheless, the court refused to dismiss the 
passengers' claims under the Warsaw Convention with prejudice 
because it was unable to conclude that the passengers would be 
unable to amend their complaints with additional and consistent 
facts to supply a ground for relief. The passengers were 
accordingly granted leave to amend their complaints, and the 
court advised that they would be required to present a factual 
basis for any allegation that the accident was unusual or 
unexpected. 
Pavey v. Qantas Airways Ltd260 (Australian Case) 
The High Court of Australia in a joint judgment affirming 
QANTAS Ltd v. Povey,261 in which the appellant alleged that, 
"during the course of or following the flights" from Sydney to 
London and return, he suffered from deep venous thrombosis 
(DVT) , "caused by the conditions of and procedures relating to 
passenger travel upon the flights," including cramped seating 
260 
261 2005 WL 1460709 (RCA 2005). 







from which it was not easy to move, the discouraging of 
movement about the cabin, and the offering of alcohol, tea, and 
coffee during the flights, held that the allegations which the 
appellant makes, if proved, would not establish a cause of action 
against the carriers. 
The court noted that that conclusion is consistent with the 
decisions reached in intermediate courts of appeal in the United 
States and in England about the application of the Warsaw 
Convention and subsequent treaties to cases of DVT. The court 
noted that in the Deep Vein Thrombosis case infra, the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales held that the word "accident" in 
the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Hague Protocol was 
to be given a natural and sensible, but also flexible and 
purposive, meaning in its context and that for there to be an 
accident within the meaning of the relevant article, there had to 
be an event external to the passenger which impacted on the 
body in a manner which caused death or bodily injury and the 
event had to be unusual, unexpected, or untoward. The 
conditions In which passengers travelled on flights (with 
cramped seating and the like) were not capable of amounting to 
an event that satisfied the first limb of the definition of an 
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accident which "took place on board the aircraft or in the course 
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." 
The High Court of Australia further noted that in the United 
States, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Blansett v. 
Continental Airlines, Inc.,262 and the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia Ltd.,263 have 
also held that development of DVT was not, in the 
circumstances alleged in those cases, an accident within the 
meaning of the Warsaw Convention. Although the appellant 
sought to gain some comfort from a statement made in the 
opinion in Rodriguez to the effect that the court did not need to 
decide whether an airline's failure to warn ofDVT can constitute 
an accident, that aspect of the court's opinion was no more than 
a reflection of the narrowness of the issue tendered for its 
decision, and it is not, as the appellant's argument tended to 
suggest, to be translated into any positive proposition of law. For 
these reasons, it was held that appeal to the High Court should 
be dismissed with costs. 
262 
263 379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 672, 160 L. Ed. 2d 498 (U.S. 2004). 
See supra note 257. ' 
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Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, Ri64 
(UK Case) 
Where a group of international airline passengers alleging 
that a group of carriers was liable to them under the Warsaw 
Convention for the occurrence of deep vein thrombosis (DVT) 
resulting from traveling in the carrier's aircraft, the United 
Kingdom court held that the alleged provision of cramped 
seating, inadequate air pressure, and uncomfortable atmosphere 
and temperature in the cabin, integral features of carriage 
pertaining throughout the flight, were not capable of amounting 
to an accident for purposes of Article 17. The existence of those 
permanent features of the aircraft or the subjecting of the 
passengers to carriage in an aircraft with those features was not 
capable of amounting an event that satisfied the first limb of the 
definition of an accident taking place on board an aircraft or in 
the course of any of the operations of embarking or 
disembarking, the court stated. For that reason alone, the court 
concluded, the flight itself, even assuming that it caused the 
DVT, was not capable of amounting to an accident under Article 
17. 
264--------
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2-8-4. Will failure to warn the risks associated with 
international flight be an "accident" 
Whether failure to warn the risks associated with 
international flight could be a Warsaw Convention Article 17' s 
"accident", the global courts said "no", except one US case, 
Miller (infra), the court held differently. These cases are mainly 
concerned about DVT as well, except one case, re UAL Corp 
(infra), concerned the issue of exposure to pesticides. 
Miller v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 265 
Allegations of international airline passengers In their 
amended complaints that the failure of the defendant carriers 
failed to warn them of risk of deep vein thrombosis (DVT) 
despite the customary procedure and policy of the carriers to 
warn passengers of the risks of contracting DVT during lengthy 
flights and to warn or advise of the simple steps that passengers 
could take to minimize the risks of DVT constituted an 
"accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention were 
sufficient, the court held, to withstand the carriers' motion to 
dismiss the passengers' Warsaw Convention claims under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. Rule 12(b)( 6) for failure to state a claim on which relief 
265 
2003 WL 21557678 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
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can be granted. The court rejected as immaterial the carrier's 
argument that the passengers' allegations had no factual basis 
since, under Saks, the occurrence of an accident IS a 
fact-intensive inquiry that should be flexibly applied after 
assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's 
injuries, an evaluation not appropriate on a motion to dismiss. 
Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia Ltd. 266 
The court held that the air carrier's alleged failure to warn 
the passenger about the risks of developing deep vein 
thrombosis CDVT) during long flights was not an "accident" 
within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, given the 
absence of evidence of either an industry standard or airline 
policy requiring the air carrier to issue such warnings, and of a 
showing that the air carrier's conduct rose to the level of an 
unexpected or unusual event or happening external to the 
passenger, who developed DVT during the international flight. 
L . B·· h A . L d 267 Owe v. ntls lrways, t. 
Holding that a carrier's alleged failure to warn an 
international airline passenger of the risk of deep vein 
266 
267 383 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1665 (U.S. 2005). 
2003 WL 22769110 (D. Alaska 2003). . 
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thrombosis (DVT) associated with long periods of sitting was 
not an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention, the court granted the carriers' motion for 
summary judgment in an action under the Warsaw Convention 
alleging that the passenger suffered a stroke after his flight 
caused by a blood clot which had traveled to his brain. A failure 
to warn, the court ruled, cannot constitute an unexpected or 
unusual event in the absence, as in the instant case, of an 
established industry standard to do so. The passenger presented 
the affidavit of an expert to show the existence of an industry 
standard to warn but, the court emphasized, noticeably absent in 
that affidavit was any reference to an industry standard in place 
in 2000 when the flight in question was taken by the passenger. 
Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 268 
The plaintiff, who traveled from Houston, Texas, to 
London, England on a flight operated by the defendant, during 
the flight, suffered an episode of deep vein thrombosis ("DVT"), 
resulting in a cerebral stroke that left him permanently 
debilitated, sued the defendant, alleging that it was liable for his 
injury under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, to which the 
26& 
379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 672, 160 L. Ed. 2d 498 (U.S. 2004), 
reversing Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
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United States is a signatory, held that the defendant's failure to 
provide DVT warnings and instructions could not have 
constituted an "accident" under Article 17. The pertinent 
question was whether the defendant's failure to provide 
warnmgs and instructions concernmg DVT could have 
constituted a covered "accident" under Article 17. The court 
noted that because the Convention was written in French and 
against the background of French law, the Supreme Court has 
looked to French law to interpret the meaning of "accident" in 
Article 17 (citing Saks). In French law, "accident" is usually 
given to mean a "fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended 
event." The Supreme Court noted, accordingly, that an accident 
under Article 17 is an "unexpected or unusual event.. .. " The 
Supreme Court also noted that the Convention speaks of an 
"accident which caused" an injury rather than an accident that is 
an injury, and accordingly, a qualifying "unusual or unexpected 
event" must be distinct from "the passenger's own internal 
reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the 
aircraft." The court noted that in Olympic Airways v. Husain,269 
the Supreme Court concluded that, under some circumstances, 
an "accident" may constitute an omission or refusal to act. The 
269 540 u.s. 644,124 S. Ct. 1221, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004). 
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court noted that the situation in the instant case differs markedly 
from that in Husain. Here, no request was made of the airline; 
the flight staff was entirely passive. The Supreme Court noted 
that facts similar to those here are at least distinguishable from 
those in Husain. Justice Scalia's dissent pointed to decisions in 
several foreign jurisdictions concluding that a failure to warn 
and instruct ofDVT risks is not an "event" under Article 17. The 
Supreme Court stated that the failure to give warning in the 
foreign Warsaw Convention cases involving DVT, as 
distinguished from a specific refusal to lend requested aid in 
Husain, was enough to prevent conflict between them. The court 
held that the defendant's failure to warn of DVT was not an 
"unusual or unexpected event" and not a qualifying "accident." 
The court noted that though many international carriers in 2001 
included DVT warnings, it was undisputed that many did not, 
and, moreover, the defendant's battery of warnings was in 
accord with the policies of the Federal Aviation Administration 
("FAA"), which prescribes what warnings airlines should issue 
to passengers. The court thus held that no jury may be permitted 
to find that the defendant's failure to warn of DVT constituted 
an "accident" under Article 17, as the defendant's policy was far 
from unique in 2001 and was fully in accord with the 
147 
expectations of the FAA, and its procedures were neither 
unexpected nor unusual. 
Re UAL Corp. 270 
The court held that personal injuries that the airline 
passenger allegedly sustained due to her exposure to pesticides 
applied in furtherance of the airline's legal obligation to 
exterminate insects that might be present on planes flying to 
Australia and New Zealand did not result from any 
"unexpected" or "unusual" event, as required for injuries to arise 
from an "accident" and to be compensable under the Warsaw 
Convention, though the passenger may not have been aware that 
the airline routinely applied such pesticides in planes flying to 
Australia and New Zealand as a result of the airline's failure to 
inform her of this fact; accordingly, the personal injury claim 
filed in the debtor-airline's Chapter 11 case for such injuries had 
to be disallowed, as invalid under governing law. 
Pavey v Qantas Airways, Ltd. 271 (Australian Case) 
A joint judgment of the High Court of Australia held that 
the alleged failure of the carrier to provide the passenger with 
270 31 
271 0 B.R. 373,43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
2005 WL 1460709 (HCA 2005). . 
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information or any warnmg about the risks of DVT did not 
constitute an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17. The 
joint judgment noted that references to "failure" to warn in this 
context were irrelevant and unhelpful. They were irrelevant 
because they had to proceed from unstated premises about the 
content or origin of some duty to warn. The joint judgment 
noted that there was no basis for introducing, for example, 
concepts of the common law of negligence to the construction or 
application of an international treaty like Montreal No.4. The 
joint judgment noted that unless there is resort to some standard 
of legal behavior to determine whether what happened was a 
"failure," the description of what happened as a failure is, in 
truth, no more than an assertion that there was no warning. The 
joint judgment further noted that the references to failure were 
unhelpful because they suggested that the only point at which 
some relevant warning could or should have been given was on 
board the aircraft. But if some warning was necessary or 
appropriate, it is not apparent why it should not have been given 
at a much earlier point of making arrangements to travel by air, 
rather than on board the aircraft. Further, the joint judgment 
noted, reference to failure was unhelpful because it diverts 
attention from what it is that happened on board to what might 
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have, could have, or perhaps should have happened there and 
why that should be so; if it is appropriate to ask "what happened 
on board?" the answer in this case is that the appellant alleged 
that nothing unexpected or unusual happened there. 
The lower court in Qantas Ltd. v Povey,272 noted that 
following the definition of the word "accident" by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Saks, the word accident requires proof of a 
specific incident or occurrence that can be characterized as 
fortuitous. Noting that the passenger's allegations started out in 
relatively simple terms largely derived from a description of the 
flight conditions particularized in five different but cumulative 
ways and a bald allegation that there was "an accident which 
took place on board the aircraft," the lower court said an 
allegation that the passenger had not been provided with any 
information or warning about the risk ofDVT or about measures 
to reduce that risk, on its own, certainly could not amount to an 
accident. The reason, the lower court declared, was not only that 
it referred to a nonevent and mere inaction, but also that it 
described a state of affairs which did not change from the start 
to the end of each flight. On their own or in combination, the 
flight conditions alleged by the passenger seemed far removed 
272 
2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 2003), affmned by 2005 WL 1460709 (HCA 2005). 
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from the description of an accident given in Saks because they 
were merely the broad description of circumstances attending 
the flights. At the end of the day, the lower court commented, 
one was left with a description of the conditions and 
circumstances of the flight rather than anything that could in 
ordinary language be described as an event, occurrence, and 
more particularly, an accident. Moreover, the lower court stated, 
the concentr~tion on the carrier's behavior and whether it was 
either expected or unexpected, or usual or unusual, missed the 
point because Article 17 is directed toward the occurrence of an 
accident which must take place on board the aircraft. It was thus 
irrelevant, the lower court continued, who caused the accident. 
The strict or presumptive liability of Article 17 does not seek an 
answer to that question as long as the accident occurs in one of 
the designated places, which is why acts of hijackers satisfy 
Article 17 although there may be no responsibility in common 
law on the part of the carrier. If the allegations in the instant 
case go at all beyond nonaction, the lower court concluded, they 
must consist in the describing of the alleged circumstances in 
colored terms such that the alleged behavior becomes unusual or 







accident, i.e., a fact, event, happening, or incident of a fortuitous 
kind for which Article 17 otherwise provides compensation. 
McDonald v. Korean Air273 (Canadian Case) 
An action under the Warsaw Convention by an airline 
passenger against a carrier for injury caused by deep vein 
thrombosis (DVT) during an international flight, the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice held that the failure of the carrier to 
warn and educate passengers on lengthy flights that they may be 
exposed to DVT did not constitute an unusual and unexpected 
operation of the aircraft, that the failure did not mark a breach of 
duty of care of carriers to their passengers, and that the breach 
of such duty was not an accident within the meaning of Article 
17. While noting that a carrier may be negligent in not advising 
passengers of the risk they assume, the court said that such 
negligence is not in itself an accident within the meaning of 
Article 17 in the sense that the DVT sustained by the passenger 
was not linked to an unusual or unexpected event external to the 
passenger. 
273 2002 WL 1861837 (Ont. S.C.J. 2002), surmnarily affirmed by, 2003 WL 8203 (Ont. c.A. 
2003), leave to appeal refused by, 2003 WL 22006338 (Can. 2003). 
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!2eep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, Ri74 
(UK Case) 
The United Kingdom held in an action by a group of 
international airline passengers alleging that a group of carriers 
was liable to them for the occurrence of deep vein thrombosis 
(DVT) resulting from traveling in the carrier's aircraft, that the 
failure to warn of the risk of DVT or to advise on precautions 
which would avoid or minimize that risk could not be 
categorized as an accident under Article 17. Rather, the court 
explained, it was simply something that did not happen, a 
nonevent. 
2-9. Other events 
2-9-1. Can the conduct of another passenger be an "accident" 
Can the conduct of another passenger be an accident under 
Warsaw Convention Art. 177 Under the pressure of 
Warsaw-Montreal System's power of exclusivity, smce 
recovery for personal injury if not allowed under Warsaw 
Convention, is not available at all,275 courts usually interpret the 
meaning of "accident" in a broad fashion after the US Supreme 
274 
275 2003 WL 21353471 (CA (Civ Div) 2003). 
See Tseng, 525 u.s. at 161, (1999). 
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Court's decision of Tseng. From 1999 to present date, only one 
case held the conduct of other passenger was not an Article 17's 
"accident", 0' Grady infra. 
Schneider v Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd. 276 
The court stated that the full reclining of two seats in front 
of the plaintiff, coupled with the refusal of the occupants of the 
seats to raise their seats when requested to do so, and the refusal 
of the flight attendant to intervene when requested to do so, 
could be considered by the fact-finders to have been external to 
the plaintiff and beyond the usual, normal, and expected 
operation of an aircraft and, finding that genuine issues of 
material fact remained as to whether the carrier's personnel 
refused to intervene, denied the carrier's motion for summary 
judgment, in which the carrier claimed that the plaintiffs injury 
was not caused by an "accident" within the meaning of Article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention. 
Wallace v Korean Air277 
Holding that sexual molestation by a fellow passenger 
constituted an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the 
276 
277 686 F. Supp. 15 (D. Me. 1988). 
214 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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Warsaw Convention, the Second Circuit reversed the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the carrier 
in the plaintiffs action under the Warsaw Convention based on 
an incident in which the person sitting next to her unzipped and 
unbuttoned her shorts and placed his hand in her underpants 
while she slept. The court remarked that the struggle with the 
Supreme Court's definition of "accident" in Saks, as an 
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the 
passenger is particularly difficult where putative injuries are 
caused by torts committed by fellow passengers. Without taking 
a position on the propriety of the standard applied by the district 
court, that an accident under Article 17 must arise from risks 
that are characteristic of air travel, the court found that even 
under that narrow approach, an accident occurred in the instant 
case. It was plain, the court thought, that the characteristics of 
air travel increased the plaintiffs vulnerability to the fellow 
passenger's assault: when she took her seat, she was cramped 
into a confined space beside two men she did not know, one of 
whom turned out to be a sexual predator, the lights were turned 
down, and the sexual predator was left unsupervised in the dark. 
Equally important, in the court's view, was the manner in which 
the fellow passenger was able to carry out his assault. The court 
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pointed out that his actions could not have been brief even for 
the nimblest of fingers, and they could not have been entirely 
inconspicuous yet for the entire duration of the attack not a 
single flight attendant noticed a problem. Finally, the court said 
it was not insignificant that when the plaintiff awoke, she could 
not get away immediately and had to endure another attack 
before clambering out into the aisle. 
Lahey v Singapore Airlines, Ltd. 27s 
Where the plaintiff, a passenger on an international flight, 
sought damages under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention for 
injuries sustained in an alleged assault by a fellow passenger, 
the court held that the assault in the instant case was an 
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17. The fellow 
passenger, who was seated behind the plaintiff, pushed and 
kicked the back of the plaintiffs seat on several occasions. 
Refusing to switch seats, the fellow passenger subsequently 
punched the plaintiff through a gap in her row of seats, threw a 
food tray at her, and struck her head with a plastic entree dish 
causing a laceration of the plaintiffs scalp. The plaintiff pressed 
charges against the fellow passenger and he was arrested when 
;=-8 -------
115 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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the aircraft landed. Contrary to the position the carrier advanced 
at trial, the court said the actions of the crew were not relevant 
to a determination of whether the assault was an "accident" 
because it was clear that nothing in the term "accident" suggests 
a requirement of culpable conduct on the part of the airline crew. 
Noting the plaintiffs testimony that she was "shocked and 
surprised" when she was struck on the temple from between the 
seats and that no member of the crew expected that the fellow 
passenger would throw his tray at the plaintiff, the court 
declared that the incident was certainly "unexpected and 
unusual" and "external" to the plaintiff and, as such was an 
accident under Article 17. 
Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. 279 
The court held that an accident within the meanmg of 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention occurred when a fellow 
passenger fell unexpectedly on the plaintiff-passenger, and thus 
the Warsaw Convention applied in the action of the injured 
passenger against the airline. The court stated that, although the 
alleged cause of the accident, the continued availability of 
alcohol on the plane, may not have been accidental, the proper 
279 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,283 (D. Md. 1983). 
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focus was on what happened to the injured passenger. The court 
stated that, while the Warsaw Convention does not itself define 
the term "accident," the facts in the instant case met the 
definition found in Demarines v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,28o 
that an accident is "an unexpected and sudden event that takes 
place without foresight." The court concluded, however, that the 
filing of that claim more than two years after the alleged 
accident was time barred, because the passenger's claim was 
governed by the terms of the Warsaw Convention, and 
accordingly granted the airline's motion to dismiss. 
Tsevas v Delta Air Lines. Inc. 281 
Where a passenger sought to recover damages under the 
Warsaw Convention for injuries suffered in a sexual assault by 
another passenger, contending that the carrier's flight attendants 
continued to serve the assailant alcoholic beverages despite 
being notified of the assailant's behavior, and that the flight 
attendants refused to move her to another seat until after the 
assault, the court recognizing the Supreme Court's definition of 
280 433 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Although the Third Circuit reversed the district court in 
DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 3 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 575,26 Fed. R. 
Servo 2d 226 (3d Cir. 1978), the court of appeals stated that the trial court's definition of "accident" 
properly presented the jury with the correct legal standard for determining the occurrence of an 
accident. 
281 1997 WL 767278 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
158 
"accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention in Saks, 
as an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external 
to the passenger, held that the unwanted advance of another 
passenger, coupled with the refusal of the carrier's flight 
attendants to intervene when requested to do so, constituted an 
unexpected event external to the passenger that was beyond the 
usual and normal operation of the aircraft. In the instant case, 
the court observed, the passenger's injuries clearly did not result 
from her internal reaction to normal airplane operations, but 
rather from a combination of unexpected and unusual events 
external to her. According to the complaint, the carrier's 
employees served alcohol to the assailant to the point where he 
became intoxicated or otherwise uninhibited. When the 
passenger informed the flight crew that the assailant was 
intoxicated, they took no action and continued to serve him 
drinks. Thereafter, when the assailant began to make unwanted 
and unsolicited advances toward her, the passenger advised the 
flight crew of the situation and asked to be moved. Again, the 
carrier's employees failed to act by either subduing the assailant 
or moving the passenger to a different seat on the plane. The 
court rejected the carrier's argument that an assault by a fellow 
passenger cannot be an accident, an argument based on Stone v 
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Continental Airlines, Inc.,282 the court distinguished Stone from 
the instant case, pointing out that there was no indication in 
Stone that the carrier's flight attendants failed to provide any 
service to the plaintiff that would have defused the situation or 
that the situation allowed the carrier's employees an opportunity 
to prevent the assault. Finding that the passenger's alleged 
injuries, if established, could be the result of an accident within 
the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the court 
denied the carrier's motion to dismiss her claims under the 
Warsaw Convention. 
Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlinei83 (UK Case) 
An action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention by a 
15-year old female international airline passenger who allegedly 
was touched in an inappropriate manner by a fellow male 
passenger seated next to her, that the incident which befell the 
passenger was an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17. 
Specifically, it was agreed that the passenger was seated next to 
two men who were speaking French to each other. After a meal, 
she fell asleep and woke to discover the hand of the man next to 
her was caressing her between her hip and knee and his fingers 
282 
283 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995). 
2001 WL 483072 (CA (Civ Div) 2001). 
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dug into her thigh. She got up, walked away, and told an air 
hostess what had occurred. The court took judicial notice of the 
fact that those who travel economy have to accept relatively 
cramped conditions which bring them into close proximity with 
their neighbors and the circumstances are rare that result in a 15 
year-old girl settling down to sleep in close proximity to an 
unknown man. The court did not doubt that incident exemplified 
a special risk inherent in air travel and that, whatever the precise 
test may be, it constituted an accident. 
O 'G dB·· h A . 284 ra y v ntzs zrways 
The court denied the motion for a new trial of an 
international airline passenger following an adverse jury verdict 
on her action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention based 
on an alleged assault by a fellow passenger, ruling that although 
the courts in Wallace v Korean Air285 and Lahey v Singapore 
Airlines, Ltd.286 found that the passenger on passenger violence 
in those cases constituted an accident under the Warsaw 
Convention, those cases do not lend support to the proposition 
that this Court was required to instruct the jury that an accident 
under the Warsaw Convention includes, as a matter of law, an 
284 
285 134 F. Supp. 2d 407 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
286 See supra note 277. 
See supra note 278. 
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assault committed upon a seated plaintiff by a fellow airline 
passenger. In fact, in Wallace, the Second Circuit explicitly 
stated that "we have no occasion to decide whether all 
co-passenger torts are necessarily accidents for the purposes of 
the Convention." The fact that neither court made the bold 
assertion that an assault committed upon a seated plaintiff by a 
fellow airline passenger was ipso facto an accident under the 
Warsaw Convention belies Ms. O'Grady's argument. In addition, 
the fact that the decisions of neither court are directly binding 
upon this Court further negates Ms. O'Grady's argument. As 
such, Ms. O'Grady's argument that the Court erred by not 
instructing the jury that the definition of accident includes, as a 
matter of law, an assault committed upon a seated plaintiff by a 
fellow passenger during an international flight is without merit. 
These cases serve as fair warning to air carriers that their 
immunity from liability of passenger actions continues to be 
severely limited to circumstances that do not lend themselves in 
any way to being labeled as an unusual or unexpected event. 
The rulings above demonstrate that courts have rejected the 
airlines' argument that the Warsaw Convention was not 
intended to impose absolute liability on air carriers for the 
unforeseeable acts of passengers. Under the Saks definition of 
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"accident", an injury passenger need only prove that some link 
in the chain of causation was an unusual or unexpected event 
external to the passenger. Courts will impose liability on air 
carriers where a link in the chain of causation was some act or 
omission on the part of the airline or its employees. The recent 
trend in the law indicates that air carriers may avoid liability 
only when courts adopt the "inherent in air travel requirement" 
and then find that passenger torts are either not "characteristic 
risk of air travel" or have no relationship with the "operation of 
the aircraft". 
As in the 1970's and 1980's, the courts responded to 
hijackings, terrorist attacks, and bombings on board 
international aircrafts by imposing liability for passenger 
injuries caused by these "accident". At the tum of twenty-first 
century, the courts are again responding to the rise in violent 
incidents aboard aircrafts by extending liability for "accident" 
caused by the violent intentional acts of passengers. Commercial 
air carriers are in the best position to enact and implement safety 
and security measures that would deter dangerous passenger 
behavior. To avoid liability for violent passenger behavior, air 
carriers must be proactive rather than reactive. Airlines must 




2-9-2. Will turbulence be an "accident" 
Can turbulence be an accident under Warsaw Convention 
Art. 17? The US courts more likely to answer it as "yes", 
however, outside of the US, such as Canada, courts are more 
likely to answer it as "no". 
Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlinei87 
Reversing the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of a carrier in an action by a passenger under 
the Warsaw Convention for an injury received during a flight 
when he bumped his head on the cabin ceiling while the aircraft 
encountered turbulence, the court held that the plaintiff 
presented a genuine issue of material fact as to the degree of 
turbulence experience by the aircraft and whether his injury was 
an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention. In the instant case, the district court decided that, as 
a matter of law, injuries sustained in the course of "light" or 
"moderate" turbulence as described by the turbulence reporting 
criteria of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can never 
qualify as resulting from an "accident" under the Warsaw 
287 
339 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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Convention for purposes of imposing liability on a carrier and 
determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the degree of turbulence experienced by the flight on 
which the plaintiff was injured. Noting the Supreme Court's 
exhortation in Saks, to apply its definition of accident as an 
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the 
passenger flexibly, the court rejected the carrier's view, adopted 
by the district court, that turbulence will not constitute an 
accident under Article 17 unless it is established that the 
turbulence was "severe" or "extreme" as defined by the FAA as 
well as the plaintiffs view that the degree of turbulence is 
irrelevant to the accident inquiry as long as it results in an 
impact, an event external to the passenger. Observing nothing in 
the Supreme Court's various formulations of an accident 
suggesting that a bright-line rule of liability should be or 
necessarily can be, established for particular weather events and 
all their attendant consequences, the court said that the district 
court's attempt to graft weather-reporting criteria for pilots, 
which the court characterized as not regulatory and established 
for purposes wholly independent of the Warsaw Convention, 
namely to facilitate pilot reporting to a national weather 
database, was misplaced. Contrary to the district court's 
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conclusion, based on FAA information on several web sites, that 
light and moderate turbulence are a normal part of any routine 
flight while severe and extreme turbulence are not, the court 
thought that such a determination was a factual matter more 
appropriately addressed at trial. 
Furthermore, the court ruled that the record in the instant 
case was far from settled regarding the amount of turbulence 
actually experienced by the flight. While the pilot described the 
turbulence as both light and medium in the log, the plaintiff 
indicated that he found walking almost impossible, a hallmark 
of severe turbulence, a fellow passenger described the 
turbulence as significant, and the plaintiff presented expert 
testimony suggesting that the aircraft may have encountered 
momentarily severe turbulence. By concluding that the flight 
experienced only light or moderate turbulence, the court 
reasoned, the district court essentially credited the pilot's 
characterization over the plaintiffs contrary evidence, an 
approach that was not appropriate at the summary judgment 
stage when the record was to be construed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. 
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Brunk v. British Airways PLC. 288 
Rejecting the defendant carrier's contention that it was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff 
international airline passenger's claim under the Warsaw 
Convention that the turbulence which the plaintiff claimed 
caused her knee injury was not sufficiently severe to constitute 
an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17, the court held 
that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
. plaintiff, showed that a reasonable juror could find that the 
plaintiffs injury was caused by an unusual or unexpected event, 
a precipitous drop of the aircraft during moderate to severe 
turbulence, and not be her own internal reaction to the usual, 
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft. In particular, the 
court noted, there was evidence that the plaintiff sustained an 
injury caused by a jolt of turbulence substantial enough to cause 
her to leave her feet and fall to the floor of the aircraft with such 
an impact that the ligaments of her knee were tom. Moreover, 
the court observed, it was claimed that the turbulence caused a 
sensation likened to that resulting from the dip of a roller coaster 
which, in addition to causing the plaintiff to fall, dislodged 
several of the passengers' food trays. Applying the definition of 
288 
195 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2002). 
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accident under Saks, and elementary summary judgment 
principles, the court denied the carrier's motion for summary 
judgment. 
Koor v. Air Canada289 (Canadian Case) 
An action by a passenger on an international flight under 
the Warsaw Convention for injury suffered when the aircraft 
encountered turbulence while she was attempting use a lavatory, 
causing her to fall and fracture her ankle, the court held that the 
turbulence in the instant case did not constitute an "accident" 
within the meaning of Article 17. The court noted a "Turbulence 
Reporting Criteria Table" produced by Transport Canada with 
the purpose of providing guidelines for reporting cases of 
various levels of turbulence which described four different 
degrees of turbulence: light, moderate, severe, and extreme, as 
well as a flight report filed by the crew indicating moderate 
turbulence for six or seven seconds. Observing that the 
witnesses were not unanimous in their description of weather 
conditions, the court found it more probable that there was only 
light turbulence at the very most during the 10 to 15 minutes 
that the seatbelt lights had been on prior to the passenger's fall 
289 2001 WL 452006 (Ont. S.C.J. 2001) .. 
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and that what caused her fall was a violent, sudden, and 
extremely brief increase in the intensity to the point where the 
turbulence for six or seven seconds was of the high moderate 
classification bordering on the severe. Accordingly, the court 
ruled, since the turbulence was short of severe, the passenger's 
injury was not caused or contributed to by any accident within 
the meaning of Article 17. 
Quinn v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd. 290 (Canadian 
Case) 
Where a 72-year-old international airline passenger, 
suffering from severe chronic osteoporosis, brought an action 
against a carrier both in contract and tort after she sustained 
compression fractures of three vertebrae in her back allegedly 
caused by a pocket of turbulence encountered by the aircraft, the 
Ontario Court of Justice ruling that to succeed, the passenger 
was required to establish that her injuries were suffered during 
the flight and that her injuries were the result of an "accident" 
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 
held that the degree of turbulence encountered on the flight in 
290 1994 WL 1694773 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1994), Affirmed without opinion by, 1997 WL 1917376 
(Ont. CA. 1997), leave to appeal refused by, 1997 WL 1932474 (Can. 1997). 
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the instant case could not be said to have been unusual or 
expected and did not constitute an accident under Article 17. 
The court referred to the testimony of the plaintiff and two 
other passengers that, in addition to the turbulence of the sort 
that they had often previously experienced and that they 
regarded as normal and expected, there was on the flight in 
question an incident of turbulence that was notably more severe, 
involving a sudden loss of altitude and a loud bump which made 
two of them think that the aircraft may have hit the ground. 
Remarking that air turbulence is neither unexpected nor unusual 
and that up to some level of severity it is a commonplace of air 
travel, the court found as a fact that the turbulence encountered 
on the flight in question, while greater than that previously 
experienced by three passenger-witnesses, including the plaintiff, 
did not amount to an accident, defined in Saks, as an unexpected 
or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger. 
The court, relying on a "Turbulence Reporting Criteria Table" 
published by Transport Canada which classified turbulence 
intensity in four categories: light, moderate, severe, and extreme, 
the court opined that the degree of turbulence encountered on 
the flight in the instant case did not amount to severe turbulence. 
The court observed that the passenger herself did not report any 
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strain on her seatbelt, that the evidence did not show that objects 
were tossed about, and that the captain did not file any report of 
severe or extreme turbulence, a report that would have been 
required if such turbulence had been encountered. 
2-9-3. Will acts of terrorism be an "accident" 
Can acts of terrorism be accidents under Warsaw 
Convention Art. 17? The courts unanimously said "yes", 
terrorism acts are within the scope of the Warsaw Convention's 
"accident" . 
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd. 291 
In an action by a passenger against an airline for bodily 
injury and mental anguish allegedly suffered by the passenger as 
a result of an aircraft hijacking, the court held that a hijacking 
was within the ambit of the term "accident" and sufficient to 
raise the presumption of liability under the Warsaw Convention 
as modified. The flight from Zurich to New York was hijacked 
to Amman, Jordan, where the passengers were forced to remain 
for approximately six days. The court declared that to invoke the 
Convention there must be an "accident" within the 
291 
485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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contemplation of Article 17, and the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff to establish that such an accident occurred. The airline 
argued strenuously that, if the cause of the damage is intentional, 
it is not an "accident." Rejecting this contention, the court based 
its construction of the word "accident" on the United States State 
Department press releases and orders of the United States Civil 
Aeronautics Board subsequent to the Montreal Agreement, 
which amends the Warsaw Convention. The court emphasized 
the wording of the State Department that "those guilty of 
sabotage and persons claiming on their behalf will not be 
entitled to recover any damages," explaining that one is led to 
infer that the innocent victims of willful acts by others were to 
be able to recover from the carrier, even in respect to acts of 
sabotage to the aircraft. The court reasoned that the analogy 
between hijacking and sabotage is clear and that the airline had 
failed to indicate any logical basis for distinguishing the two. 
The court explained further that the policy underpinnings of the 
Warsaw Convention also led to its conclusion that the hijacking 
was an accident since the Convention as modified functions to 
redistribute the costs involved in air transportation: the carrier is 
best qualified initially to develop defensive mechanisms to 
avoid such incidents since the carrier physically controls the 
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aircraft and access to it; the carrier is likewise the party most 
capable of assessing and ensuring against the risks associated 
with air transportation; and, finally, the carrier is the party most 
able to distribute the costs of the first two steps effectively. The 
court accordingly denied the airline's motion for dismissal of the 
complaint and for summary judgment. 
Re Tel Aviv292 
The court held that passengers who were injured in a 
terrorist attack in the baggage area of an airport terminal 
building were no longer in the course of disembarking, stated 
that the defendant airline conceded that the terrorist attack was 
an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention. 
Day v TWA 293 
Holding that the fact that a terrorist attack occurred inside a 
terminal building did not preclude coverage under the Warsaw 
Convention, the appellate court stated that it was undisputed that 
a terrorist attack is considered an "accident" within the purview 
292 
2 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975). 
93 528F.2d31 (2dCir.1975). 
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of Article 17.294 The appellate court affirmed a judgment III 
favor of passengers who had been injured in the attack. 
Evangelinos v TWA 295 
The court of appeals discussing whether a terrorist attack 
on airline passengers in an airport took place in the course of 
any of the operations of embarking, stated that the airline did not 
dispute the district court's conclusion that a terrorist attack on an 
airline's passengers is an "accident" within the meaning of 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.296 
La Compagnie Nationale Air France, SA v Haddad297 (French 
Case) 
The French court determined that the term "accident" could 
not be restricted to technical or mechanical accidents affecting 
the aircraft. The court ruled that physical injuries resulting from 
hijackers aboard an international flight from Tel Aviv, Israel to 
Paris, France, was within the category of Article 17 
compensable acts. The court found that the term applies to 
294 The court cited without elaboration Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., supra note 
291, as authority 
295 . 
29 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) . 
. 6 The trial court in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), 
Judgment rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977), had stated that there was no attempt 
by the Montreal Agreement to limit the application of" an accident" as defined in Article 17 of the 
~arsaw Convention to exclude the criminal act of a third party. 
CAParis, June 19, 1979, E.C.C. 1981,207 .. 
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troubles during a normal flight that result from "unforeseen 
intervention by malevolent third parties," such in the 
circumstances of a hijacking. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
What Constitutes "From EMBARKING To 




Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 provides: 
"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or 
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the 
accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in 
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." (The Montreal 
Convention 1999 Art. 17 is substantially the same). 
While the word "accident" describes the type of incident 
covered by the provisions of the Conventions, the terms 
"embarking" and "disembarking" delineate the points in time at 
which liability of the carrier begins and ends. 
It makes no difference that the negligence occurred or that 
the contract was formed prior to embarkation, for Article 17 
refers to the place in which the accident causing injury must 
take place in order for that article to cover the case and establish 
the presumption of liability for the injury. The actual, ultimate 
cause of the accident is irrelevant for purposes of Article 17 ... 
As long as, and only if, the accident which caused the injury 
'took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the 
operations of embarking or disembarking,' the action is covered 
by Article 17.298 
At the 1929 Warsaw Conference, the delegates were faced 
298 See Husser! v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 13 CCH Avi 17603 (S.D. NY 
1975). . 
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with two general proposals concernmg the extent of carrier 
liability. One point of view was that liability attached from the 
moment the passenger entered the air terminal and extended 
until the passenger left the terminal at his destination. A more 
restrictive view was advanced which would have extended 
liability from the time the passenger boarded the aircraft until 
the time of deplaning. The broader plan of liability was rejected 
in favor of the language presently contained in Article 17.299 
Perhaps the restrictive one too. 300 Since the Guatemala 
Conference, in 1971, the use of the words "embarking" and 
"disembarking" were re-examined in the light of the absolute 
liability regime which had been established by the Montreal 
Interim Agreement, but it was apparently the consensus of 
opinion of the delegates that the wording needed no change.301 
Even in the new Montreal Convention 1999, the words are still 
the same. 
Little difficulty has been encountered in the cases dealing 
with the phrase, "on board the aircraft," physical presence while 
299 For useful background discussion of the views expressed at the 1929 Conference, see Martinez 
Hernandez v Air France (1976, CAl Puerto Rico) 545 F2d 279, cert den 430 US 950, 51 LEd 800, 
97 S Ct 1592. Infra. 
See also Note: Warsaw Convention--Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Injuries Sustained Within 
~orerrninal. 45 Fordham L Rev 369. 
See Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1975, CA2 NY) 528 F2d 31,36 ALR Fed 477, cert den 
~o~9 US 890, 50 LEd 172, 97 S Ct 246, reh den 429 US 1124,51 LEd 574,97 S Ct 1162. Infra. 
As to discussion of "embarking" and "disembarking" by the delegates of the Guatemala 
Conference, see Minutes of the International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City (1971), 
ICAO Document 9040--LC/167-1, pp 31 et seq. . 
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reboarding is sufficient to allow the carner to avail of the 
Convention even though the claimed injury was assertedly 
caused by negligent activity of another airplane of defendant 
carrier--other than the one being reboarded in international 
transportation?02 A somewhat more complicated problem as to 
construction of "on board the aircraft" occurs where a passenger 
claims damages for injuries also suffered while she was being 
confined in a hotel by hijackers after having been removed from 
the aircraft being hijacked. The Husserl opinion, in construing 
"on board the aircraft" to include the time spent in the city in 
question in the hotel, reasoned as follows: 
The drafters of the Convention undoubtedly assumed that 
the time 'on board the aircraft' included all of the time between 
embarkation at the origin of a flight and disembarkation at a 
scheduled destination of a flight. Furthermore, the purpose of 
the Convention to limit liability is best served by such a 
construction. Presumably, if a third party caused the plaintiff 
injury while she was detained off the aircraft, the airline would 
302 Scarf v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 4 CCH Avi 17795 (1955, SD NY), app dismd, 4 CCH Avi 
18076 (CA2 NY) 233 F2d 176. 
See also Chutter v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 611,4 CCH Avi 17733 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1955), where the court held that the case fell within the Convention because the accident 
causing the damage had occurred on board the aircraft, etc., where the passenger had stepped out 
onto a ramp or loading stairs to wave goodbye to her daughter just as the ramp was being pulled 
away, and had fallen. Infra. 
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be subrogated to her claim against that party; but it would bear 
primary liability. In any case and particularly in this case, it 
would be extremely difficult to determine what part of plaintiffs 
alleged injuries was caused directly by the accident on the 
aircraft, what part was caused by events themselves proximately 
caused by the accident, and what part was caused by events not 
proximately caused by the accident, by the negligence of the 
carrier, or by a breach of contract. Therefore, all events which 
caused the plaintiff's alleged injuries and which occurred during 
the time between leaving Zurich (point of departure) and 
returning to Zurich shall be considered to have occurred 'on 
board the aircraft. ,303 
Until the present day, a huge number of cases have been 
strenuously contested as to the meaning of the terms 
"embarking" and "disembarking". Those cases have arisen in the 
United States and around the world. While some courts appear 
to have given more weight to the location factor, other courts 
will take into account the totality of circumstances at the time of 
the passenger injury, including such factors as the location of the 
passenger, the specific activities being performed by the 
303 See HusserI v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., supra note 298. See also, Simons, a review of 
issues concerned with aerial hijacking and terrorism 63 JALC 731 (1998); Duncan, battling aerial 
terrorism and compensating victims 39 NAVLR 241 (1990); Gross, limitation of liability of air 
carrier for personal injury or death, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 547. 
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passenger, and the degree of control being exercised over the 
b h . 304 h h passenger y t e carner. Hence, t e courts ave not been 
uniform in construing "in the course of ... embarking or 
disembarking" as used in Article 17, due perhaps to the 
ambiguous history of the Convention and the changes in air 
transportation technology since the original drafting. The 
advantages of international uniformity in the interpretation and 
application of the Warsaw Convention are well known,305 but 
this is difficult to achieve in the face of conflicting decisions of 
national courts, even within one Contracting State, as with the 
United States. 
Generally, however, "Embarking and disembarking," for 
the purposes of the Warsaw Convention, does not include within 
its scope all injuries a passenger sustains from the time he or she 
first enters the airport of departure until he or she leaves the 
airport of arrival. 306 The phrase "embarking and disembarking" 
connotes a close temporal and spatial relationship with the flight 
itself. 307 
Most of the cases wherein it was alleged that the passenger 
was killed or injured while embarking held that the injuries did 
304 Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. See supra note 299. 
305 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines (1980) 2 All E.R. 696 (H.L.). JBL 1993, Jul, 396-397. 
:06 Beaudet v British Airways, PLC, 853 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
07 McCarthy v Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F: 3d 313 (1 51 Cir. 1995). 
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in fact occur during the course of "embarking," as that word is 
used in Article 17. Except those people injured in the common 
areas of airports are found not to be embarking,308 and if an 
accident occurs more than an hour before the scheduled 
departure, it is generally not considered to have occurred in the 
course of embarking.309 However, in those cases wherein it was 
alleged that the passenger injuries occurred during the operation 
of disembarking, most of them were held that the allegation was 
not sustained under the particular circumstances involved. 
Article 17 holds the carrier liable for accidents occurring 
during the course of "any of the operations of embarking or 
disembarking." A broad interpretation of that language might 
permit the conclusion that such peripheral activities as checking 
baggage, or waiting to pick it up, are indeed operations 
connected with embarking or disembarking from an aircraft.
31o 
308 McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 FJd 313 (1st Cir. 1995) (passenger injured on 
escalator in common area); Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(passenger killed by terrorist in public area of airport after checking baggage); Abu Hamdeh v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (passenger injured on escalator in 
common area of airport); Knoll v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 844 (D. Colo. 1985) 
(slip and fall near immigration area at least 300 yards from gate); Kantonides v. KLM Royal 
Dutch Airlines, 802 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1992) (passenger injured on moving sidewalk in 
common area of airport); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(passenger injured on moving sidewalk in public are of airport); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 681 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (passengers in line to check baggage and receive boarding 
Ptasses when terrorists attacked). 
09 Abu Hamdeh v. American Airlines, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (1 Yz hours before 
flight); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (more than 1 Yz 
hours before flight); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (more 
than 1 \12 hours before flight); Stovall v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 595 N.E.2d 
330 (1992) (more than one hour after landing and 2Y2 hours before next flight). 
310 Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. See supra note 299. Discussed infra. The court observed that 
the French word "operation," as contained in the official version of the Warsaw Convention, 
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Arguably, the point could be made that the movements of a 
disembarking passenger are still under the control of the carrier's 
agents until the passenger picks up his baggage, for the 
passenger would certainly be loath to leave the terminal without 
his baggage. In fact, in many larger terminals, the passenger is 
not permitted to leave the baggage area with luggage until an 
agent of the airline has examined the baggage check stubs to 
ascertain whether they coincide with the claim checks attached 
to the luggage items.311 
In those cases that present a close factual question as to 
whether the client was "embarking" or "disembarking," when 
the injury occurred, the attorney might consider the possibility 
of proceeding against either the carrier or the airport authorities, 
or both, on a premises liability theory. While such a proceeding 
would not have the advantage of absolute liability under the 
Warsaw System, neither would it be subject to the limitation on 
liability or the two years time bar provided for in the 
Convention.312 
connotes a process composed of many acts, and that it has been defined in English as meaning "a 
~roup of procedures combined to achieve a result." 
11 See, however, MacDonald v Air Canada (1971, CAl Mass) 439 F2d 1402; and also Martinez 
&mandez v Air France (1976, CAl Puerto Rico) 545 F2d 279, cert den 430 US 950, 51 LEd 800, 
97 S Ct 1592, both discussed infra, in which the court held that under the circumstances involved 
in each case passengers killed or injured in the baggage claim area of an air terminal would not 
fave the benefit of absolute liability under Article 17. 
12 See Adatia v Air Canada (1992) 2 S&B AY. REP. Discussed infra. 
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3-2. View that total circumstances in each individual case are 
determinative in the US 
Taking the position that the physical location of a passenger 
was not a sufficient sole criterion on which to determine 
whether a passenger was in the course of "embarking" or 
"disembarking" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention, the courts in the cases below will look at the 
following factor: 
(1) The activity of the passenger at the time of the accident 
or injury; whether the activity is related to boarding or leaving 
the plane; 
(2) The passenger's whereabouts at the time of the injury; 
the physical proximity of the passenger to the gate and whether 
the passenger was in an area controlled by the carrier; 
(3) The extent to which the carrier was exercising control 
over the passenger at the moment of injury; whether the 
passenger was acting at the direction of the carrier or was 
restricted by the carrier; 
(4) The Immmence of actual boarding or leaving the 
plane.313 
313 McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 1995); Buonocore v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441 
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3-2-1. Day v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 314 (The leading US 
case) 
Injured passengers and the executrix of a passenger who 
died in a terrorist attack, filed an action against airline company 
in which they claimed that the TWA was liable for the injuries 
and the death under the Warsaw Convention. The TWA 
contended that the application of Article 17 should be 
determined by reference only to the area where the accident 
occurred. Liability under the Convention should not attach while 
the passenger is inside the terminal building. The very earliest 
time at which liability can commence is when the passenger 
steps through the terminal gate. Judge Brieant, the trail judge, 
however, believed that 'the issue ... is not where (the plaintiffs) 
feet were planted when the killing began, but, rather, in what 
activity was he engaged.' Applying a tripartite test based on 
activity (what the plaintiffs were doing), control (at whose 
direction) and location, the district judge determined that Article 
17 covered the attack at the departure gate. And the appeal 
judges agreed. 
Irving R. Kaufman, Chief Judge in the appeal, held that the 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Abu Hamdeh v. American Airlines, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1994); 
Stovall v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 595 N.E.2d 330 (1992). 
314 See supra note 299. , 
185 
: .. ,', 
words 'in the course of any of the operations of embarking' do 
not exclude events transpiring within a terminal building. Nor, 
do these words set forth any strictures on location. Rather, the 
drafters of the Convention looked to whether the passenger's 
actions were a part of the operation or process of 
embarkation.315 
Article 1 7 does not define the period of time before 
passengers enter the interior of the airplane when the 'operations 
of embarking' commence. It is, nevertheless, appropriate to 
consider the activities of the plaintiffs in this case as falling 
within the purview of this somewhat cryptic phrase. The facts 
disclose that at the time of the terrorist attack, the plaintiffs had 
already surrendered their tickets, passed through passport 
control, and entered the area reserved exclusively for those 
about to depart on international flights. They were assembled at 
the departure gate, ready to proceed to the aircraft. The 
passengers were not free agents roaming at will through the 
terminal. They were required to stand in line at the direction of 
TWA's agents for the purpose of undergoing a weapons search 
which was a prerequisite to boarding. Whether one looks to the 
315 The French word 'operation' contained in the official version of the Warsaw Convention 
connotes a process composed of many acts. It is defmed in the Nouveau Petit Larousse (1950) as 
'Ensemble de moyens que l'on combine pour en obtenir un resultat,' or 'a group of procedures 
combined to achieve a result.' 
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passengers' activity (which was a condition to embarkation), to 
the restriction of their movements, to the imminence of boarding, 
or even to their position adjacent to the terminal gate, the court 
driven to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were 'in the course of 
embarking. ' 
Comparing this case with Macdonald v Air Canada316 , 
discussed infra, the court held: 
"We find Macdonald v Air Canada clearly distinguishable. In MacDonald, the court 
declined to construe Article 17 as covering an elderly passenger who fell after 
disembarking. Mrs. MacDonald was, at the time of her accident, standing near the 
baggage 'pickup' area, waiting for her daughter to recover her luggage. Mrs. 
MacDonald was, therefore, not acting, as were the passengers in the case at bar, at the 
direction of the airlines, but was free to move about the terminal. Furthermore, she 
was not, as were the plaintiffs here, performing an act required for embarkation or 
disembarkation. We do not, of course, indicate any views on the correctness of the 
MacDonald decision." 
Moreover, a relatively broad construction of Article 17, 
affording protection to the plaintiffs under the Warsaw liability 
umbrella, is in harmony with modem theories of accident cost 
allocation. The airlines are in a position to distribute among all 
passengers what would otherwise be a crushing burden upon 
those few unfortunate enough to become 'accident' victims.317 
Equally important, this interpretation fosters the goal of accident 
prevention.318 The airlines, in marked contrast to individual 
passengers, are in a better posture to persuade, pressure or, if 
316 MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1970). 
3\7 See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents at 39--45 (1970). 
318 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558,569--70 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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need be, compensate airport managers to adopt more stringent 
. .. k 319 
secunty measures agaInst terronst attac s. 
Finally, the administrative costs of the absolute liability 
system embodied in the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the 
Montreal Agreement, are dramatically lower than available 
alternatives. If Article 17 were not applicable, the passengers 
could recover--if at all--only by maintaining a costly suit in a 
foreign land against the operator of the airport. The expense and 
inconvenience of such litigation would be compounded by the 
need to prove fault and the requirements of extensive pretrial 
investigation, travel, and other factors too difficult to anticipate. 
Such litigation, moreover, would often unduly postpone 
payments urgently needed by the seriously injured victim or his 
surviving dependents. 320 
The court stated that, in interpreting a treaty, one should 
look to its legislative history. The Warsaw Convention was the 
product of two international conferences, one held in Paris in 
1925, and another in Warsaw in 1929.321 The Paris conference 
appointed a small committee of experts, the Comite 
319 
320 Calabresi at 150--152. Supra note 308. 
See Rosenberg and Sovem, Delay and Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 
~?lumL.Rev. 1115 (1959). 
The history of the Warsaw Convention is discussed in Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United 
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497 (1967); and in Ide, The History and 
Accomplishments of the CITEJA, 3 J.Air.L. 27 (1932). 
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Intemationale Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA), 
to prepare a draft convention for consideration by the delegates 
at Warsaw. The version proposed by CITEJA would have 
extended accident coverage to passengers from the time when 
they enter the airport of departure until the time when they exit 
from the airport of arrival. 322 At the Warsaw conference, several 
of the delegates criticized this draft. Alcibiades Pecanha, the 
Brazilian delegates, proposed that Convention liability not 
attach until the passengers were actually inside the aircraft. 323 
Prof. Georges Ripert, the French delegate, however, forcefully 
argued against both the CITEJA and the Brazilian proposals. It 
was, he observed, virtually impossible to draft a precise formula 
that would satisfactorily cover the myriad of cases that could 
arise. Prof. Ripert proposed that the article be recast in terms 
broad enough to allow the courts to take into account the facts of 
each case.324 The delegates voted to reject the CITEJA draft and 
to accept the French suggestion?25 The drafting committee then 
rewrote the CITEJA proposal in the form now set forth in 
Article 17. 
322 
323 See Warsaw Minutes at 171. 
Id. at 49. 
324 
Id. at 49--50 53--54 325 ,. 
Id. at 57. 
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TW A argues that the rejection of the CITEJA draft 
manifested an intent to exclude from Warsaw coverage of all 
accidents occurring within a terminal building. The court did not 
agree. The court asserted that the delegates' action constituted a 
rejection of a rigid location-based test in favor of the more 
flexible approach espoused by Prof. Ripert. Even if one 
disregards this legislative history, the most the court could infer 
from the rejection of the CITEJA formula would be a reluctance 
to cover all accidents occurring inside a terminal, not a 
determination that no such accidents should be covered. 
The minutes of the Warsaw proceedings thus undermine 
TWA's contention that the delegates wished to implement a rigid 
rule based solely on location of the accident. Rather, the court 
believes they preferred to provide latitude for the courts to 
consider the factual setting of each case by considering the 
elements which have been referred to above. 
In interpreting a treaty, the court continues: Those called 
upon to construe a treaty should, in the words of Judge Clark, 
strive to 'give the specific words of a treaty a meaning consistent 
with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting 
parties. ,326 These expectations can, of course, change over time. 
326 See Maximov v United States, 299 F. 2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962), affd 373 U.S. 49, 83 S.Ct. 
1054, 10 L.Ed. 2d 184 (1963). 
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Conditions and new methods may arise not present at the precise 
moment of drafting. For a court to view a treaty as frozen in the 
year of its creation is scarcely more justifiable than to regard the 
Constitutional clock as forever stopped in 1787. Justice 
Holmes's counsel concerning Constitutional construction, set 
forth in his opinion in Missouri v Holland, applies with equal 
force to the task of treaty interpretation: 
"(W)hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act ... we must realize 
that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters."m 
The conduct of the parties subsequent to ratification of a 
treaty may, thus, be relevant in ascertaining the proper 
construction to accord the treaty's various provisions. A court 
might even feel obliged to sustain (the parties' later) 
construction of a treaty differing widely from that which it was 
in fact possible to prove to have been the design of the parties at 
the time when the agreement was concluded. In so acting, the 
court does not, of course, impose its own values upon the parties. 
Rather, the court does no more than respect and implement the 
goals and intentions of the parties.328 
327 See Missouri v Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433,40 S.Ct. 382, 383, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920). 
328 See Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co. v Cox, 291 U.S. 138, 158-63, 54 S.Ct. 
361, 78 L.Ed. 695 (1934); Harvard Research, Article 19; M. McDougal, H. Lasswell and 1. Miller, 
The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order 56, 58 (1967); II. C. Hyde, 
International Law 72 (1922); Vienna Convention Art. 31(3). 
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In divining the purposes of the Warsaw treaty, the court 
found the adoption in 1966 of the Montreal Agreement 
particularly instructive. This Agreement did not alter the 
language of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. But it 
provides decisive evidence of the goals and expectations 
currently shared by the parties to the Warsaw Convention. 
Although it was the foreign airlines, and not their 
respective governments, who signed the agreement 
implementing these modifications (raise the Warsaw liability 
limit to $75,000; and impose absolute liability), the governments 
whose carriers were to participate in the plan formally assured 
the United States, at the request of the State Department, that 
they would permit the new plan to go into effect.329 
And as a conclusion, the court stated: "even if we restricted 
our interpretation to the intent and purposes of the Warsaw 
treaty as of 1929, we would reach the same result." 
Since 1929, the risks of aviation have changed dramatically 
In ways unforeseeable by the Warsaw framers. Some 
commentators have suggested that when confronted with such 
genuine gaps in the parties' expectations, the interpreter should 
consider accepted policy goals, such as accident prevention, in 
329 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 594, 595. See supra note 312. 
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filling them. It is relevant in this connection that the technology 
of embarkation has also changed in ways unforeseeable to the 
Warsaw delegates. Moreover, airports are today far larger and 
boarding procedures substantially more complex than they were 
in 1929. And, many of the operations of embarking have been 
moved inside the terminal building. Indeed, even the boarding 
ladder, now being increasingly replaced by the jetway, may 
soon become an anachronism. 
The court believes that the Warsaw drafters wished to 
create a system of liability rules that would cover all the hazards 
of air travel.330 The rigid location-based rule suggested by TWA 
would ill serve that goal. Under TWA's test, many claims 
relating to liability for the hazards of flying would be excluded 
from the Warsaw system and would be governed by local law. 
Rather than serving the drafters' intent of creating an inclusive 
system, TWA's proposal would frustrate it. 
Moreover, the court also believes that the result it has 
reached furthers the intent of the Warsaw drafters in a broader 
sense. The Warsaw delegates knew that, in the years to come, 
civil aviation would change in ways that they could not foresee. 
330 See Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention, 7 1. Air. L. 
1,20 (1936); Calkins, The Cause of Action under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J.Air.L. 217 (1959). 
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They wished to design a system of air law that would be both 
durable and flexible enough to keep pace with these changes. 
3-2-2. Evangelinos v Trans World Airlines, Inc33 ]. 
Issues arising out of the same facts as Day case, supra, the 
court also rejected location of the passengers as the only test as 
to whether they were embarking or disembarking within the 
meaning of Article 17, and held that the passengers were in the 
course of embarking at the time the terrorist attack occurred. 
The court noted that the undisputed facts revealed that at 
the time of the attack the passengers had completed virtually all 
the activities required as prerequisites to boarding, and were 
standing in line at the departure gate ready to proceed to the 
aircraft, and that the injuries were sustained while the 
passengers were acting at the explicit direction of airline 
employees and while they were performing the final act required 
as a prerequisite to taking boarding buses to the aircraft itself. 
The court also noted that at the time the boarding operations had 
commenced, the flight had already been called for final boarding, 
and that as a result, the passengers were no longer mingling over 
a broad area with passengers of other airlines, but were 
331 (1977, CA3 Pa) 550 F2d 152. 
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congregated in a specific geographical area designated by airline 
employees and were thus identifiable as a group associated with 
a particular flight. The court concluded that by announcing the 
flight, forming the group, and directing the passengers as a 
group to stand near the departure gate, the airline had assumed 
control over the group and caused them to congregate in the area 
where the attack occurred. 
The court observed that adoption of a strict location test 
could lead to differing results based solely on the fortuity of 
where passengers are placed at the time of injury. The court 
stated that in its own view, three factors are primarily relevant to 
a determination of the question of liability under Article 17: (I) 
location of the accident; (2) the activity in which the injured 
person was engaged; and (3) the control by the defendant of 
such injured person at the location and during the activity taking 
place at the time of the accident. Although in so recognizing, the 
court stated that it would place less emphasis upon carrier 
control over passengers than did the Day Court, reasoning that 
while control remains at least equally as important as location 
and activity, it is an integral factor in evaluating both location 
and activity. 
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A dissenting opinion pointed out that a terrorist attack in an 
airport is no more likely to occur than the bombing of a 
restaurant, bank, or other place of public congregation, and that 
the conclusion of the majority that the passengers were injured 
as a result of a risk inherent in air travel was therefore 
unwarranted. The dissenting opinion further stated that 
operations of embarking could only include the actual boarding 
of the aircraft or, at most, movement across the traffic apron 
from the terminal building to the plane itself. 
3-2-3. Maugnie v Compagnie Nationale Air France332 
In 1971 Maugnie exited from the Air France plane and 
entered the Orly Airport terminal to make her Swiss Air 
connection. She proceeded down the only passenger corridor 
leading from the Air France gate to the main terminal area. In a 
hallway between the airline gate and the center of the terminal, 
appellant slipped and fell, incurring the injuries which gave rise 
to the complaint. The sole dispute of this case is whether 
Maugnie's injury come within the scope of disembarkation of 
the Warsaw Convention Article 17, the court said no. 
332 (1977, CA9 Cal) 549 F2d 1256,39 ALR Fed 440, cert den 431 US 974, 53 LEd 2d 1072,97 S Ct 2939. 
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To arrive at a workable definition of the term "in the course 
of . . . disembarking" as used in Article 17, the court may 
properly look to the history and purpose of the Convention and 
subsequent interpretations thereof. The scope of the Warsaw 
Convention is a matter of federal law and federal treaty 
interpretation, and must be determined from an examination of 
the "four corners of the treaty." 333 Moreover, it is well 
established that treaty interpretation involves a consideration of 
legislative history and the intent of the contracting parties.334 
Maugnie argues that since jurisdiction in this action IS 
based on diversity of citizenship, the court should have 
consulted conflicts rules in interpreting the scope of Article 17. 
It is true that the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of 
action, but merely creates a presumption of liability if the 
otherwise applicable substantive law provides a claim for relief 
based on the injury alleged. 335 Thus, conflicts rules are 
applicable in determining whether a cause of action exists. 
However, the determination of the scope of the Warsaw 
Convention is a matter of federal law and federal treaty 
333 See American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957); Husser! v. Swiss Air 
Transport Co., Ltd., 388 FSupp. 1238, 1249 (S.D.N.Y.1975). 
334 See Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-432, 63 S.Ct. 672, 87 L.Ed. 877 
(1943); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385,392,358 N.Y.S.2d 97,314 N.E.2d 
848,854 (1974). 
335 See Noel v. Linea Aeroposta1 Venezolana, 247 F2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 907, 
78 S.Ct. 334,2 L.Ed.2d 262 (1957); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 FSupp. 393 
(S.D.N.Y.1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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interpretation. Conflicts principles are not applicable in 
interpreting the words of the Convention; rather, the meaning of 
Article 17 should be ascertained from the intention of the 
drafters and the goals of the Convention.336 
The Warsaw Convention, together with its modifications, 
function to protect passengers from the hazards of air travel and 
also spreads the accident cost of air transportation among all 
passengers. Taking a broad view of the term "accident," courts 
generally have extended air carrier liability to include injuries 
resulting from such modem air hazards as hijacking and terrorist 
attacks. However, the courts have not been uniform in 
construing "in the course of ... embarking or disembarking" as 
used in Article 17. 
In construing "disembarking," several courts have 
interpreted Article 17 as defining Warsaw coverage primarily by 
1 . f hIM D ld 337 . . . ocatlOn 0 t e passenger. n ac ona case, InJunes 
sustained by a passenger while awaiting her suitcase in 
defendant airline's baggage area were held to be outside the 
scope of the Convention. The First Circuit reaffirmed the 
MacDonald decision in Hernandez v. Air France338, and at the 
same time indicated its willingness to consider factors other than 
336 See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336-338 (5th Cir. 1967). 
337 MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (Ist Cir. 1970), infra. 






location of passenger in interpreting Article 17. Also in re Tel 
Aviv 339 , involved a terrorist attack on passengers who had 
deplaned and were waiting in the baggage area of the terminal 
building. Endorsing a test based primarily on physical location 
of passengers, the district court held that the Warsaw 
Convention did not apply. On the other hand, the Second and 
Third Circuits have refused to give a strictly geographical 
interpretation to the language of Article 17 with respect to 
"operations of embarking. ,,340 
Embarkation and disembarkation might be distinguished 
for purposes of Article 17, since the embarking passenger must 
perform certain required acts within the terminal as a condition 
of completing his Journey. In contrast, the disembarking 
passenger normally "has few activities, if any, which the air 
carrier requires him to perform" once the passenger has entered 
the terminal building. 341 Similarly, other courts have denied 
Warsaw coverage to in-terminal accidents in the context of 
disembarkation.342 
339 
340 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975). 
3 
See Day v TWA, and Evangelinos v TWA, supra notes 314 and 34. 
41 
342 See Day v TWA, supra note 314. 
See Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Avi.Cas.17,145 (SD.N.Y.1974) (injury on 
escalator leading to lower level of terminal); Klein v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 A.D.2d 679, 
360 N.Y.S.2d 60 (2d Dept. 1974) (injury on baggage conveyor belt inside tenninal); cf. Mache v. 
Air France, Rev. Fr. Droit Aerien 343 (Court d'Appel de Rouen 1967), affd Rev. Fr. Droit Aerien 
311 (COlif de Cassation 1970) (injury in customs area off the traffic apron). 
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The court in present case held that a rule based solely on 
location of passengers is not in keeping with modem air 
transportation technology and ignores the advent of the mobile 
boarding corridors utilized by many modem air terminals. In 
construing the scope of the Convention, the court may properly 
consider changes in circumstances subsequent to the drafting of 
the treaty.343 Today the expandable boarding units have 
eliminated to a great extent the need for embarkation and 
disembarkation outside the terminal building. Thus, determining 
whether passengers were inside or outside the airport terminal at 
the time of injury should not end the analysis. Since the 
Convention drafters did not draw a clear line, the Court is also 
reluctant to formulate an inflexible rule. Rather, prefer an 
approach which requires an assessment of the total 
circumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries, viewed against 
the background of the intended meaning of Article 17. Location 
of the passenger is but one of several factors to be considered. 
However, even under the more flexible interpretation of the 
language of Article 17, Maugnie's claim does not come within 
the scope of the Warsaw Convention. Maugnie's situation 
contrasts sharply with the status of the passengers in Day and 
343 See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53,255 N.Y.S.2d 249,203 N.E.2d 640 (1964); 
ALI Restatement Second of Foreign Relations Law ss 147, 153. 
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Evangelinos. There the passengers had obtained their boarding 
passes and were standing in line at the departure gate, waiting to 
be searched immediately before boarding. On those facts, it was 
reasonable for the courts to conclude that the travelers were 
involved in embarkation operations. Maugnie, on the other hand, 
had deplaned and was heading to the Swiss Air gate to make her 
connecting flight to Geneva at the time of injury. She had 
proceeded through a boarding lounge and into a common 
passenger corridor of Orly Airport which was neither owned nor 
leased by Air France. Furthermore, she was acting at her own 
direction and was no longer under the "control" of Air France. 
Under these circumstances, the court finds that appellant had 
completed disembarkation operations within the meaning of 
Article 17. 
One important thing from present case should be bear in 
mind is Judge Wallace (who argues that Day test is seriously 
wrong) concurring that the majority recognizes that application 
of either the location-of-the-passenger MacDonald test, or the 
tripartite Day test results in the same disposition. It is therefore 
plainly unnecessary in this case to resolve an important question 
concerning an international treaty. The court ought not to be 
reaching out to do so. However, if choose he must, he would 
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choose the MacDonald test because he believes that test is more 
in keeping with both a fair reading of the language of Article 17 
and the Article's historical derivation. 
Courts defining "disembarking" have consistently refused 
to extend the coverage of the Warsaw Convention to encompass 
injuries occurring within the terminal. The principle announced 
in MacDonald and followed by the courts in Felismina v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc.,344 and in re Tel Aviv345, created a standard 
which emphasized the passenger's location, thereby ending 
liability when the passenger has reached a "safe" point within 
the terminal. 
The Day test, on the other hand, suffers from several 
serious flaws. First, the conclusions reached by Day rest upon a 
somewhat selective reading of the Warsaw minutes.346 In other 
words, the substantial portions of the legislative history, which 
favor the location test,347 were disregarded. Second, the Day 
test is bottomed on a social theory of compensation designed to 
spread the burden of damages from travel to all travelers. By 
relying on this theory of social engineering, "the Day court 
clearly injected policy arguments alien to the spirit of the 
344 13 Av.Cas. P 17,145 (S.D.N.Y.1974). 
345 405 F.Supp. 154 (D.P.R.l975). 
346 See 45 Fordham L.Rev. at 380. 
347 See Id at 380-381. 
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Warsaw convention when drafted in 1929.,,348 Moreover, it is 
not possible to implement such a theory under the current terms 
of the Warsaw Convention without such a torturing of language 
as to constitute a redrafting. The court in Day, unfortunately, 
engaged in such contortions. If the signatories of the Convention 
wish to redraft it, they may do so, but the courts should not. 
Finally, it seems clear that the Day test was designed to extend a 
right of recovery to persons for whom sympathy inspires a 
method of compensation. The Day test was meant to be 
plaintiffs' law. Yet in many cases it may operate to thwart 
plaintiffs' attempts to recover the full value of their claims. The 
Warsaw Convention is a two-edged sword: the basis of liability 
is strict but at the same time the amount recoverable is limited. 
3-3. Particular circumstances considered: "embarking" 
3-3-1. The course of "embarking" established 
Under the circumstances presented in each of the following 
cases, it was held that at the time of the incident that caused 
their death or personal injuries, the passengers involved in each 
case were in the course of "embarking," as that word is used in 




















Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and that the provisions of 
the Convention were therefore applicable to death or personal 
injury actions arising out of the particular incident. 
Chutter v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines349 
wherein a passenger who, after boarding an airplane and 
being escorted to her seat, and while the "fasten seat belt" sign 
was lighted, got up from her seat and proceeded to the rear 
toward the open door of the aircraft in order to wave a farewell 
to relatives, was "on board the aircraft or in the course of any of 
the operations of embarking or disembarking," as that 
phraseology is used in Article 17. At the very moment that the 
passenger appeared at the doorway to wave the farewell, the 
ramp or loading stairs were being pulled away from the plane by 
employees, and the passenger fell from the plane as she went to 
step on the ramp which was no longer there. Without going into 
a detailed analysis of the law, the court merely stated that to hold 
otherwise in the instant case would be an unwarranted dissection 
of minute and almost undefinable areas from the coverage of the 
Convention. 




h T A· I· 350 s.. en v Japan zr znes 
Airline passengers were "embarking" within meaning of 
Article 1 7 when they were wrongfully detained and tortured by 
airline for 15 hours at hotel near airport and then wrongfully 
deported by airline. 
Rajcooar v. Air India Ltd. 351 
Passenger was in process of embarking on airplane, for 
purposes of applying the Warsaw Convention, where he was 
proceeding to departure gate when he suffered heart attack, he 
had completed virtually all steps required to board, and he was 
in part of airport accessible only to passengers on international 
flights. 
Leppo v Trans World Airlines, Inc. 352 
Also arising out of the same incident as the Day and 
Evangelinos Cases, the court affirmed the granting of a 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs to the extent of 
finding the airline absolutely liable under Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention. Noting that the precise issue before it was 
350 (1994, SD NY) 918 F Supp 686. 
351 89 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 




whether the terrorist attack took place in the course of 
"operations of embarking or disembarking," the court cited the 
opinions in the Day and Evangelinos cases, both supra, and 
expressed the view that while tenable arguments could be made 
for the point of view opposite that reached by those courts, it 
would be inadvisable for a state court to reach a different 
decision from that which the two United States Courts of 
Appeals rendered with respect to the identical incident, 
particularly where, as in the instant case, the question presented 
was one of federal treaty law. 
3-3-2. The course of "embarking" not established 
Under the circumstances presented in each of the following 
cases, it was held that at the time of the incident that caused 
their death or personal injuries, the passengers involved in each 
case were not in the course of "embarking," as that word is used 
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and that the provisions 
of the Convention were therefore inapplicable to death or 
personal injury actions arising out of the particular incident. 
Marotte v. Am. Airlines. Inc. 353 
353 296 F.3d 1255. 
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The husband and the wife, along with their son and his 
girlfriend, attempted to board their scheduled flight from Miami 
to New York, which was the final leg of their round-trip travel 
from New York to the Bahamas. The wife was unable to find 
their tickets and the husband asked the attendant on duty if they 
could board because the tickets had been paid for and the seats 
were already assigned. The attendant called over the supervisor, 
who refused to allow them to board the plane. The wife 
eventually found the tickets and when the party attempted to 
board the plane, the supervisor assaulted the husband. The 
husband was taken by ambulance to the hospital where he 
remained for a number of days. Four years after this event took 
place the husband and the wife brought the instant action. The 
court of appeals held that based on the total circumstances 
surrounding the incident in question, with particular emphasis 
placed on location, activity, control, and the imminence of the 
intended flight, the injury that the husband suffered due to the 
attack by the supervisor occurred in the process of embarking, 
as contemplated by the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, the 
husband and the wife's claims were barred by the Warsaw 
Convention's two-year limitations period. 
The court noted that the terms "embarking" and 
207 
"disembarking" are not specifically defined in the Convention. 
Despite the Marottes's contention to the contrary, however, the 
court held that the definition of the term "embarking" within the 
Warsaw Convention is a question of law to be decided by the 
court, not one of fact to be decided by the jury.354 That is, its 
interpretation is left up to the courts and is dependant upon the 
facts of each case.355 
Generally, when determining whether an airline is liable 
under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, courts employ a 
totality of the circumstances approach. 356 In making this 
determination, three factors are particularly relevant: (1) the 
passenger's activity at the time of the accident; (2) the 
passenger's whereabouts at the time of the accident; and (3) the 
amount of control exercised by the carrier at the moment of the 
injury.357 Additionally, courts also consider the imminence of 
the passenger's actual boarding of the flight in question. 358 
Under this analysis, no single factor is dispositive, and the three 
factors form a "single, unitary [analytical] base.,,359 However, 
because the term "embarking" evokes a "close temporal and 
354 See Blake v Am. Airlines, Inc., 245 F. 3d 1213, 1215 (11 th Cir. 2001). (" Construction of the 
{Varsaw Convention is a question of law. "). 
3
55 See Schmidkunz v Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 628 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9 th Cir. 1980). 
56 
See Maugnie v Compagnie Nationale Air France, (1977, CA9 Cal) 549 F2d 1256, 39 ALR Fed 
:40, cert den 431 US 974, 53 LEd 2d 1072, 97 S Ct 2939. 
57 S Id 
358 ee . 
359 See Buonocore v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1990). 
See McCarthy, 56 F. 3d at 317. . 
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spatial relationship with the flight itself," a close connection 
between the accident and the physical act of boarding the 
aircraft is required.360 
Seemingly ignoring these cases mentioned above, the 
Marottes asks the court "to adopt the view that a passenger is 
only 'embarking' after the ticket has been collected and honored 
for travel and the passenger is passed through [the] gate check 
where the boarding stub is given the passenger to be examined 
by the attendant on the plane." In other words, the Marottes ask 
the court to draw a bright-line at, what appears to be, the actual 
doorway to the jetway leading to the aircraft. Such a position 
based on arbitrary line-drawing "is both too arbitrary and too 
specific to have broad application,,361 Because treaties should 
generally be read to have broad applicability, the court rejected 
the Marottes's position and adopted the broader position of at 
least five other circuits. 
Viewing the total circumstances surrounding the incident in 
question, with particular emphasis placed on location, activity, 
control, and the imminency of the intended flight, leads the 
court to the firm conclusion that any injury that Mr. Marotte 
suffered due to the attack by Barrett occurred in the process of 
360 See Id at 316. 
361 See Evangelinos, 550 F.2d at 155. (drafters of the Warsaw Convention "intended a flexible 
approach which would adapt to the changing conditions of international air travel over the years"). 
209 
.[:'.11 
embarking, as contemplated by the Warsaw Convention. First, 
the party had their boarding passes in hand and were attempting 
to board the plane when the attack took place. This is significant 
because it shows that the Marottes had already passed through 
security and were in a section of the airport that is not open to 
the general public, but rather only to ticketed passengers.362 
Further, it evinces that the Marottes had satisfied almost all of 
the conditions precedent to boarding.363 Second, the door into 
which Mr. Marotte was pushed was the door leading to the 
actual aircraft he had hoped to board, evincing an extremely 
close spatial relationship between the attack and the aircraft. 
Third, as the facts clearly show, American Airlines exerted much 
control over the Marottes. By taking their boarding passes and 
tickets and forbidding them access to the jetway that led to the 
airplane they wished to board, American Airlines, through its 
employee Barrett, exerted control over the entire Marotte party. 
Furthermore, by jumping on top of Mr. Marotte, Barrett 
physically prevented him from boarding his intended flight. It is 
difficult to imagine a situation that more clearly establishes 
control then the act of physical restraint. Finally, it is apparent 
from the facts before the court that the flight in which the 
362 
363 See McCarthy, supra note 343, at 318. 




Marottes were attempting to board was imminent. All the 
Marottes had to do was pass through the glass door, which 
Barrett ordered closed, walk down the jetway, and take their 
seats. The fact that they were prevented from doing so, without 
more, does not take this case out of the purview of the Warsaw 
Convention. Viewing the surrounding facts in totality, the court 
concluded that the Warsaw Convention applies to the Marottes's 
claims, and therefore those claims are barred by the 
Convention's two-year limitations period. 
Upton v Iran Nat. Airlines Corp. 364 
Taking into account steps required by airline to complete 
embarkation, test for liability is based upon three elements, 
activity (what passengers were doing), control (at whose 
direction), and location; passengers had not entered into control 
of carrier where they were in public waiting area, not in 
restricted area reserved for departing passengers, and were free 
to proceed to restaurant, visit with nonpassengers, or exit 
building at time when roof of airport terminal collapsed causing 
death and injury to passengers. 
364 (SD NY) 450 F Supp 176. 
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Kflntonides v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines365 
In action against international air carrier in which airline 
passenger alleged that she had been injured as result of fall 
within airport terminal building, court granted carrier's motion 
for summary judgment where fall occurred on moving walkway 
within common area of airport terminal building, so accident did 
not occur during "course of any of the operations of embarking 
or disembarking" from plane, and action thus was not covered 
by Warsaw Convention; passenger's Injury occurred 
approximately one-half hour before her flight had been 
scheduled to depart, she had been injured about 200 to 500 feet 
from her departure gate, passengers for plaintiffs flight had not 
yet been congregated into specific geographical area, and there 
was no suggestion that carrier's personnel had been near moving 
walkway, monitoring it, or instructing passengers to use it. 
Schmidkunz v Scandinavian Airlines System366 
Passenger was not embarking as defined by Article 17 of 
Warsaw Convention, where she left airplane on which she had 
arrived, walked not closer than approximately 500 yards from 
boarding gate to airliner that she was to take, was still within 
365 (1992, DC NJ) 802 F Supp 1203. 
366 (1980, CA9 Cal) 628 F2d 1205. 
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common passenger area of terminal, did not receive boarding 
pass, was not imminently preparing to board plane, and was not 
at that time under direction of airline personnel. 
Stovall v Northwest Airlines. Inc. 367 
Plaintiff daughter brought an action against defendant 
international air carrier after she was injured and her mother was 
killed when they fell off a bus in route to the domestic air 
terminal where they were to board a connecting flight. The sole 
issue is whether Stovall and Shaleen were injured "in the course 
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Neither 
the text of the convention, nor its history, clearly defines the 
scope of liability for accidents in and around an airport terminal. 
Some courts, looking only to the passenger's location at the 
time of the accident, have defined the scope of liability narrowly. 
Thus, a passenger who fell in the baggage area of an airport was 
deemed to have disembarked from "the time he had descended 
from the plane by the use of whatever mechanical means had 
been supplied and had reached a safe point inside of the terminal, 
even though he may have remained in the status of a passenger 
of the carrier while inside the building. ,,368 However, with the 
367 (1992) 33 Mass App 1,595 NE2d 330. 
368 See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402,.1405 (1st Cir.1971). 
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growing risk of airport terrorism, courts have been called upon 
to extend the protection of the treaty to passengers within airport 
terminals.369 In Day case, and numerous other cases following it, 
courts have held that coverage would depend upon the particular 
facts analyzed on the basis of a number of factors: (1) the 
activity in which the passenger was engaged at the time of the 
accident; (2) the degree of control the airline had over the 
passenger at the time; (3) the physical proximity of the 
passenger to the aircraft; and (4) the closeness of the time of the 
accident to the passenger's entering or leaving the airplane?70 
Even under the more expansive Day test, which is now 
routinely applied whether the issue raised relates to embarkation 
or debarkation, the plaintiff in this case may not prevail. The 
accident occurred while the two women were engaged in the 
activity of travelling on a public bus from one terminal to 
another. True, they were required to travel between terminals to 
continue their flight, but the activity in which they were engaged 
presented none of the dangers generally associated with air 
travel with which the Warsaw Convention was concerned. 
Airline personnel exerted some restrictions and control over 
Stovall and Shaleen's activities by providing them with vouchers 
369 See e.g., Shinn v. El Al Israel Airlines. 21 Av.Cas. (CCH) 18,331 (D.Co1.1989); Sweis v. Trans 
~or1dAirlines, Inc .. 681 F.Supp. 501 (N.D.Il1.1988). 
oSee Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc .. ,550 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir.l977). 
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and escorting them to the Massachusetts Port Authority bus. The 
airline did not tell them they were required to take that particular 
bus, however, and they were free to proceed by any means of 
. h d . . 1371 If transportatIOn to t e omestlc termlna . any agency was 
directly in control of the two women at the time of the accident, 
it was the Massachusetts Port Authority, operating the bus, 
rather than Northwest, the airline. With regard to the relative 
proximity of the accident scene to the aircraft, the accident 
occurred a considerable distance from the airplane, the tarmac, 
or even the type of secure passenger waiting area on occasion 
found to be covered.372 Finally, with regard to the time factor, 
more than an hour had elapsed since the flight from London had 
landed, and the Minneapolis flight was not scheduled to depart 
for yet another two and a one-halfhours.373 
The plaintiff emphasizes the facts, different in some 
respects from those in the numerous cases cited by Northwest in 
which no liability was found, that at the time of the accident 
371 See Martinez Hernandez v. Air France. 545 F.2d 279,284 (1st Cir.l976); Knoll v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc .. 610 F.Supp. 844, 846-847 (D.Colo.l985); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines. 741 
ESupp. 441, 446 (S.D.N.Y.l990); Curran v. Aer Lingus. 17 Av.Cas. (CCH) 17,560, 17,562 
(S.D.N.Y.1982). 
372 See Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d at 282; Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air 
France. 549 F.2d at 1262; Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc .. 900 E2d 8, 9 (2d Cir.1990). 
Contrast Ricotta v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana, 482 F.Supp. 497, 499-500 (E.D.N.Y.l979) 
("accident occurred immediately after plaintiff had descended the steps of the aircraft" and "prior 
~~3 time that she entered any common passenger area"). 
Compare Schmidkunz v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys .. 628 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir.l980); 
Jiuonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc .. 900 F.2d at 10; Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines. 741 
ESupp. at 446. 
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stovall and Shaleen remained passengers on the Northwest 
flight from London to Minneapolis, they were in possession of 
their boarding cards, their baggage was in custody of the airline, 
and Northwest had made arrangements for their transportation 
between terminals. The plaintiff contends, therefore, that the 
women were on one continuous journey to their final destination. 
However, the court held: 
"The entire duration of a stop-over in the course of such a journey, however, is not 
necessarily included within 'the operations of embarking or disembarking' as that 
phrase is used in the Warsaw Convention.374 Where an accident occurs, as this one 
did, outside any airport terminal building while the passengers are on a public bus, 
substantially removed both in time and space from their flight, the court thinks the 
uniform result in courts throughout this country would be that the accident is not 
covered by the Warsaw Convention. The risk that materialized was not a risk of 
aviation. " 
Beaudet v British Airways, PLC375 
Beaudet (the passenger) slipped and fell in a lounge owned 
by the airline, while awaiting an international flight that was 
scheduled to depart almost 2 hours later. The Defendant 
contends that this case falls within the scope of the Convention; 
Plaintiff contends that it does not. This type of dispute is a 
matter of federal law and federal treaty interpretation. 376 In 
374 See Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines. 741 FSupp. at 447. 
375 (1994, ND Ill) 853 F Supp 1062. 
376 
See Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines. 875 F2d 613, 617 (7th Cir.l989) (quoting 
Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France. 549 F2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 
U.S. 974, 97 S.Ct. 2939, 53 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1977)). 
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interpreting a treaty, the Court must begin "with the text of the 
treaty and the context in which the written words are used. ,,377 
The Article at question here is the Warsaw Convention 
1929 Article 17. The court held, at minimum, Article 17's 
"embarkment" language does not extend to "all injuries a 
passenger sustained from the time he first entered the airport of 
departure until the moment he left the airport of arrival. ,,378 
Such a proposal was expressly rejected by the delegates of the 
Convention.379 Beyond this, the federal courts have adopted 
multifactor tests to determine whether a plaintiff may be said to 
have been injured during "any of the operations of embarking." 
In the Seventh Circuit, the proper test for determining the 
scope of" any of the operations of embarking" requires the Court 
to look at the total circumstances surrounding the Plaintiffs 
accident, "with particular emphasis on location, activity, and 
control.,,380 And the court concluded that under the Seventh 
377 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,396-97, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 1340-41,84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985). 
378 See id. 
379 See Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279,283 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 
950,97 S.Ct. 1592,51 L.Ed.2d 800 (1977), and Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890,97 S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976). 
380 This approach represents a combination of the multi-factor test applied by the Second Circuit 
in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890,97 
S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976) (using a "triparte test" considering activity, control, and 
location), and employed by both the First and Third Circuits and district courts in this district, see 
Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279,282 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950, 
97 S.Ct. 1592,51 L.Ed.2d 800 (1977); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 
155 (3d Cir.1977); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 501 (N.D.Il1.1988), with a 
"total circumstances" test employed by the Ninth Circuit in Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air 
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Circuit approach, or either of the other Circuits, the Plaintiff in 
this case was not performing "any of the operations of 
embarking. " 
Looking first to the three factors emphasized in Day, the 
Court finds that these factors favor a finding that the plaintiff 
was not in the course of embarking. First, location. This factor 
originated with a now rejected rule that required solely an 
inquiry into the passenger's location. Once the passenger had 
reached a "safe" point within the terminal, the Convention no 
longer applied.381 While the location of a passenger at the time 
of injury is but one factor to be considered, generally, the closer 
a passenger is to the gateway, or jetway or "jetty", the more 
likely the passenger is performing "any of the operations of 
embarking. ,,382 Also, location may include a reference to an 
area owned or leased by the defendant. 383 Here, the Plaintiff 
was nowhere near the gateway. In fact, she was on a different 
level of the airport, potentially hundreds of yards away from any 
gate from which she might board her plane. Plaintiff argues that 
she was "elevator rides, passageways, and potentially in excess 
381 See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir.1971). 
382 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 85-C-9899, 1987 WL 8168, 1987 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2053 (N.D.!Il. March 13, 1987) (fmding that the plaintiff was in the course of 
embarking when she was injured twelve feet from the gate room of her departing flight). 
383 See Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d at 618 (indicating that one reason 
Article 17 did not govern the plaintiffs case was because her injury occurred outside neither 
owned nor leased by the airline defendant). 
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of ten football fields from the departure gate." The Defendant 
virtually ignores this point, but does point out that Plaintiff was 
injured in an area controlled by the Defendant. This fact IS 
counterbalanced, however, by the other two factors. 
Second, control. The more a passenger is acting at the 
direction of an airline in boarding an airplane, the more the 
passenger may be said to be in the course of embarking.384 Here, 
the Plaintiff was acting entirely at her own direction. She was 
free to leave and re-enter the Lounge at any time and there was 
nothing in the Lounge that the airline considered a prerequisite 
to boarding. While the Defendant controlled whether or not a 
given passenger could enter the Lounge, that fact has no bearing 
on the Plaintiffs boarding her flight. Had she so desired, the 
Plaintiff need never have entered the Lounge. Even if the 
Defendant had directed her to stay in the Lounge, it is unlikely 
that Plaintiff could be said to be in the Defendant's control, since 
she had not been segregated from other passengers on other 
flights or airlines.385 
384 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 85-C-9899, 1987 WL 8168 at *4, 1987 
D.S. Dist. LEXIS 2053 at *11 (finding that the plaintiff was in the course of embarking when she 
Was "in the process of completing acts required of her by the defendant."); see also Sweis v. Trans 
:World Airlines, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 501, 505 (N.D.Il1.1988) (stating that the passengers' standing in 
line at the direction of the Defendant's employee was not necessarily within the Defendant's 
Control). 
385 
See Sweis. 681 F.Supp. at 505. 
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Third, activity. The more a passenger's actions relate to the 
purpose of boarding, the more likely the passenger may be said 
to be in the course of embarking.386 Plaintiff was relaxing when 
she was injured. Her purpose was to get some reading material, 
not board any plane. While Defendant correctly points out that 
another of her purposes was that of waiting for her flight, it is 
the opinion of the Court that this notion of "activity" is too 
broad to assist in the current inquiry. Otherwise, any passenger 
waiting for a plane might be said to be in the course of 
embarking. As any air traveler is well aware, waiting for a plane 
and starting to get on it are two different things. 
Extending this inquiry to other factors does not assist the 
Defendant. In Sweis,387 Judge Shadur read Day to include an 
"imminence" factor, that is, any inquiry into how soon the plane 
was to be boarded. Here, boarding was not imminent when the 
Plaintiff was injured. At best, Plaintiff was injured one and a 
half hours before her flight was to leave, and a half of an hour 
before the flight even was to be called for boarding. At worst, 
the flight was a full two hours from departure and a full hour 
386 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 85-C-9899, 1987 WL 8168 at *4, 1987 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2053 at * 11. (finding that the plaintiff was in the course of embarking when her 
actions "were solely related to the purpose of boarding.") 
387 See supra note 378. . 
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from boarding. Under either VIew, boarding was not 
"imminent".388 
Plaintiff was injured in a Lounge maintained and operated 
by the Defendant, but used for passengers on multiple of the 
Defendants' flights and by passengers on other airlines. She was 
injured not less than one and one half hour before her flight was 
to leave and a half hour before it was to board. She was not 
doing anything at the Defendant's direction or for the purpose of 
boarding. And, she was on a level of the airport that differed 
from the gate level at the time she was injured. In these 
circumstances, the Court must conclude that she was not 
engaged in "any of the operations of embarking." 
In an analogous case, Buonocore,389 the Second Circuit 
held that Article 17 did not govern an injury to a passenger who 
had only checked in at a ticket counter and was injured in a 
public area. There, as here, the plaintiff was unrestricted in his 
movement. The fact that Plaintiff here was injured in a location 
maintained by the Defendant is not dispositive. In Sweis,390 the 
plaintiffs were under more control of the airline than was 
388 Compare Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F.Supp. at 505 (stating that boarding was not 
"imminent" when departure was scheduled for two hours after the plaintiffs injury) with Day, 528 
F.2d at 32-34 (indicating that when passengers were injured while in line at the gate of departure, 
boarding was imminent). 
389 Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.1990). 
390 See supra note 378. 
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Plaintiff here, yet the Court held that the Convention did not 
apply. Other authorities also support this conclusion.391 
The two cases most favoring Defendants, Day 392 and 
Jefferies,393 are distinguishable. In both cases, the Court found 
that Article 17 applied to a passenger's claim for damages. In 
Day, passengers were killed and injured when terrorists attacked 
them while they stood in line at a departure gate, waiting to be 
searched before entering their airplane. At the time of the attack, 
the passengers had surrendered their tickets, passed through 
passport control, and entered the areas reserved for departures 
on international flights, just like Plaintiff here. In addition, 
however, they were assembled at the departure gate "virtually 
ready to proceed to the aircraft" and they were required to stand 
in line at the airline's directions, and boarding was imminent. 
Plaintiff here was subject to none of these last conditions. 
391 See Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir.l977) (holding that 
Article 17 did not govern passenger injured in public area not under the "control" of the air line, 
despite fact that passenger was on way to connecting flight), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974, 97 S.Ct. 
2939, 53 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1977); Kantonides v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 802 F.Supp. 1203 
(D.NJ.1992) (holding that passengers were not "in the course of the operations of embarking" 
when they were injured on a moving walkway when en route to connecting flight; passengers had 
not yet been segregated); Rolnick v. EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 551 F.Supp. 261 (E.D.N.Y.l982) 
(holding that Article 17 did not govern passenger injured on elevator in public area while 
proceeding to his gate); Upton v. Iran Nat'l Airlines, Corp., 450 F.Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y.1978) 
(holding that Article 17 did not govern passenger injured under the collapse of a roof after being 
directed to wait in a public area by the defendant's personnel because the passengers were free to 
~~ve about the airport), affd, Upton v. Iran Nat'lAirlines Corp., 603 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.l979). 
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890,97 
~3Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976). 
Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 85-C-9899, 1987 WL 8168, 1987 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 
2053 (N.D.Ill. March 13, 1987). 
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Similarly, in Jefferies, the plaintiff was injured while completing 
acts required by the airline, was twelve feet from her departure 
gate room, and her actions were "solely related to the purpose of 
boarding." None of these conditions are similar to those of the 
plaintiff here. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds, as a matter of 
law, that Plaintiff was not "in the course of any of the operations 
of embarking" when she was injured. 
Buonocore v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 394 
Appellant parents filed an action against appellee airline, 
arguing that appellee was liable for the death of their son due to 
a terrorist attack at a Rome airport, pursuant to Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention. The language of Article 17, however, is not 
so clear. Reasonable people may differ as to whether the focus 
should be on "embarkation", so that only the physical act of 
enplaning is covered. Alternatively, a focus on "any operations" 
can be broad enough to cover almost any transaction between a 
passenger and an airline relating to the passenger's eventual 
walk onto the airplane. Reference to the treaty's history therefore 
. . 395 
IS appropnate. 
394 900 F.2d 8 (1990, CA2 NY). 





The court held that consistent with a flexible approach, 
such as Day case, several factors should be assessed to 
determine whether a passenger was "in the course of any of the 
operations of embarking". The factors to be considered are: (1) 
the activity of the passengers at the time of the accident; (2) the 
restrictions, if any, on their movement; (3) the imminence of 
actual boarding; and (4) the physical proximity of the 
passengers to the gate. 
The Day test has come under some criticism over the years 
on the ground that it construed Article 1 7 too broadly in favor of 
liability.396 Aside from the rule that one panel of the Court is 
not free to overrule the holding of a previous one,397 the court 
hold that the Day analysis is still the correct one. A side-by-side 
comparison of the facts in Day with the facts in the instant case 
leads the court to believe that a different outcome is warranted. 
The first factor enunciated in Day is the activity of the 
passengers at the time of the accident. The Day passengers were 
actively engaged in preparations to board the plane. By contrast, 
Buonocore here had only checked in at the ticket counter and 
(1943). 
396 Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F2d 1256, 1262 (9 Cir.) (Wallace, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 97497 S.Ct. 2939, 53 L.Ed.2d IOn (1977); Martinez 
Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 283-84 (1 Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 95097 S.Ct. 
1592, 51 L.Ed.2d 800 (1977); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 FSupp. 501, 504 
(N.D.Ill.1988). 
397 See e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F2d 786, 788 (2 Cir.1980.), affd, 456 U.S. 
461,102 S.Ct. 1883, n L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). 
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,1,,1" 
was in the public area near a snack counter. The second factor is 
the restrictions on the passengers' movement. The Day 
passengers had been herded in line and risked missing the flight 
if they strayed. Buonocore had ample time to roam freely about 
the terminal before his flight was called. The third factor is the 
imminence of actual boarding. The Day passengers were within 
minutes of boarding. Buonocore's flight was to depart almost 
two hours later. The fourth factor is the proximity of passengers 
to the gate. The Day passengers were at the gate. Buonocore was 
nowhere near the gate. 
Appellants here place great emphasis on the fact that the 
Day passengers, like Buonocore, had not yet gone through 
security inspection, although they acknowledge that, unlike 
Buonocore, the Day passengers had gone through passport and 
immigration control. The disparity in physical layout between 
the Rome and Athens airports explains why this similarity is 
relatively unimportant. At the time of the Day terrorist attack, 
passengers in Athens could not avail themselves of security 
inspection until immediately before they boarded the plane. 
They had no choice but to remain exposed to the risks 
associated with an area open to the public. By contrast, the 
Rome airport has the configuration more familiar to the 
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contemporary traveler. That is, passengers may use the services 
(restaurants, newsstands, and the like) in the airport's public 
areas, and wait until the last minute to go through the security 
checkpoint (i.e., when the passengers walk through the metal 
detector and submit their carry-on bags for x-ray screening). 
Alternatively, if they choose to undergo security inspection 
earlier, they can find the same services in the "secured" or 
"sterile" area. Since passengers are free to exercise that option, it 
would not be consistent with Article 17 to hold airlines liable to 
those passengers who elect to remain in the area open to the 
general public. If the court was to adopt appellants' claim, for 
practical purposes the court would be imposing Article 17 
liability on airlines for all accidents that occur in airport 
terminals. The drafters of Article 17 specifically rejected such 
liability. 
Appellants and TWA do not agree whether TWA instructed 
Buonocore to arrive at least two hours prior to departure. On 
appeal from summary judgment in favor of TWA, the court 
assumes all inferences favorable to appellants, including the 
assumption that the airline did so instruct Buonocore. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of Day above leads the court to hold 
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that this one factor in favor of Article 17 liability is insufficient 
by itself to tip the balance in favor of appellants. 
"This court has applied the Day test once before.398 In Upton, the passengers had 
checked in and were waiting for their delayed flight in the airport's public area when 
the roof collapsed, killing several. The case was similar to the instant one in all 
material respects other than the cause of the injuries. The district court, applying Day, 
ruled for the airline, due primarily to the fact that the passengers were in the airport's 
public area and not under any immediate supervision by the airline. 399 We affirmed 
without opinion. 
Appellants contend that the distinction between a terrorist attack and a roof collapse is 
significant for Article 17 liability. They fail to point to any basis for such distinction in 
the treaty's text or history. Instead they merely assert that terrorism is a more serious 
danger in modem air travel. While they may be correct, that strikes the court as 
having no apparent relevance to the issue of the construction of a treaty. 
The court aware, as was the district court, of the well-reasoned opinion in Sweis400, 
infra, which involved an action for damages arising from the same terrorist attack as 
in the instant case. Sweis criticized the Day test, but applied it anyway. It held in favor 
of TWA on a motion for summary judgment. We find the analysis in Sweis, while not 
binding, to be persuasive." 
Appellants attempt to distinguish Sweis on the ground that 
Buonocore had received his boarding pass and baggage claim 
check, while the Sweis passengers were in line waiting for theirs. 
To the extent that this distinction is relevant, it cuts both ways. 
The Sweis passengers were at an earlier stage of the check-in 
process than was Buonocore, but they were under greater 
restriction of movement by TWA than was Buonocore. 
For the reasons above, the court held that Buonocore has 
not in "any operation of embarking". 
398 
See Upton v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 450 FSupp. 176 (S.D.N.Y.1978), affd mem., 603 F2d 
215 (2 Cir 1979) 
399 .' • 
400 See Id at 178. 
Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 FSupp. 501 (N.D.I1l.1988). 
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S.weis v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 401 
Terrorists attacked the airline's terminal at an Italian airport 
at around 9:10 a.m. The travelers were injured in that attack, and 
filed suit against the airline. The only issue in this case is: Did 
the accident that caused the injuries take place "in the course of 
any of the operations of embarking"? 
Sweises (the passengers) say because they were checking 
their baggage and obtaining boarding passes at the time of the 
attack, they were engaged in one of the operations of embarking. 
That does not overly strain the word "embark" taken alone--two 
of its accepted meanings are "to make a start" and "to engage, 
enlist or invest in an enterprise ,,402. But that certainly cannot be 
the meaning of the word in the context of a treaty fixing air 
carriers' liability to their passengers. After all, Sweises 
"embarked" in that same sense when they started for the airport. 
Certainly the Convention did not contemplate carrier liability 
that far afield. Moreover, the term "embark" is paired with 
"disembark," a word of narrow meaning: It is defined only as "to 
go ashore out of a ship" and "to get out of any vehicle" .403 
Normal reading would treat the terms as a matching pair, so that 
401 See id. 
402 See Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 739 (1976). 
403 S . 
ee Id at 648. . 
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the correspondingly limited meaning of "embark" would also 
apply. 
By examined the famous Day case, which emphasizes four 
factors: activity, control, imminence, and location. TWA says 
Day was wrongly decided and mounts a frontal attack on its 
doctrine. TWA reads the legislative history and 
contemporaneous understanding of Article 17 as applying strict 
liability only when passengers are actually boarding or 
"deplaning" the aircraft (and perhaps when they are crossing 
from aircraft to terminal). TWA's argument has plausibility and, 
while no United States court has held Article 17 is that limited, 
several judges and commentators have criticized Day's 
interpretation of the legislative history. However, the court held 
that to decide this case it is unnecessary to choose between the 
Day approach and TWA's position. Neither alternative imposes 
liability on TWA under the Convention. 
As for the first factor--the activity in which the passenger is 
engaged--in Day the passengers were standing in line to be 
searched before boarding, which the court characterized as a 
"condition of embarkation". 404 Sweises were checking their 
baggage and obtaining boarding passes, also conditions of 
404 528 F.2d at 33. 
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embarkation. But compared to the Day plaintiffs, Sweises' 
activities were several steps further removed from actual 
boarding. They still had to go through passport control and a 
security check, make their way to the boarding gate and wait for 
their flight to be called. No case applying Day has found Article 
17 to apply at a stage of the departure process so remote from 
physical embarkation. 
As for the second factor--carrier restriction of the 
passengers' movements-- the Day plaintiffs were told by airline 
personnel to stand in line at the boarding gate. They had to obey 
if they wanted to go on their flight. Sweises stress that factor, 
noting that TWA required them to obtain boarding passes and 
chose the location of the ticket counter outside a sterile area. But 
Sweises were not in TWA's control in the same sense as the 
plaintiffs in Day. TWA employees had not told them to go 
someplace at a specific time as in Day. Rather, TWA required 
them to get a boarding pass at its counter at some time. It is also 
unclear that each of the Sweises had to go to the counter to get a 
pass. Sayel (one of the passengers) had gone elsewhere. Finally, 
unlike the situation in Day, TWA had not segregated its 
passengers from those on other flights (or even other airlines): 
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Michael (one of the passengers) was with the rest of the family 
and he was not a TWA passenger. 
As for the third factor--the ImmInence of actual 
boarding--in Day the plaintiffs were a few moments from 
getting on the aircraft. Here departure was not scheduled until 
two hours after the attack. Boarding can hardly be said to have 
been imminent. 
As for the final factor--physical proximity to the plane or 
the boarding gate--in Day the plaintiffs were a few feet from the 
boarding gate and 250 meters from the plane. Here Sweises 
were about 620 feet (by the most direct route) from the boarding 
gate, and their plane had not yet even landed in Rome. 
Thus, on all four factors identified in Day this case presents 
no really persuasive reason to apply Article 17 --each factor has a 
far more attenuated nexus than in Day to the primary 
"embarkation" concept of physical boarding of the aircraft. And 
there is another practical reason supporting the conclusion that 
Article 17 should not apply. When the Convention governs, its 
provisions supplant local law. There may be substantial variance 
between the agreed international rule and the local rule. It makes 
sense that there ought to be a point at which the Convention's 
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provisions attach at the beginning of the trip, and another where 
they end once the trip is over. 
Yet to accept Sweises' position would have passengers 
"wandering" in and out of the Convention's coverage. 
Passengers might be seen as under a carrier's control or in 
sufficient proximity to the gate at any number of points after 
arriving at the airport, but not at others.405 For example, had 
Sweises left the check-in counter to go to a lunchroom 
elsewhere in the airport once they had obtained boarding passes, 
the analysis they urge would treat them as no longer being in an 
operation of boarding. Then when going through security they 
might again be boarding (depending on how the Day factors are 
assessed). Then when left to their own devices in the Transit 
Hall, they would again not be boarding and would be subject to 
local law. Obviously the variations could be multiplied. 
It is always necessary to draw lines in shaping legal rules, 
even if it is not possible to say precisely where the lines should 
be drawn before a specific case presents itself. Yet it is generally 
preferable to draw fewer lines rather than more--if only for the 
sake of simplicity and certainty. The court stated that: 
405 See, e.g., Rolnick v. EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 551 F.Supp. 261, 263-64 (ED.N.Y.1982), 
where passengers were injured while walking to passport control, after having obtained boarding 
passes and checked their bags. Applying Day, the Court found Article 17 nonapplicable. 
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"We need not resolve whether the one line needed to give Article 17 meaning should 
be drawn at the terminal wall, as TWA suggests. Rather it is enough to say that the 
Convention has clearly drawn the line at some point much closer to actual boarding 
than where Sweises were." 
3-4. Particular circumstances considered: "disembarking" 
3-4-1. The course of "disembarking" not established 
Under the circumstances presented in each of the following 
cases, it was held that at the time of the incident that caused 
their death or personal injuries, the passengers involved in each 
case were not in the course of "disembarking," as that word is 
used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and that the 
provisions of the Convention were therefore inapplicable to 
death or personal injury actions arising out of the various 
incidents. 
In the following cases from the First Circuit, the courts 
appeared to place more emphasis on the location factor, but did 
not foreclose the consideration of other criteria in determining 
the applicability of the terms "embarking" and "disembarking" 
to particular circumstances. 
MacDonald v Air Canada406 
406 (1971, CAl Mass) 439 F2d 1402. 
233 
This is the most often cited case by other courts as 
advocating a strict location test. The passenger, a 74-year-old 
woman in apparent good health and who was accompanied, fell 
in the baggage area while awaiting her suitcase. The airline had 
leased rights to the baggage delivery and customs clearance area 
along with other carriers who used it simultaneously. The 
passenger had made no request for any assistance and gave no 
appearance of needing any. On appeal, the court held that there 
was no negligence on the part of the airline because the airline 
should not have known that the passenger needed volunteer 
attention. The court held further that the airline was not liable 
under the Warsaw Convention, holding that there was no basis 
for finding an accident, which was the first requirement under 
the Convention. 
In addition, even if there was evidence of an accident, the 
Convention required that the accident occur in the course of 
disembarking operations. The court held that if these words 
were given their ordinary meaning, it would seem that the 
operation of disembarking had terminated by the time the 
passenger has descended from the plane by the use of whatever 
mechanical means have been supplied and has reached a safe 
point inside of the terminal, even though he may remain in the 
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status of a passenger of the carrier while inside the building. 
Examination of the Convention's original purposes reinforces 
this view. The most important purpose of the Warsaw 
Conference was the protection of air carriers from the crushing 
consequences of a catastrophic accident, a protection thought 
necessary for the economic health of the then emerging industry. 
Partially in return for the imposition of recovery limits, and 
partially out of recognition of the difficulty of establishing the 
cause of an air transportation accident, the Conference also 
placed the burden on the carrier of disproving negligence when 
an accident occurred. 407 Neither the economic rationale for 
liability limits, nor the rationale for the shift in the burden of 
proof, applies to accidents which are far removed from the 
operation of aircraft. Without determining where the exact line 
occurs, it had been crossed in the case at bar. 
Martinez Hernandez v Air France408 
It was held that passengers killed or injured by a terrorist 
attack in the baggage claim area of an airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, 
were not in the course of disembarking insofar as that word is 
407 II Conference International De Droit Prive Aerien, 4-12 Octobre 1929, at 135-36 (1930); 
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. G, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934). 






used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The facts 
indicated that on arrival at the airport, the plane came to a halt 
about 113 to 112 mile from the terminal building, the passengers 
then descending movable stairs to the ground from where they 
walked or rode a bus to the terminal. Once at the terminal, they 
presented their passports for inspection by Israeli immigration 
officials and then passed into the main baggage area of the 
terminal. It was while the passengers were awaiting the arrival 
of the baggage that three terrorists removed their luggage from 
the conveyor belt, produced submachine guns and hand 
grenades, and opened fire upon persons in the baggage area. 
In rejecting the passengers' claim that the case cited by the 
District Court as controlling precedent 409 should be 
re-examined III light of recent decisions involving the 
applicability of Article 17 to injuries sustained in a terrorist 
attack on departing passengers,410 the court stated that it did not 
view its holding in the precedential decision as necessarily 
foreclosing the adoption of the tripartite test used to determine 
the applicability of Article 17 in the other terrorist attack cases, 
and further expressed the view that the nature of a plaintiffs 
409 The case cited was MacDonald v Air Canada, supra. 
410 The decisions specifically referred to were Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1975, CA2 NY) 
528 F2d 31,36 ALR Fed 477, cert den 429 US 890, 50 L Ed 172,97 S Ct 246, reh den 429 US 
1124,51 LEd 574, 97 S Ct 1162; and Evangelinos v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1977, CA3 Pa) 
550 F2d 152, both discussed supra. 
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activity when injured, its location, and the extent to which the 
airline was exercising control over the plaintiff at the time of the 
injury are certainly relevant considerations in determining the 
applicability of the Article. 
Applying the tripartite test to the facts of the instant case, 
the court noted that at the time of the attack all that remained to 
be done before the passengers left the airport was to pick up 
their baggage, and that passengers who either carry no luggage 
or carry their luggage on the plane, would have no occasion to 
retrieve their baggage, it seeming therefore, that such activity 
could not constitute a necessary step in becoming separated 
from a plane. The court felt that the passengers' location also 
militated against Article 17 coverage since the attack occurred 
inside the terminal building located approximately 1/3 to 112 
mile from the point where the aircraft was parked. The control 
factor also weighed against holding the carrier liable, stated the 
court, since in sharp contrast to the factual situations in the other 
terrorist attack cases cited by the passengers, they were not here 
segregated into a group at the direction of airline employees, 
there being no indication that airline personnel were dictating to 
the passengers how they were to go about retrieving their 
baggage or leaving the terminal, and that, rather, the passengers 
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appeared to have been "free agents roaming at will through the 
terminal. " 
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion that the 
operation of disembarking continues until the passengers 
retrieve their baggage, such suggestion being based on Article 
18, in which a carrier's liability for damage to baggage extends 
until the baggage is retrieved, the court noting that the history of 
the Warsaw Convention indicates that the questions of baggage 
liability and personal injury liability were intended to be 
absolutely distinct. Referring to the intentions of the framers of 
the Convention, the court concluded that while the drafting 
history did not determine the precise meaning of Article 17, it 
was quite clear that the delegates understood embarkation and 
disembarkation as essentially the physical activity of entering or 
exiting from an aircraft, rather than as a broader notion of 
initiating or ending a trip. 
The court added that a fundamental premIse of the 
argument for expanding carrier liability in this case is that the 
risk of death or injury in a terrorist attack is appropriately 
regarded as a characteristic risk of air travel, but the court felt 
that this could not be said of the sort of senseless act of violence 
involved in this case, since the risk of violence at the hand of 
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zealots could occur in any public place, whether it be a bank, 
courthouse, university campus, Olympic village, or airport. 
Unlike the risk of hijacking, stated the court, where the aircraft 
and the fact of air travel are prerequisites to the crime, the risk 
of a random attack such as that which gave rise to this litigation 
is not a risk characteristic of travel by aircraft, but rather a risk 
of living in today's world. Finally, the court observed that to 
expand carrier liability under Article 17 to include all terrorist 
attacks at airports would produce anomalous results, since, 
under Article 17, only passengers could have a right to recover, 
and that any nonpassengers injured in the same attack would not 
have the benefit of the absolute liability provisions of the 
Convention.411 
Tl C · IA·I· 412 urturro v. ontznenta zr meso 
Airline passenger who requested to deplane pre-departure 
due to anxiety had fully disembarked within meaning of Warsaw 
411 AffIrmed by the Martinez Hernandez Case was Re Tel Aviv (1975, DC Puerto Rico) 405 F 
Supp 154, in which the court expressed the view that whatever uncertainties there may be as to the 
precise line drawn by Article 17, the legislative history of the Convention indicated that Article 17 
was not intended to be applicable to accidents occurring after the passenger "has reached a safe 
point inside of the terminal," and "which are far removed from the operation of the aircraft." 
The court in Maugnie v Compagnie Nationale Air France (1977, CA9 Cal) 549 F2d 1256, 39 ALR 
Fed 440, cert den 431 US 974, 53 L Ed 1072, 97 S Ct 2939, supra, disapproved of the position 
taken by the court in Re Tel Aviv, as expressing a point of view too closely related to a strict 
location test, the Maugnie Court preferring the tripartite test initially set out in the Day and 
Evangelinos Cases, both supra. 
412 
128F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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Convention at time that airline employees allegedly caused, via 
conversations with police, passenger's false imprisonment in 
mental hospital; conversations occurred in terminal after 
passenger was out of airline's control, and thus airline could not 
be liable under Convention's accident provisions for employees' 
statements. 
Knoll v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 413 
Passenger who, after leaving airplane, walked 
approximated 100 yards to first moving sidewalk and then 
traveled on two more moving sidewalks approximately 100 
yards each and who, as she approached immigration area, 
slipped and fell on some liquid sustaining injuries including 
fractured elbow, did not fall while disembarking airplane for 
purposes of Article 17 of Warsaw Convention. Airline did not 
have exclusive use of area where accident occurred as plaintiff 
was in concourse of airport which was not near enough to airline 
gate from which she had walked to warrant finding of liability 
and she was not under control of airline agents at that point but 
involved in activity of looking for immigration; plaintiffs 
actions in going through immigration and customs were not 
413 (1985, DC Colo) 610 F Supp 844. 
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conditions imposed by airline for her disembarking but by host 
country in which plaintiff and her husband were traveling. 
Klein v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines414 
An action arising out of an infant's injuries caused by a 
conveyor belt in an airport, the court held in a memorandum 
opinion that the plaintiffs, having gotten off the aircraft and 
having arrived safely within the terminal, had disembarked 
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. 
3-4-2. The course of "disembarking" established 
Under the circumstances presented in each of the following 
cases, it was held that at the time of the incident that caused 
their death or personal injuries, the passengers involved in each 
case were in the course of "disembarking," as that word is used 
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and that the provisions 
of the Convention were therefore applicable to death or personal 
injury actions arising out of the various incidents. 
Ricotta v Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana415 
Ricotta (the passenger) had flown on a flight operated by 
414 (1974) 46 App Div 2d 679, 360 NYS2d 60. 
415 (1979, ED Ny) 482 F Supp 497. 
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the airline, when the flight arrived, the passenger boarded a bus 
that was to drive the passenger, and the others from the flight, to 
the airport terminal, the passenger fell when the bus moved, and 
the passenger sustained personal injuries. The passenger filed an 
action against the airline, but the complaint was filed more than 
two years after the accident. The only issue here is whether the 
accident occurred while plaintiff was "disembarking" within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the Convention. If plaintiff was injured 
during the course of operations of disembarking, then the rights 
of the parties are governed by the provisions of the Warsaw 
Convention. The two year period of limitations contained in 
Article 27 of the Convention would therefore be applicable to 
the damage action and the failure to commence suit within the 
two year period perforce would extinguish plaintiff's remedy. 
It is well established that on a motion for summary 
judgment, the moving party has the burden of showing that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.416 Yet an action to determine the 
precise meaning of the terms of the Warsaw Convention is to be 
treated by the court as a question of law and not as a triable 
416 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Friedman v. 
Meyers, 482 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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issue of fact.417 The scope of the Convention IS a matter of 
federal law and federal treaty interpretation.418 
Here, plaintiff had descended from the plane, but she had 
neither reached a safe point inside the terminal nor left the 
control of Iberia personnel. The area where the incident 
occurred was not a public portion of the airport and only aircraft 
passengers, airline staff and airport ground personnel were 
permitted in the area. Further, the accident occurred immediately 
after plaintiff had descended the steps of the aircraft and prior to 
the time that she entered any common passenger area. Plaintiff 
had not proceeded through Spanish immigration or customs and 
had not located her baggage. She was not roaming at will but 
was within the control of Iberia personnel who were directing 
passengers to board airport buses owned and operated by Iberia. 
The buses were located near the plane and the terminal was 
some distance from the aircraft. Significantly, on the date of the 
accident, the Iberia bus driver completed an Iberia accident 
report in accordance with Iberia company policy. Under such 
factual circumstances, the court finds that plaintiff was in the 
417 Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 392 U.S. 
905, 88 S.Ct. 2053, 20 L.Ed.2d 1363 (1968); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 
F.Supp. 95 (W.D.Pa.1975), Rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally 
Strong v. United States, 518 F.2d 556, 563, 207 Ct.Cl. 254 (1975); Citizen Band of Potawatomi 
Indians v. United States, 391 F.2d 614,618, 179 Ct.Cl. 473 (1967), Cert. denied 389 U.S. 1046,88 
S.Ct. 771, 19 L.Ed.2d 839 (1968). 
418 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F.Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.1975). 
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course of disembarking as envisioned by Article 17. 
The court's determination is further supported both by the 
French text and the purpose of the Convention. The binding 
meaning of the terms of the Convention is the French legal 
meaning. 419 The French word "operation" contained in the 
official version of the Convention connotes "a process of many 
acts" combined to achieve a result.420 Finally, the minutes of the 
Convention proceedings undermine any contention that the 
delegates wished to implement a narrow construction or a rigid 
rule in determining accident coverage pursuant to Article 17.421 
Accordingly, the Warsaw Convention is applicable to the 
accident in question. The claim is therefore barred by the two 
year time period of Article 29(1) and summary judgment is 
granted on behalf of the defendant. 
People ex rei. Compagnie Nationale Air France v Giliberto. 422 
Removal of passengers from airplane by hijackers at point 
which was neither intended destination nor intended 
intermediate stop cannot realistically be looked upon as 
419 See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 392 
U.S. 905, 88 S.Ct. 2053, 20 L.Ed.2d 1363 (1968). 
420 See Nouveau Petit Larousse (1950). 
421 See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 
Harv.L.Rev. 497 (1967). 
422 74 Ill2d 90,23111 Dec 106,383 NE2d 977, cert den 441 US 932, 60 LEd 2d 660, 99 S Ct 
2052. 
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"disembarkation" which would terminate airline's liability under 
article 17 of Warsaw Convention. 
A . Il A· 1 423 Lyons v merzcan rans lr, nco 
When Lyons fell, she had just deplaned and was walking 
down a corridor under the control and supervision of ATA and 
Sceptre agents or employees. Lyons was not free to move about 
the terminal, nor was she in a common public area. Rather, she 
was being escorted by airline personnel to customs, a necessary 
step in the disembarking process. It is therefore clear that, since 
the injury occurred "in the course of. .. the operations 
of ... disembarking" from an international flight, the Warsaw 
Convention governs the claims. 
3-5. Location is the crucial factor, if not the only factor, in 
English approach 
Probably due to the different attitude to process a lawsuit in 
court, English courts have seldom occasions to consider the 
meaning of "embarking" or "disembarking" in the Article 17 of 
the Warsaw Convention. Until the present day, there is no 




authority on "embarking", nevertheless, there is a landmark 
case 424 on the issue of "disembarking", from which, the English 
Court of Appeal express the opinion that location is the crucial 
factor, if not the only factor to determine the extent of from 
embarking to disembarking. 
Adatia v Air Canada425 . (The leading English case) 
The plaintiff arrived at Heathrow Airport from Toronto and 
suffered injury on the moving walkway while proceeding from 
the aircraft to the immigration and customs hall. More than two 
years after the accident, she issued a writ against Air Canada 
alleging negligence, which raised fairly and squarely the 
question whether, at the time of the accident, she had been "in 
the course of disembarkation," in which case the Warsaw 
Convention applied and with it the two-year time-bar of Article 
29. The English Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the 
County Court that the plaintiff had not suffered the injury in the 
course of disembarkation and that the Warsaw Convention, with 
two-year time-bar, did not apply. 
The Warsaw Convention is given the force of law in the 
UK by section 1 of the Carriage by Air Act 1961, as there is no 
424 Adatia v Air Canada, May 21, 1992. Lloyds Aviation Law, vol. 11, No. 13, July 1, 1992. 




dispute in this case that the defendants are vicariously liable for 
such negligent acts, the only question is whether the two year 
period provided for by the Convention applied, so as to render 
the plaintiffs claim out of time. This depended on whether the 
claim fell within Article 17. 
As the judge said, the point to be resolved was whether her 
injuries, which sustained on the travelator, were caused "in the 
course of any of the operations of ... disembarking". There is 
no English authority which specifically deals with the meaning 
of those words. In the absence of such authority, the judge 
concluded: "One has to construe them in their ordinary English 
meaning and disembarking, either from a ship or aircraft, in my 
judgment means leaving the ship or aircraft and actually 
stepping on to dry land or that part of the non-movable part of 
the airfield or aerodrome or terminal." The judge derived 
support for this conclusion from an American authority, 
MacDonald v Air Canada.426 
The equivalent phrase of Article 17 in the French text
427 
reads: "Au cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de 
debarquement". It is thus plain that the draftsman contemplated 
that the process of disembarking, as well as that of embarking, 
426 MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1970). 
427 Which must prevail ifthere is any inconsistency with the English text -- see section 1(2) of the 
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may In some circumstances be capable of including at least 
some activities beyond the mere actual assent or descent of the 
steps of an aircraft or use of an equivalent device. Problems, 
however, may arise in determining what other location should be 
treated as the point where the process of embarkation begins or 
the process of disembarking ends. 
While there appears to be no relevant English authority, the 
problem has given rise to extensive case law in other 
jurisdictions. The object of the Convention as thereby described 
is "the unification of certain rules relating to international 
carriage by air". So far as possible, therefore, uniformity of 
interpretation must be desirable and it is common ground that 
the courts of the UK, in interpreting and applying Article 17, 
should have due regard to the case law in other jurisdictions.428 
Then the court examined a list of US cases and one 
decision of the Brussels Court of Appeal relating to the 
construction and application of Article 17. The English Court of 
Appeal agreed with MacDonald Test, i.e. the location factor is 
decisive. In MacDonald v Air Canada 429, the US court held that 
if the words in Article 17 were given their ordinary meaning, it 
would seen that the operation of disembarking had terminated 
428 This case law is helpfully analysed in paragraphs 155, 155.1 and 1552. of Shaw cross & 
Beaumont on Air Law (4th Edition). 
429 MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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by the time the passenger reached a safe point inside of the 
terminal. A similar test was applied by the United States Court 
of Appeals in Klein v KLM Royal Dutch Airline 430, in holding 
that the phrase "operations of disembarking" did not cover 
injuries sustained where a passenger was hurt by a conveyor belt 
in a baggage pickup area. In the present case, the judge 
concluded that the position was the same at English law. He said: 
" ... you have disembarked when you have left the aircraft and 
you are in and within the terminal." 
A number of subsequent United States' authorities suggest 
that the mere fact that a passenger is at a particular time within 
the limits of the air terminal does not necessarily preclude him 
from being in the course of any of the operations of embarking 
or disembarking within the meaning of Article 17.431 However, 
Sir Christopher Slade held that assuming for the moment that 
the judge should have applied a test based on activity, location 
and control, he first consider location. As he said: "We have a 
plan which shows this long corridor with two passenger 
conveyors or travelators. Regrettably nobody thought to give us 
a scale, but I am satisfied that that was quite long and it was at 
the end of this travelator quite a fair distance from where the 
430 360 NYS 2d 60, 1973. 
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aeroplane had docked that the accident occurred." This fair 
distance was plainly one not of a mere few yards, but of a 
substantial number of yards. 
As to the contention that the plaintiff at the time of her 
accident was under the control of Air Canada's employee, after 
compared with two US cases,432 the judge made a finding of 
fact as follows: 
"Whatever that means I am not exactly clear but I am satisfied that after she left the 
plane she was a free agent and not under the control of anyone at all. The passengers 
just follow each other like sheep and no doubt the stewardess had the de facto control 
of the plaintiffs mother because she was wheeling her but that lady had no control 
whatsoever either factually or legally or in any other circumstance of the plaintiff." 
If in any given case an activity is a condition imposed by 
an airline itself (rather than by the country of departure or host 
country) for permitting embarkation or disembarkation, such 
activity might well be regarded as part of the process of 
embarkation or disembarkation as the case may be.433 This is 
432 In Curran v Air Lingus (17 Avi Cas 17560), the United States' District Court (New York) found 
that merely assisting passengers off the plane and towards Customs, Air Lingus did not control the 
plaintiffs movements. The court went on to state that "It is not clear what tests should be used to 
determine whether plaintiff was in the operation of disembarking. Some courts have looked solely 
to the victim's location at the time of the accident ... Other courts have looked to several factors, 
including the victim's location at the time of the accident, what he was doing when he was injured 
and whether he was acting under the control and at the direction of the airline .... I need not 
decide which test to apply because I conclude that defendant would not be liable to plaintiff under 
either test." 
In Rabinowitz v Scandinavian Airlines 741 F Supp 441 (SDNY 1990), the same court observed: 
"Here, too, the plaintiffs allegation that an SAS employee directed them toward the moving 
sidewalk does not give rise to any level of control by SAS. Where the Curran court deemed there 
to be no airline control in formal customary practice of directing and assisting passengers upon 
arrival, plaintiffs in this case were plainly not under SAS control. Plaintiffs asked someone whom 
they believed to be an SAS employee in which direction to head for connection with their 
departing flight and that employee pointed the way. Such a responsive instruction does not satisty 
the control factor set forth in Day." 
433 Compare Knoll v Trans World Airlines Inc 610 F Supp 844 (DC Colo 1985) the United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado held that a passenger who had sustained injuries when 
250 
the potential possible relevance of the element of control in the 
context of Article 17. In the present case, however, there is no 
evidence that the defendants had any right whatever to instruct 
the plaintiff to use the travelator on which the accident occurred, 
and the judge's findings of fact as to control were plainly right. 
Her activity at the relevant time was merely that of proceeding 
towards immigration in accordance with UK immigration 
requirements, and she was doing so as a free agent. 
As is pointed out in Shawcross 434 modern conditions 
governmg embarkation and disembarkation at different 
international airports may well differ widely. While not 
minimising the importance of foreign decisions in this context, 
the courts should be cautious before placing a gloss on the 
words of Article 17 and that in any case such as the present, the 
ultimate question is whether, on the wording of that Article, the 
passenger's movements through airport procedures (including 
his physical location) indicates that he was at the relevant time 
engaged upon the operation of embarking upon or disembarking 
from the particular flight in question. 
Although be viewed as English courts applied location 
she slipped when approaching the immigration area at Heathrow Airport did not fall while 
disembarking the aeroplane, saying: "The courts have consistently refused to extend coverage of 
the Warsaw Convention to injuries incurred within the terminal, except in those cases in which 
plaintiffs were clearly under direction of the airlines." 
434 See supra note 61, para 155. . 
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criterion solely, the English Court of Appeal however concluded: 
" ... the judge in the present case was right to conclude that the 
plaintiff at the time of her accident was not still engaged upon 
the operation of disembarkation. Of the two tests which have 
been suggested to us, I find it unnecessary to express a view as 
to whether the MacDonald test or the tripartite Day is to be 
preferred. Indeed, I am not sure that they are inconsistent with 
one another. I merely say that on an application of the tripartite 
test, which is more favourable to the defendants, or indeed any 
other test, I would uphold the judge's finding that the plaintiff 
when she fell was not "in the course of any of the operations of 
disembarking" within the meaning of the words of Article 17." 
As a final comment to this section, although there is no 
authority on the issue of "embarking" in English case law, 
according to the criteria set force in the Adatia case, the author 
believes that the most likely point to start embarkation followed 
by the UK approach is when a passenger hand in the boarding 
pass, of course, this consideration under further observation of 
future English case law. 
3-6. The civil law jurisdictions' approaches 
252 
Other than the US and UK common law approaches, no 
matter which test the courts adopted, locational or tripartite, in 
considering the interpretation and application of the Warsaw 
Convention Article 17, the civil law jurisdictions' courts adopted 
similar but different approaches. They frequently pay some 
regard to the question whether the relevant accident related to 
the activity of aviation, in another word, whether there is any 
aviation risk. They also attach considerable importance to the 
question whether at the relevant time the passenger was under 
the control of the carrier. The following cases may serve as 
some examples. 
Mache v Cie Air France435 
In this case the French court held that the physical injuries 
received as a result of the passenger falling into a manhole when 
crossing the apron to customs did not take place in the course of 
disembarkation since there is no aviation risk. 
Air-Inter v. Sage et al. 436 
A passenger slipped and fell in an airport entrance hall, 
while he was in front of the check-in counter before proceeding 
435 17 RFDA353, 20 RFDA228, (1966); 21 RFDA343, (1967); 24 RFDA311, (1970) Cour de 
Cassation. 
436 Cour d' Appel de Lyon (France), February 10, 1976; RFDA 266. 
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to the departure lounge. The fall was caused by the passenger 
slipping over a pool of whisky split on the ground by a previous 
traveler. The French court held that the fall could not be blamed 
on the carrier, since the airport entrance hall is a public place 
and not subject to the carrier's control and management. 
Consequently, the preparatory stage of air transport could not be 
considered as having commenced. 
Consorts Zaoui v. Aeroport de Paris437 
The French Court of Appeal has, for good reason, rejected 
the request for compensation from an airline for injuries 
sustained by passengers who used the escalator situated in the 
airport entrance hall; it noted that the people applying for 
compensation were, at the time when the accident occurred, in 
airport buildings used by different airline companies and where 
the carrier's agents had not yet taken over responsibility for 
those persons. 
Blumenfeld v BEA438 
Unlike the French approach illustrated above, the German 
court adopted a rather extensive interpretation as to the Warsaw 
437 Cour de Cassation (lre Ch. Civ.), May 18, 1976; [1976] RFDA 394. 
438 (Federal Republic of Germany), March 11, 1961; [1962] ZLW 78. 
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Convention Article 17. In this case, an aircraft of the defendant 
airline had been unable to take off on schedule due to thick fog, 
so the passengers had to wait for some time. When the flight 
was finally called the plaintiff, who alone with other passengers 
hurried down the steps of the air terminal building in order to 
board the aircraft, slipped and fell; she boarded the aircraft with 
bruises on her leg and ankle. The plaintiff then claimed and 
received compensation for the accident, because the court ruled 
that when the airline company calls its passengers to board the 
aircraft it takes full charge of the passengers. 
Adler v Austrian Airlines439 
In this case, the Brussels Court of Appeal held that where 
the passenger who slipped on ice disembarking from a bus in 
order to embark on the aircraft was in the course of embarking. 
3-7. "From embarking to disembarking" vis-a-vis "from 
entering to alighting" 
It is a general understanding that insurance is closely 
associated with international air carriers' risk management, air 
439 [1986] 1 S & B A v R VIII191 (Brussels CA). 
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carrier's liability to passengers is one of them. As to the duration 
of form what time to what time a air carrier should liable, while 
the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention Article 17 
requires "from embarking to disembarking", the London 
Aircraft Insurance Policy (which is a world wide standard policy) 
section 3.1 and the other similar aviation insurance policies 
around the world provide: 
"The Insurers will indemnify the Insured ... in respect of accidental bodily injury 
(fatal or otherwise) to passengers whilst entering, on board, or alighting from the 
Aircraft ... " 
Like the Warsaw Convention, the London Aircraft 
Insurance Policy did not draw the exactly line as to when the 
"entering" starts and when the "alighting" ends. And there is no 
case law to interpret "entering"; however, there is a case concern 
about the meaning of "alighting". 
In the case of Gustafson v National Insurance 
Underwriters,440 the court held that the allegations in the 
petition of Nancy Bischofs (the injured person) allege she was in 
very close proximity to the airplane, and a minimum of time had 
elapsed from her being on the plane and the accident. Nancy 
Bischofs' allegations in her petition establish conclusively that 
she had taken no action to leave the proximity of the airplane, 
nor completed the acts normally performed by average person in 
440 517 s.w. 414,1974 Tex. App. 
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getting away from an airplane. 
Accordingly, the word of "alighting" means close to the 
aircraft, and "entering" may the same approach. So, there is a 
gap between "from embarking to disembarking" and "from 
entering to alighting", the Warsaw Convention's scope is 
broader than the London Aircraft Insurance Policy. This may 
result future conflicts as to who, the air carrier or the insurer, 
should pay the compensation to the injured passenger. 
Nevertheless, every day's practice shows no urgent necessity to 
solve this problem. Air carriers and insurers sympathize with 
status in quo as to insurers pay the compensation to the 
accidents which happened really close to the aircraft, at the 
mean time, for the accidents which happened not so close to the 




What Constitutes "BODILY INJURY" 
Under the Warsaw - Montreal System 
258 
4-1. Introduction 
A passenger is required to satisfy three conditions to 
recover damages for any injury or death under the Warsaw -
Montreal system:441 (1) the passenger suffered an 'accident'; (2) 
The accident occurred aboard the international flight or in the 
course of embarking or disembarking the international flight; (3) 
The accident caused the passenger to suffer 'death or 
wounding ... or any other bodily injury.' Having examined the 
first two conditions in previous chapters, this chapter 
concentrates on the third condition. 
Although 'death' has its clear meaning, whether 'bodily 
injury' encompasses emotional distress under the Warsaw -
Montreal liability regime becomes one of the heaviest debated 
issues within the field. Courts have attempted for years to 
interpret and solidify the meaning of ambiguous phrasing and 
terminology, and the debate has yet to be resolved satisfactorily. 
Ever since the Warsaw Convention was opened for 
signature seventy-seven years ago, dissatisfaction has been so 
widespread that there have been numerous multilateral attempts 
to amend, supplement, and modify the convention's sometimes 
441 Warsaw Convention 1929, Art. 17. See also Montreal Convention 1999, Art. 17. 
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unreasonable provisions.442 One of these areas of dissatisfaction 
deals with whether compensation for damages arising from 
emotional distress is available under the Warsaw Convention. A 
number of decisions, most notably Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. 
Floyd443 , have indicated that there can be no recovery for purely 
mental injuries.444 In Floyd, for example, the Supreme Court 
not only rejected the view that there can be any recovery for 
purely mental injuries under the limited liability provisions of 
the Warsaw Convention, but also concluded that unless a 
passenger was made to "suffer death, physical injury, or physical 
manifestation of injury," an air carrier could not be held 
liable.445 
However, while Floyd effectively served to rule out 
recovery for purely mental injuries, the court expressly declined 
to state its views concerning whether passengers could recover 
for mental injuries accompanied by physical manifestations of 
injury.446 This left the court in Carey v. United Airlines447 to 
442 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan 1. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 
80 Harv. L. Rev. 497, 498-99 (1967). 
443 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). 
444 See Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(characterizing the plaintiffs injuries as "purely psychic injuries that do not qualify as bodily 
injuries under the Warsaw Convention"); Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 
178 (S.D.NY 2001) (absent any "physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or any alteration in 
the structure of an internal organ, then any subsequent shortness of breath, sleeplessness, or 
inability to concentrate may safely be characterized as psychosomatic and is not compensable"). 
445 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552. 
446 See Id. 








attempt to answer "the question of whether such physical 
manifestations satisfy the 'bodily injury' requirement" of the 
Warsaw Convention's Article 17. The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit determined that physical manifestations of 
emotional distress do not satisfy the bodily injury requirement, 
and the Warsaw Convention, therefore, leaves the plaintiff 
. h t d 448 WIt ou reme y. 
In reaching its conclusion, however, the Carey court failed 
to make any clear distinction between the plaintiffs physical 
manifestations of emotional distress and other cases wherein 
recovery was available to plaintiffs unable to demonstrate 
claims flowing from a physical injury, but were able, 
nevertheless, to satisfy the bodily injury requirement. 449 
Consequently, while the court's decision purports to resolve this 
issue, the debate continues. 
On the issue left unanswered by the Supreme Court, apart 
from Carey case, several district courts have held that merely 
claiming that physical injuries led to psychological damages in 
the aftermath of an accident occurring in the course of 
international transportation is insufficient for recovery under the 
448 Id, at 1053. 




Warsaw Convention.45o For example, the Alvarez court adopted 
a similar reasoning requiring that a passenger, who suffers 
psychological injuries accompanied by physical injuries, prove a 
strong causal nexus between mental and physical injuries. Other 
federal courts refuse to hold that psychological injuries that are 
coupled with physical injuries, but not caused by them, are not 
recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. 451 Instead, these 
courts hold that recovery for psychological injuries, even if 
unrelated to the physical trauma, is allowed as long as there are 
some physical injuries.452 
The following sections of this chapter will analyze those 
reported cases in which courts have considered whether, and to 
what extent, recovery for psychological injury is available under 
the Warsaw Convention. 
4-2. Article 17 and the 'bodily injury' requirement 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 provides: 
"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or 
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the 
accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in 
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." (The Montreal 
450 See Alvarez v. American Airlines, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1999). 
451 See, e.g. In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994,954 F. Supp. 
175 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
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convention 1999 Art. 17 is substantially the same). 
From its inception the 'bodily injury' requirement has 
proved contentious in its application as courts adjudicating 
claims under Article 17 have conservatively interpreted the 
phrase "bodily injury" as either pure physical injury or mental 
suffering accompanied by physical injury where the latter was a 
causative factor in bringing about the former.
453 
Most courts have applied this standard and have been 
unwilling to venture beyond the requirement that a passenger be 
made to "suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation 
of injury" before permitting recovery against an airline for 
bodily injury under the Warsaw Convention.454 Only recently 
have courts attempted to answer the question of whether mental 
injuries' accompanied by physical manifestations of injury are 
within the purview of Article 17.455 
Part of the difficulty arises from the tendency of courts to 
try to determine the intention of the drafters of the Warsaw 
Convention and the meaning of the French term 'lesion 
corporelle' (translated into English as "bodily injury") 
incorporated into the original treaty document. 456 The Carey 
453 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Distress in Aviation Claims-- Emergent Trends, 65 J. Air L. 
& Com. 225, 225 (2000). 
454 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552. 
455 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051-52. 
456 Gregory C. Fisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The Elusive 
Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lesion Corporelle, 25 Tex. Int'l LJ. 12 (1990). 
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court, for example, relied heavily on the conclusions drawn in 
1§rrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.,457 wherein the 
court agreed with the Floyd analysis that 'lesion corporelle' was 
correctly translated as 'bodily injury' and held that because the 
plaintiff could not demonstrate direct, concrete, bodily injury, it 
did not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Warsaw 
. 458 ConventIOn. 
Despite the contention arising from the language of Article 
17, the majority of proposed changes and amendments to the 
Warsaw Convention have dealt with the liability limitations of 
Articles 20 and 22. 459 The limited debates addressing the 
language of Article 17 have not centered on the bodily injury 
requirement, but on the distinction between the application of 
the term "accident" as opposed to such alternate terms as 
"occurrence" or "event. ,,460 Nevertheless, early drafts of the 
Montreal Convention's Article 17 would have expressly 
included liability for mental injury. 461 Later drafts even 
introduced the element of personal injury designed to 
457 Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 FJd 108 (3d Cir. 1998). 
458 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052. It should be noted that many of these conclusions were drawn, in turn, 
from Floyd. 
459 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20 and 22. 
460 Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances Under the Warsaw 
Convention, 16 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 891,914-19 (2001). 







encompass both physical and mental injuries.462 For example, 
the provision (then Article 16) of the first draft of the Montreal 
Convention corresponding to Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention read: 
"The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury or mental 
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the damage 
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations 
of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury 
resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.,,463 
Other drafts of the convention even included the term 
"personal injury"; however, after further deliberations, the ICAO 
removed both "mental injury" and "personal injury" from the 
provision, choosing, instead, to leave the language virtually 
unchanged. 
4-3. Recovery for pure emotional injury 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Floyd, courts were 
split as to whether a plaintiff could recover for pure psychic 
injuries. In one of the earlier cases, Rosman v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc.,464 New York's highest court considered the 
claims of passengers involved in the hijacking of a flight from 
462 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Distress in Aviation Claims-- Emergent Trends, 65 J. Air L. 
& Com. 225, 225 (2000). 
463 Id. at 226-27 (quoting Report of the Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consolidation of the 
Warsaw System, Aviation Q., July 1997, at 286,313) (emphasis added). 






Tel Aviv to New York. The claims were brought under Article 17 
for emotional injury accompanied by physical injury. The plane 
was hijacked on September 6, 1970, and plaintiffs were held 
hostage for six days by guerillas armed with rifles and hand 
grenades. 
Plaintiffs claimed that they suffered "severe psychic 
trauma" and that they were damaged "by the physical 
circumstances of their imprisonment aboard the aircraft." 465 
Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that they suffered physical injury 
as a result of the forced immobility, inadequate sanitary facilities, 
and scarcity of food and water. The alleged physical injuries 
included backache, swollen feet, boils, skin irritation, weight 
loss, dehydration, and sleep deprivation. 466 The defendant 
airline argued that the liability scheme of the Warsaw 
Convention did not allow recovery because physic injury, "with 
or without palpable physical manifestation," is not 'bodily 
injury' within the meaning of Article 17, and that 'the physical 
injuries claimed did not result from any impact and in any case 
are so slight as not to amount to compensable bodily injury. ,467 
The court began by examining the meaning of Article 17 in 
its original French and found that there was no dispute that the 
465 Id, at 850. 
466 Id. 
467 Id, at 852. 
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words "mort, de blessure, ou de toutes autres lesion corporelle" 
were properly translated as "death or wounding or any other 
bodily injury.,,468 For purposes of the plaintiffs' claims, the 
meaning of "bodily injury" was at issue. The court 
acknowledged that the French legal usage of the term lesion 
corporelle should be considered, but declined to apply French 
law to determine the meaning of the term. The first step in the 
court's analysis was to determine whether "the treaty's use of the 
word 'bodily,' in its ordinary meaning, can fairly be said to 
include 'mental. ",469 
The court found that the ordinary meamng of the term 
"bodily injury" connotes "palpable, conspicuous physical injury, 
and excludes mental injury with no observable 'bodily,' as 
distinguished form 'behavioral,' manifestations. ,,470 Given the 
plain meaning of the term, the court concluded that "the 
compensable injuries must be 'bodily' but there may be an 
intermediate causal link which is the 'mental' between the cause 
_ the 'accident' - and the effect - the bodily injury.,,471 Once the 
causal link is established, the court reasoned, damages sustained 
as a result of the 'bodily injury' - whether mental or physical -
468 Id. 
469 Id, at 855. 
470 Id. 
471 Id, at 857. 
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are compensable under the Warsaw Convention. The court 
found that the airline was liable for the palpable, objective 
bodily injuries, "including those caused by the psychic trauma 
of the hijacking," and for the damages caused by them, but not 
"for the trauma as such or for the non-bodily or behavioral 
manifestations of that trauma. ,,472 
On the other hand, in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,473 the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the phrase 
"lesion corporelle" in the authentic French text of Article 17 
encompassed purely emotional distress.474 Similarly, a host of 
trial courts interpreted the Convention to permit damages for 
purely emotional injury.475 
Although the Supreme Court had decided cases under the 
Warsaw Convention several times before,476 it was not until its 
review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Floyd v. Eastern 
Airlines,477 that the Court established the framework for the 
recovery of emotional injuries under the Warsaw Convention. 
The case was brought by passengers of an Eastern Airlines flight 
472 Id. 
473 Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989). 
474 Id, at 147l. 
475 See Karfunke1 v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971,977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 
Husser! v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Krystal v. British 
Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
476 See EIAI Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999); Zicherman v. Korean Air 
Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 218 (1996); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985). 







from Miami to the Bahamas. 
Shortly after takeoff, one of the engines lost oil pressure 
and, as part of the normal emergency protocol, the flight crew 
shut down the engine and returned to Miami. The two remaining 
engines then failed, and the flight crew informed the passengers 
that the plane would be "ditched" in the Atlantic Ocean. As the 
plane was descending, the crew was able to restart one of the 
engines and the plane landed safely at Miami International 
Airport. 478 The passengers brought suit to recover damages 
solely for their mental distress. The district court concluded that 
pure psychic injury was not compensable under the Warsaw 
Convention.479 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the 
phrase "lesion corporelle" encompassed "purely emotional 
distress. ,,480 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the 
conflict between the Eleventh Circuit and the New York Court 
of Appeals decision in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines.
481 
The 
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, ultimately holding 
that recovery for pure psychic injury was not permitted under 
478 Id. 
479 In re E. Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5, 1983,629 F. Supp. 307 
(S.D. Fla. 1986). 
480 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480. 
481 See Rosman, 314 N.E.2d at 850 (holding that purely psychic trauma is not compensable under 
Article 17). 
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the Warsaw Convention. 
The Court applied long-accepted methods of treaty 
interpretation, considering the text of the treaty, its context, as 
well as the "history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the 
practical construction adopted by the parties. ,,482 The narrow 
issue reviewed by the Supreme Court was whether mental or 
psychic injury alone satisfies the requirements of 'lesion 
corporelle. ,483 
The Court examined the French text and its English 
translation. French dictionaries, the English translation of the 
treaty as ratified by Congress, and the United Kingdom's 
translation of the term all define the term "lesion corporelle" as 
"bodily injury.,,484 In the absence of disagreement as to its 
proper English translation, the Supreme Court next turned to the 
French legal interpretation of the text. The Court applied the 
same principles that would have been applied by contemporary 
French lawyers to interpret the text - "(1) legislation, (2) judicial 
decisions, and (3) scholarly writing.,,485 The Court found that 
the term "lesion corporelle" was not in use in French legislative 
texts at the time of the Warsaw Convention.486 Second, the 
482 Floyd, 499 u.s. at 552. 
483 Id. 
484 Id. at 536-37. 
485 Id. at 537. 





Court found no French court decisions explaining the meaning 
of the phrase. Third, the Court found no supplemental materials 
or scholarly writing prior to the Convention discussing the 
meaning of the term "lesion corporelle. ,,487 Since neither Article 
17 nor the traditional methods of interpretation suggested that 
the term "lesion corporelle" should be translated as anything but 
"bodily injury," the Court then examined the negotiating history 
of the Convention. 
The protocol established by the Paris Convention in 1925 
would have held air carriers liable for a broad range of injuries, 
including emotional distress. 488 At the Warsaw Convention, 
CITEJA drafted the more narrow provision that was ultimately 
adopted, although the negotiating history does not provide an 
explanation as to why the language was revised or of the 
meaning of the term "lesion corporelle." The Floyd Court's 
review of the documentary record "confirms - and courts and 
commentators appear universally to agree - that there is no 
evidence that the drafters or signatories of the Warsaw 
Convention specifically considered liability for psychic injury or 
automobile accidents. Id. at 538. The Court found that the recent cases "tend to support the 
conclusion that, in French legal usage, the term "lesion corporelle" refers only to physical 
inJuries." Id. at 538. 
48 Although some scholarly writings discussed "lesion corporelle" subsequent to the Convention, 
the Court found the analysis unpersuasive. Id. 
488 Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The Elusive Search for 





the meaning of 'lesion corporelle. '" The Court was persuaded by 
the "unavailability of compensation for purely psychic injury in 
many common and civil law countries at the time of the Warsaw 
Convention. On balance, the evidence of the post-1929 'conduct' 
and interpretations of the signatories . . . supports the narrow 
translation of 'lesion corporelle.'" After examining subsequent 
amendments to the Convention as well as case law from other 
Signatory States, the Court concluded that there was no support 
for a broader reading of the term. The Court ultimately held that 
"an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an 
accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical 
injury or physical manifestation of injury," but expressed "no 
view as to whether passengers can recover for mental injuries 
that are accompanied by physical injuries. ,,489 
In cases subsequent to Floyd, courts have consistently 
found that pure emotional distress is not actionable. In Fishman 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,490 plaintiffs--an infant child and her 
mother--brought an action against an airline for damages 
sustained by the infant when a stewardess applied a cup 
containing a warm cloth over the child's ear to alleviate the 
child's pain from changes in air pressure. When the stewardess 
489 Floyd, 499 u.s. at 552. 
490 Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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applied this to the child's ear, scalding water dripped onto the 
child, causing burns.491 The crew declined to administer first 
aid upon arrival, and eventually, the child was rushed to the first 
aid station at the airport and was treated. The court's primary 
focus was whether the alleged torts arose from an "accident" 
under the Warsaw Convention and whether the statute of 
limitations was tolled during the child's infancy. Relying on the 
Supreme Court's Decision in Air France v. Saks,492 the court 
found that the claim fell within the scope of the meaning of 
accident as the injury was caused "by an unexpected or unusual 
event or happening that is external to the passenger.,,493 
In an attempt to bring, her claim outside of the Warsaw 
Convention, the child's mother argued that her claims were 
solely for emotional harm and, therefore, outside the scope of 
Article 17.494 Because the claim arose out of an accident, it was 
within the ambit of Article 17. In fact, the court found that all 
claims for both infant and mother were accident claims under 
the Warsaw Convention. 495 However, because the mother's 
claims were solely for emotional distress they were not 
compensable under the Warsaw Convention. 
491 Id. 
492 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985). 
493 Fishman, 132 F.3d at 141 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405). 




In Lee v. American Airlines, Inc.,496 an individual brought 
a putative class action under Article 19 of the Warsaw 
Convention 497 on behalf of himself and other similarly situated 
passengers on a flight from New York to London. The flight was 
delayed and eventually cancelled, and the plaintiff alleged a 
variety of "inconveniences" under Article 19 of the Warsaw 
Convention arising from the delay. The inconveniences he 
suffered included: "(1) having to remain in the holding area 
without adequate food, water, restroom facilities and 
information; (2) having to stay in a substandard motel; (3) 
having to 'be subjected' to misinformation about the flight status; 
(4) having to obtain alternative means of transportation; and (5) 
losing out on a refreshing, memorable vacation." 
While acknowledging that economic damages arising from 
delay were compensable under Article 19 of the Warsaw 
Convention,498 the court found that the plaintiffs alleged 
damages were nothing more than pure mental injuries arising 
"from discomfort, annoyance, and irritation" suffered as a result 
of the delay. As such, the Lee court relied on Floyd and Daniel v. 
496 Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., (N.D. Tex. 2002). 
497 Warsaw Convention Article 19 provides that "the carrier is liable for damage occasioned by 
delay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage, or goods." 
498 "Because the Warsaw Convention is premised upon a 'contract' between the passenger and the 
airline, courts permit recovery of economic damages arising out of the delay itself (i.e., rental, 
hotel accommodation, taxis, etc.) under Article 19." See Pakistan Arts & Entm't Corp. v. Pakistan 
Int'IAirlines Corp., 660 N.Y.S.2d 741,743 (NY App. Div. 1997). 
274 
Yirgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.,499 and concluded that plaintiff 
could not recover for mental injuries under the Warsaw 
. 500 
ConventIOn. 
In another Article 17 case, Croucher v. Worldwide Flight 
Services, Inc.,501 the court reviewed a claim for emotional 
distress resulting from a passenger coming into contact with 
biomedical waste in an air sickness bag that was allegedly left 
from a prior flight. The plaintiff also alleged emotional distress 
from the fear of contracting a disease from the waste. Plaintiff 
alleged no bodily injury, and the court rejected the plaintiffs 
arguments as having no basis in law.
502 
In El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng503 , where a 
former passenger claimed that an intrusive 15-minute search left 
her sick and upset during the flight, emotionally traumatized and 
499 Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992- 93 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(dismissing claims of emotional distress including anxiety, exhaustion, frustration, humiliation, 
mental anguish and physical discomfort arising out of a flight delay). 
500 Under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention, courts have allowed recovery for inconvenience 
as a result of delay. See Daniel, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 994 ("Damages for inconvenience do not fall 
within the rubric of 'emotional distress.' Time is money, after all, and the Court fmds that the 
inconvenience of being trapped for hours in an unfamiliar airport is a compensable element of 
damages for delay in air travel under the Warsaw Convention and domestic law, even in the 
absence of economic loss or physical injury. "); see also Pakistan Arts & Entrn't Corp., 232 A.D.2d 
at 32 (holding that "damages resulting from the delay in transporting a passenger are the type 
permitted to be recovered under the Convention"); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 69 
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provided a cause of action for 
delay where plaintiffs were "bumped" from their scheduled flight and the airline did not provide 
transportation for six days). 
Notably, the cases that have rejected recovery under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention for pure 
emotional injury arising from delay have relied on Floyd, which denied recovery under Article 17 
of the Convention based on the meaning of "lesion corporelle," a term that is not used in Article 
19. 
501 Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502 (D.N.J. 2000). 
502 Id. at 507. 




disturbed during her month-long trip in Israel, and resulted in 
medical and psychiatric treatment, the Court noted that she was 
not entitled to compensation under Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention because she sustained no bodily injury and could 
not recover for her solely psychic or psychosomatic injuries. 
In Li v. Quraishi, 504 the court accepted the airline's 
argument that the Warsaw Convention bars recovery for purely 
psychological damages even if caused by intentional misconduct, 
then dismissed the claims of a former passenger for severe 
emotional and psychological damage to herself and her infant 
that resulted from being urinated upon by an intoxicated 
passenger. 
After examined the case law, the conclusion could be draw 
like that pure emotional distress is not recoverable under the 
Warsaw - Montreal liability system of the modem aviation. 
4-4. Emotional injury manifested in physical injury 
Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether 
emotional injury that manifests itself in physical injury is 
compensable under Article 17, lower federal courts have 
504 780 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. N.Y. 1992). 
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generally agreed that, like pure emotional injury, emotional 
injury that manifests itself in physical injury is not compensable 
under Article 17. 
For instance, in Hermano v. United Airlines505 , the plaintiff 
brought an action for unlawful arrest, defamation, and negligent 
infliction of severe emotional distress. The plaintiff checked 
several bags--some of which contained motorcycle parts--on a 
flight from Los Angeles to Miami with a connecting flight to 
Brazil. While on board the aircraft, the plaintiff was approached 
by a uniformed airline employee and questioned about whether 
he had any firearms in his checked bags. After denying the claim, 
the plaintiff was asked to deplane the aircraft, which he did. 
After the bags were re-examined and no firearms were found, 
the airline employee located another flight for the plaintiff and 
the rest of his trip proceeded without further incident. Plaintiff 
sought damages for "severe and enduring mental distress and 
anguish, emotional shock to his nervous system, and monetary 
expenditures for medical treatment." Relying on Floyd and 
Tseng, the court found that plaintiffs "physical manifestations of 
alleged emotional distress" were insufficient to constitute bodily 
injury under the Convention.506 
505 Hermano v. United Airlines, (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
506 See id. 
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Similarly, in Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. 507, 
a passenger sought damages for extreme emotional distress, post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and anorexia. During her 
flight to London, the captain became aware of a bomb threat 
against the plane; it was classified as a "nonspecific warning 
which could be related to one or more targets but where there 
could be doubt as to its credibility or the effectiveness of 
existing security measures.,,508 In accordance with the airline's 
protocol, the captain informed the passengers of the threat, and 
the plane landed safely as scheduled in London.509 
There was no dispute that the event constituted an 
"accident" under Article 17, and the only question was whether 
plaintiffs injuries were compensable under the Convention.510 
The plaintiff relied on a sentence at the very end of the Floyd 
opinion, which states: "We conclude that an air carrier cannot be 
held liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a 
passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical 
manifestation of injury. ,,511 
In light of the last phrase, "physical manifestation of 
injury," the plaintiff asserted that her injuries were compensable 
507 Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 109 (3d Cir. 1998). 
508 Id, at 108. 
509 Id, at 109. 
510 Id,at11O. 
511 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552 (emphasis added). 
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under the Convention. Rather than claim that PTSD was the 
physical manifestation of injury, the plaintiff relied on her 
weight loss as the actual physical manifestation of the injury. 
The Terrafranca court rejected the plaintiffs argument, relying 
on the central holding of Floyd - that a passenger cannot recover 
absent bodily injury.512 The court concluded that the text of 
Article 17 requires "bodily injury" as "a precondition to 
recovery" and that the plaintiff "must demonstrate direct, 
concrete, bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear 
or anxiety.,,513 Since the plaintiffs claims of post traumatic 
stress disorder complicated by anorexia and weight loss were 
found to be purely psychic, they did not qualify as "bodily 
injuries" under Article 17.514 
In Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 515 a plaintiffs 
pocketbook was stolen prior to boarding a flight to Costa Rica. 
The pocketbook contained plaintiffs medication, Xanax, which 
plaintiff regularly took to treat panic attacks, anxiety, and 
nervousness. Plaintiff boarded the aircraft, but became 
concerned that the medication would wear off during the flight, 
and asked the flight attendant if she could disembark. The flight 
512 Terrafranca, 151 F.3dat 111. 
513 Plaintiff's psychiatrist classified plaintiffs injuries-- fear, anxiety and isolation--as emotional. 
Id. at 112. 
514 Id. 
515 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.NY 2001). 
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attendant denied her request, despite the fact that they had not 
yet pushed back from the gate. After her third request was 
denied, plaintiff began to feel terrified. She started to sweat and 
as alleged, began to "feel dizzy, nauseated, and short of breath." 
She had a rapid heartbeat and pain in her stomach. 516 The 
plaintiff dialed "911" from her cell phone and eventually the 
police contacted the pilot and the aircraft returned to the gate. 
An airline employee "announced over the loudspeaker that an 
'unruly' passenger wished to leave; some fellow passengers then 
greeted plaintiff with hisses and jeers." The plane returned to the 
gate, and the plaintiff disembarked, where she was treated by 
EMS technicians and transported to a nearby psychiatric 
emergency room. 517 
Plaintiff claimed she suffered "embarrassment, humiliation, 
loss of liberty, psychological injury, pain, suffering emotional 
distress and mental anguish." 518 She also claimed that she 
suffered post traumatic stress, psychological injury and pain, 
and that she continued to suffer physical manifestations519 after 
her release from the hospital, including "insomnia, restlessness, 
516 Id, at 173. 
517 Id. 
518 Id, at 174. 
519 Evidence of plaintiffs diagnosis by her psychiatrist was confusing, as she made two different 
diagnoses - acute stress disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, each with different 
manifestations. Id. 
280 
inability to concentrate, and unexplained aching in her arms and 
legs. ,,520 
The court reasoned that, in Floyd, although not expressly 
alleged, many of the plaintiffs suffered what "we may call 
'psychosomatic' sequelae (such as insomnia or weight loss) as a 
result of their acute fear while airborne. ,,521 The court reasoned 
that Floyd bars recovery for "physical manifestations" of 
emotional distress where the accident causes "no direct physical 
injury but rather merely terrifies the passengers (even when the 
terror later leads to physical symptoms, such as weight 10SS).,,522 
The court determined that this reading is bolstered by the 
Supreme Court's narrow reading of lesion corporelle, which 
respected the Convention's primary purpose of limiting the 
liability of air carriers and maintaining uniformity.523 The court 
held that to "the extent that plaintiff throughout her ordeal did 
not receive any physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or 
any alteration in the structure of an internal organ, then any 
subsequent shortness of breath, sleeplessness, or inability to 
concentrate may safely be characterized as psychosomatic and is 
not compensable. ,,524 
520 Id. 
521 Id, at 175. 
522 Id, at 177. 
523 Id. (citing Floyd, 499 U.S. at 547). 
524 Id, at 178. 
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The Turturro court also considered sua sponte whether the 
accident caused the plaintiff to develop PTSD. In its review, the 
court acknowledged new medical advances that make it possible 
to document the physical effects of PTSD, including changes to 
brain cell structure, and "that under some circumstances a 
diagnosis of chronic PTSD may fall within the Convention's 
definition of 'bodily injury. ",525 While ultimately concluding 
that the plaintiff did not adequately plead PTSD, as she did not 
proffer "reliable evidence beyond her purely subjective 
experience of panic, ... somatic complaints, ... and conflicting 
diagnoses," the court held that plaintiff's claims are not 
compensable under the Warsaw Convention. The court's 
conclusion may represent a significant development in the 
ability of plaintiffs to recover for PTSD under Article 17 since 
the court recognized that its finding might open the "floodgates 
of litigation" unless claims ofPTSD are carefully scrutinized.526 
In more recent cases, plaintiffs have begun bringing claims 
that PTSD is tantamount to physical injury, based on new 
medical technologies that suggest that injuries traditionally 
considered "purely psychic" or "purely emotional" parallel 
physiological manifestations. However, most of the cases were 
525 Id at 179. 
526 Id. 
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unsuccessfully established that PTSD is tantamount to physical 
injury except the Weaver case, infra. 
In Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines527, plaintiffs alleged that 
they suffered emotional injuries and physical manifestations of 
emotional trauma during a flight through severe turbulence 
related to a hurricane. Plaintiffs generally alleged that PTSD, 
like other stress-related disorders, "causes 'biochemical and 
structural changes' in the brain." 528 The court divided the 
alleged injuries into several categories, none of which were 
compensable under Article 17. First, several injuries were 
"patently and purely emotional" and, as such, they were 
non-compensable under Floyd's construction of Article 17.529 
The second category of injury included "manifestations of 
emotional injury--either physical (nausea, cold sweats) or 
mental (nightmares, lack of concentration).,,530 The court found 
that these claims were expressly precluded by Terrafranca531 , 
which required direct, concrete, bodily injury. While evidence 
was offered to suggest that severe turbulence could directly 
cause physical symptoms such as nausea and cold sweats, 
plaintiffs did not allege that such symptoms were a direct result 
527 Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, 232 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D.N.J. 2002). 
528 Id, at 322. 
529 Id, at 325. 
530 Id. 
531 See supra note 67. 
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of the severe turbulence encountered by the aircraft. Plaintiffs 
also alleged that the mere experience of G-forces amounted to 
bodily injury under the Convention. The court rejected this 
argument, noting that "while such forces may of course cause 
injury, experiencing them does not in itself constitute bodily 
.' ,,532 lllJUry. 
The Bobian court also declined to apply the reasoning in 
Turturro, instead relying on Terrafranca and concluding that 
PTSD is purely an emotional injury, despite plaintiffs' attempt to 
re-characterize PTSD in terms of its effect on the brain. 
However, unlike Terrafranca where the plaintiff did not allege 
physical injury from her PTSD, in Bobian, the plaintiffs 
presented evidence that PTSD and other stress-related disorders 
are associated with biochemical and structural changes in the 
brain.533 The plaintiffs in Bobian presented general evidence 
that PTSD and other emotional disorders are tantamount to 
physical injuries, but they did not present specific evidence such 
as MRIs or other medical evidence of their particular injuries. 
Other lower courts presented with such evidence have allowed 
the actions to proceed. 
532 Bobian, at 326. 
533 Id. 
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For example, in Weaver v. Delta Airlines,534 the District 
Court for the District of Montana awarded damages to a plaintiff 
whose emotional injury resulted in a simultaneous brain injury. 
In Weaver, the defendant airline made an emergency landing 
during a flight from London. The plaintiff alleged that she was 
terrified during the emergency landing and had to subsequently 
seek treatment for emotional and physical injuries attributable to 
the accident.535 She was subsequently diagnosed with PTSD. 
The plaintiff argued that recent developments in medicine have 
determined that "extreme stress causes actual physical brain 
damage, i.e., physical destruction or atrophy of portions of the 
hippocampus of the brain. ,,536 Plaintiff also presented evidence 
sufficient to meet her burden of showing "an absence of any 
factual issue that the emergency landing physically impacted" 
her brain, while the defendant did not raise a genuine issue that 
the plaintiffs injury was non-physical. 537 As such, no material 
issue of fact existed and the court focused on whether the 
plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The 
Weaver court concluded that, because plaintiffs PTSD 
manifested as a brain injury, she sustained a bodily injury within 
534 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999). 
535 rd. at 1190-91. 
536 rd. at 1191. 
537 rd. at 1192. 
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the meaning of Article 17. Cognizant, as was the Turturro court, 
that its decision could open the "floodgates of litigation," the 
court reasoned that because claims must be based on a "definite 
diagnosis of a disorder that arises from a physical injury that is 
medically verifiable," there would be no flood of litigation 
arising out of its holding.538 
In Carey v. United Airlines 539, the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished Weaver. In Carey, a passenger brought a claim 
against an airline arising out of a confrontation with a flight 
attendant. The passenger was seated in first class, while his three 
daughters were seated in coach. During the flight, two of his 
daughters experienced ear aches and attempted to seek their 
father's assistance in first class. A flight attendant prevented 
them from reaching their father. The father alleged that the flight 
attendant refused to assist him and humiliated him in front of the 
other first-class passengers.540 The passenger alleged emotional 
and mental distress and claimed that he suffered "physical 
manifestation including nausea, cramps, perspiration, 
nervousness, tension and sleeplessness." The lower court 
concluded that the passenger's sole remedy was under the 
Warsaw Convention and that the alleged InJunes were not 
538 Id. 
539 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 FJd 1044 (9th Cir. 2001). 
540 Id, at 1046. . 
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compensable. This is consistent with the holding in Weaver and 
~hendrimada v. Air India,541 although the lower court in Carey 
did not require medical evidence of "physical injury" of the 
emotional injury in order to sustain the action. 
On appeal, the Carey court affirmed the Third Circuit's 
reasoning in Terrafranca that the physical manifestations of the 
passenger's emotional distress and mental distress - nausea, 
perspiration, cramps, nervousness, tension and sleeplessness -
did not satisfy the Article 17 "bodily injury" requirement. As in 
Terrafranca, the passenger did not demonstrate "'direct, concrete 
bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear or 
anxiety. ",542 The Carey court relied on the reasoning in Floyd 
with respect to the purpose of the Convention, i.e., to limit the 
liability of air carriers to foster industry growth.543 The court 
also referenced dicta in EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng544 to 
support its conclusion that the "Supreme Court would hold that 
physical manifestations purely descended from emotional and 
mental distress do not satisfy the 'bodily injury' requirement of 
Article 17.,,545 Although other cases, including Terrafranca, cite 
to this same statement in Tseng, the issue of recovery for 
541 Chendrimada v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
542 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052 (citing Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 11 0). 
543 Id. at 1052-53. 
544 mAl Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999). 
545 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053. . 
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emotional distress was not before the Tseng Court.546 Again, as 
the plaintiffs did not provide concrete physiological medical 
evidence of their emotional injuries, the court was hard pressed 
to find that the emotional injuries constituted "bodily injury" 
under Article 17. 
In Bloom v. Alaska Airlines,547 the Ninth Circuit reviewed 
a passenger's claim with facts very similar to those in Carey. The 
passenger brought a claim for emotional distress under Article 
17 based on his confrontation. with a flight attendant. The 
plaintiff did not allege bodily harm, but alleged that intentional 
infliction of emotional distress "is not preempted because the 
Convention does not govern the commission of intentional and 
malicious torts that cause non-bodily harm." 548 The court 
analogized this case to Carey and held that the "Warsaw 
Convention creates 'no exception for an injury suffered as a 
result of intentional conduct. ",549 As the injuries were purely 
emotional, the passenger's claim was barred. 
In re Air Crash at Little Rock Arkansas, on June 1, 1999550, 
by rejecting a $6,500,000 jury award, the court found that 
546 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 172. 
547 Bloom v. Alaska Airlines, (9th Cir. May 30,2002) (unpublished opinion). 
548 Id. 
549 Id. (citing Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051). 
550 291 F.3d 503, 59 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 236, 196 A.L.R. Fed. 695 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 974, 123 S. Ct. 435, 154 L. Ed. 2d 331 (2002). 
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physical manifestation of mental injuries such as weight loss, 
sleeplessness, or physical changes in the brain resulting from 
chronic posttraumatic stress disorder are not compensable under 
the Warsaw Convention. The court held that even had the former 
passenger submitted sufficient evidence at trial of brain changes 
resulting from posttraumatic stress disorder, these physical 
manifestations of the mental injury would not be compensable 
under the treaty. 
In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, California, on January 30, 
2000,551 the court noted in dictum that claims for physical 
injury purely descended from emotional distress are prohibited 
by the Warsaw Convention. 
4-5. Emotional injury accompanied by but unrelated to 
physical injury 
The majority of courts have not allowed plaintiffs to 
recover for emotional injury that is unrelated to physical harm. 
In Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc. 552, plaintiff sought 
compensation for physical and mental injuries related to an 
emergency evacuation. Plaintiff suffered physical injuries during 
551 145 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
552 Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., (S.D.NY 1999) .. 
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the evacuation, including bruises and pain. In addition, plaintiff 
began having anxiety attacks in situations that were similar to 
those occurring just before the evacuation. The plaintiff did not 
allege a casual connection between the physical injuries and the 
mental injuries. The court concluded that only plaintiffs 
physical injuries were compensable. 
The Alvarez court adopted the majority view that in order 
to recover for psychological injuries, there must be a "causal 
link between the alleged physical injury and the alleged 
psychological injury." The court looked to the Second Circuit's 
decision in Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc.553 and 
compared the language in Article 25, which required causation, 
with the liability provisions in Article 17, which did not. The 
court found that "under Article 17, a relatively intimate link is 
required between the liability-triggering event (the accident) and 
plaintiffs' damages because the liability-triggering event is not 
necessarily culpable." In other words, whereas a liability event 
is necessary to trigger liability under Article 25 (which is 
necessarily culpable), Article 17 imposes strict liability for 
"bodily injury," and the standard for imposing strict liability 
should be more stringent. 
553 Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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Contrasting a similar case, Longo v. Air France, Inc. 554, 
where the plaintiffs alleged bodily injuries (bruises during 
evacuation) and related emotional injuries (fear of death), but 
failed to allege that their fear of death flowed from their bruises, 
the Alvarez court concluded that: 
"The Convention's goal of 'reasonable and predicable' recoveries, would be 
undennined if similarly situated passengers were treated differently from one another 
on the basis of an arbitrary and insignificant difference in their experience. The 
happenstance of getting scratched on the way down the evacuation slide ... [should] 
not enable one passenger to obtain a substantially greater recovery than that of an 
unscratched co-passenger who was equally terrified by the plane crash. In sum, in a 
case governed by Article 17, a plaintiff may recover compensation for psychological 
and emotional injuries only to the extent that these injuries are proximately caused by 
his or her physical injuries. Psychological and emotional injuries that are merely 
accompanied by physical injuries are not compensable." 
Not all courts have so hastily granted summary judgment in 
cases where psychic injury accompanies physical injury. In In re 
Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana 555, actions were 
, 
brought against airlines for pre-impact fear damages arising out 
of an air crash in which all passengers perished. In allowing 
damages for pre-impact fear, the court emphasized what Floyd 
did not address--the question of whether passengers could 
recover for mental injuries that were accompanied by physical 
injuries and the decision that "there could never be any recovery 
for purely psychic injuries." 556 The court pointed out that 
nothing in Floyd "states that once [the bodily injury] 
554 Longo v. Air France, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
555 In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
556 Id, at 178. 
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precondition is met, and physical injury or death IS present, 
damages for mental distress are not available. ,,557 
The court distinguished other lower court decisions that 
have extended Floyd to "create a partial bar to recovering for 
emotional distress under the Warsaw Convention." In these 
cases, courts found that the "emotional distress claims flowing 
from the accident (as opposed to some physical injury sustained 
in the accident) are unrecoverable." The Alvarez court declined 
to adopt the reasoning in these cases, where "Article 17 itself 
expressly requires a causal link only between 'damage sustained' 
and the accident. ,,558 In holding that plaintiffs could recover for 
their pre-impact pain and suffering, the court in In re Roselawn 
noted that its decision, "which permits those passengers who 
sustained physical injury in the accident to recover for any 
pre-impact terror they may have experienced, is no more unfair 
than the rule recognized in Floyd, which permits only 
passengers with physical injuries to recover at all.,,559 
Similarly, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 
1, 198356°, the court granted damages for emotional injury that 
was accompanied but not caused by simultaneous physical 
557 Id. 
558 Id. at 179. 
559 Id. 
560 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 814 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
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injury. Survivors sought damages for pre-death paIn and 
suffering by passengers on a Korean Air Lines flight that 
crashed after being shot down by a Soviet missile.561 The court 
found that passengers were alive and conscious for about eleven 
minutes after the initial missile strike.562 Acknowledging that, 
under Floyd, 563 damages for mental anguish were not 
recoverable "absent physical injury," 564 the court awarded 
damages for the decedents' mental anguish because the evidence 
showed that they did sustain physical injury due to rapid air 
decompression. According to the court, the facts that the 
emotional injury was "accompanied by physical injury" and that 
the decedents' suffering was "likely considerable" made the case 
"vastly different" from Floyd.565 
I~ Chendrimada v. Air India,566 plaintiffs brought an action 
for injuries that occurred on a trip to Bombay, India. Plaintiffs' 
first flight from New York was canceled due to a bomb scare, 
and plaintiffs were rescheduled on a flight the following day. 567 
The flight made a scheduled stop in Delhi, but due to weather 
conditions, the flight remained at Delhi for eleven and a half 
561 Id, at 594. 
562 Id, at 598. 
563 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 530. 
564 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. at 598. 
565 Id. 
566 Chendrirnada v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.NY 1992). 
567 Id, at 1090. 
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hours, during which plaintiffs were not allowed to deplane nor 
were they provided with any food. Plaintiffs alleged that they 
suffered "bodily injuries" by being confined without food for 
that period - including nausea, severe cramps, pain and anguish, 
malnutrition and mental injury.568 The court found that the 
plaintiffs' allegations of bodily injury satisfied the requirements 
of Floyd to survive summary judgment--namely that they 
alleged a "physical injury or manifestation of a physical 
injury." 569 The court concluded that the manifestation of 
physical injury "need not result from a suddenly inflicted trauma, 
but may, as is alleged here, result from other causes for which 
the carrier is responsible." The court's conclusion, while 
consistent with the decision in Weaver, relaxes the requirement 
that the emotional injury be related to physical injury. 
4-6. Mental injury flowing form physical injury 
In cases following the Floyd decision, most courts have 
found that recovery for emotional injuries is permitted so long 
as the emotional injury "flows from" the bodily injury. 
In In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. 
568 Id, at 1092. 
569 Id. (emphasis added). 
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h-ircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on April 2, 1986 570 , 
("TWA"), survivors brought an action against an airline for 
physical and psychic injury arising out of a bomb explosion in 
which four people were killed and others were injured. One of 
the passengers alleged physical and psychic injuries. Mr. Ospina, 
a passenger, seated directly over the bomb, was blown out of the 
plane. Expert testimony established that Mr. Ospina's body had 
been nearly severed by the blast and that he probably lived for 
five to ten seconds after the blast and was aware of what was 
happening to him. 
The court focused on the term "dommage survenue,,571 and 
began by acknowledging that while the term encompasses many 
forms of harm, it cannot include "purely mental injury 
uncomiected to physical harm.,,572 The TWA court found that 
the Floyd decision implied that "psychic damage accompanying 
physical injury is recoverable." The court distinguished Floyd 
based on the type of mental suffering experienced. In Floyd, the 
passengers were terrified, but no one was physically harmed 
from the event, while the airline's misconduct573 in TWA caused 
570 In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on 
Apr. 2, 1986,778 F. Supp. 625 (SD.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Ospina v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992). 
571 Translated in English as "damage sustained." Id. at 640. 
572 Id,at637. 
573 TWA's failure to follow established security protocol was found to be willful misconduct by 
the jury. As such, the liability limits of Article 17 did not apply. See id. at 638. 
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plaintiffs to suffer "while in pain from his wounds, falling to 
certain death after the bomb tore through his body as he was 
ejected from the aircraft." Because Mr. Ospina suffered bodily 
injury that then caused him psychic harm, the court found the 
award of damages to be appropriate. 
The court recognized that some courts574 have objected to 
permitting recovery for pain and suffering subsequent to 
physical injury because any de minimus physical injury, such as 
a scratch or bruise, could give rise to recovery for psychic 
trauma. The court reasoned that in this case, the psychic injuries 
arose directly from the bodily injury, and both types of injury 
were severe. As such, the court distinguished the case from ones 
where the passenger first experienced psychic injury followed 
by bodily injury or death, and ones where death occurred 
simultaneously with the psychic injury. In upholding the jury's 
award of damages for the conscious pain and suffering between 
the time of the explosions and Mr. Ospina's death, the court 
found: 
"Survival damages for pain and suffering comports with the main policy goals of 
general tort law--full deterrence and compensation--without interfering with the goals 
of the Warsaw Convention. These goals are compatible--in fact, almost identical. Both 
are designed to provide full compensation for hann suffered and deterrence when the 
statutory limit of $75,000 does not apply.,,575 
574 See Alvarez, 1999 WL 691922, at *5. 
575 TWA, 778 F. Supp. at 641. 
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In Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,576 plaintiffs aboard a 
flight from New York to San Francisco experienced an "aborted 
takeoff, crash and fire." All passengers survived, but many 
suffered minor physical injuries and were traumatized. Several 
passengers had international tickets, and their sole remedy was 
through the Warsaw Convention. Roughly half of the plaintiffs 
alleged only emotional injuries, while the other plaintiffs alleged 
emotional distress in addition to minor physical injuries.577 The 
court defined "physical manifestations" as "those bodily injuries 
or illnesses (such as skin rashes and heart attacks) that result 
from the distress one experiences during or after an accident," 
and emotional distress as "psychic trauma that one experiences 
either during or after the accident . . . (e.g., fear of flying or 
claustrophobia. . . or embarrassment about disfigurement or 
concern that an injury will develop complications)." 578 The 
court found that the failure of the Warsaw Convention to use the 
term "caused by" in Article 17 may indicate that the recoverable 
damages "need not be caused by the bodily injury, and may 
instead be those caused by the accident. ,,579 The court examined 
four possible approaches under Article 17 for recovery of 
576 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
577 Id, at 663. 
578 Id, at 664. 
579 Id, at 665. 
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emotional distress. The first is to disallow recovery for 
emotional distress. The second approach is to allow recovery for 
all emotional distress, as long as a bodily injury occurs. The 
third possibility is to allow emotional distress as damages for 
bodily injury, including distress about the accident. Lastly, a 
court can allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing 
from a bodily injury. 
1. Disallow recovery for emotional distress. 
First, the court examined the approach that would allow no 
recovery for emotional distress, even if accompanied by bodily 
injury. Under this approach, an injured passenger could recover 
only pecuniary loss, such as medical expenses and lost income. 
This approach is in accord with the Floyd Court's narrow 
reading of Article I7's reference to bodily injury. Denying 
emotional distress damages is also appropriate in light of the 
state of the law in many countries at the time of Warsaw 
Convention.580 And, because this approach is so restrictive on 
passengers' rights, it furthers the pro-airline industry goals of the 
Convention.581 
This approach IS unacceptable, however, because it 
provides such minimal compensation for passengers who may 
580 In Floyd, the Court noted that "such a remedy was unknown in many, if not most, jurisdictions 
in 1929." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 545. 
581 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 665. 
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have suffered traumatic injuries, either physical or mental. The 
drafters of the Warsaw Convention attempted to strike a balance 
between passengers and airlines; this approach is too one sided. 
Further, even though many jurisdictions denied recovery for 
mental distress in 1929, the number of the countries which do 
not recognize recovery for mental distress nowadays is limited 
since most of the countries adopt the theory that mental distress, 
like physical injuries, is recoverable. Even at the time of 1929, 
France recognized such claims, as did other countries, when 
accompanied by physical impact or manifestation. Because of 
the numerous problems with this approach, American courts 
have not adopted it. 
2. Allow recovery for all emotional distress, as long as a 
bodily injury occurs. 
The second approach is to allow recovery for all emotional 
distress, as long as a bodily injury occurs, regardless of the 
connection between the distress and the bodily injury. Thus, a 
passenger with a scratched arm could recover for the trauma and 
fear due to the plane crash; the bodily injury opens the door to 
liability for emotional distress. 
In Chendrimada v. Air-India582, supra, the court adopted 
582 See supra note 541. 
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this approach. There, because the plaintiffs alleged physical 
injury, the court denied Air-India's motion for summary 
judgment.583 This approach is consistent with a broad reading of 
Article I7's imposition of liability for "damage sustained in the 
event of ... bodily injury. ,,584 Significantly, the drafters did not 
use the phrase "damage caused by ... bodily injury," which 
would have served as a signal that any mental distress must be 
connected to the bodily injury. This approach is also supported 
by the fact that the Floyd Court did not mention a need for a 
causal connection between bodily injury and emotional distress. 
Further, this approach is in line with the approach to mental 
distress taken in early tort cases, where a physical impact or 
manifestation was a prerequisite to recovery.585 
However, this approach is undesirable for two reasons. 
First of all, this approach treats mental distress as an 
583 One paragraph of the court's opinion is of particular relevance: 
"As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in the Floyd case that a passenger cannot recover 
for purely emotional or mental injuries absent physical injury or manifestation of physical injury. 
Therefore, to survive Floyd, plaintiffs must allege a physical injury or a manifestation of physical 
injury. The Court fmds that plaintiffs allegations satisfy this requirement. It should be understood 
that the Court is not ruling that as a matter of law being held on an airplane for over eleven hours 
without food is a physical injury in and of itself. If a passenger in the same position as plaintiffs 
had not exhibited any physical manifestation of injury as a result of being held without food, but 
only alleged emotional injury, no action would lie. Of course, plaintiffs must still prove their 
alleged physical injuries at trial to recover, but plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact in dispute which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. In 
reaching this conclusion we of course have determined that the 'manifestation of physical injury' 
which is a prerequisite to an action under Floyd need not result from a suddenly inflicted trauma, 
but may, as is alleged here, result from other causes for which the carrier is responsible." 
Id, at 1092 (emphasis added). 
584 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
585 Under early tort law, the physical impact or manifestation was seen as proof that the emotional 
distress was not faked. 
300 
independent cause of action, which IS inconsistent with 
precedent that dictates that the Warsaw Convention creates a 
cause of action, not just a limit on remedies. 586 And, secondly, 
this approach treats mental distress as damages resulting from 
the accident, not the injury. 587 
3. Allow emotional distress as damages for bodily injury, 
including distress about the accident. 
Emotional distress is considered an element of the damages 
for bodily injury under the third approach. Under this approach, 
the distress does not need to be about the injury to be 
compensable. This approach is different from the second 
approach in that the distress must occur at the same time or later 
than the bodily injury; one cannot, therefore, recover for the fear 
before the impact and bodily injury under this approach. 
The courts in the cases concerning the downing of Korean 
Air Lines Flight KE 007 on September 1, 1983, supra, while the 
plane was in route from New York to Seoul, adopted this 
586 The dispute did not arise until the 1970s because American courts did not originally view the 
Warsaw Convention as creating a cause of action. See Sheila Wallace Holmes, Casenote, 58 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 1205, 1207 (1993). Rather, courts fIrst interpreted the Convention as simply 
limiting monetary damages on otherwise applicable law. Id. Courts thus viewed the treaty as 
creating only a presumption of liability, instead of an independent cause of action. Id. at 1209-10. 
It was not until the late 1970s that courts began to construe the Warsaw Convention as the 
"universal source of a right of action." Id. at 121 0 (quoting Benjamins v. British European 
Airways, 572 F.2d 913,919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)). 
587 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 666. This is problematic under the wording of Article 17 of the 
Convention and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985), 
where the Court noted that "'the text of Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the 
passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury. '" Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 
666 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 398). 
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approach.588 There, the plane strayed into Soviet airspace and 
was intercepted and destroyed by Soviet military aircraft over 
the Sea of Japan; all 269 passengers were killed.589 
The numerous actions filed around the country for 
wrongful death of the deceased passengers were consolidated 
for common pre-trial proceedings and the trial of the common 
issue of liability.590 After a jury found that Korean Air Lines 
engaged in willful misconduct that proximately caused the 
deaths, the individual cases were returned to the various 
jurisdictions where they had been filed in order to determine 
compensatory damages for each plaintiff.591 
One court first noted that the 269 passengers aboard the 
plane were alive and conscious for ten or eleven minutes after 
the plane was hit by the missile and before it hit the sea, and 
possibly for a period thereafter.592 The court then recognized 
that the passengers probably endured a considerable amount of 
emotional and physical (due to rapid decompression) pain 
during that period which ended in the death they were 
anticipating. Consequently, the court held, "This is pain and 
588 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 814 F. Supp. 605, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), modified, 43 F.3d 
18 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995). 
589 Zicherman, 814 F. Supp. at 606. 
590 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 575 F. Supp. 342 (J.P.M.L. 1983). 
591 Zicherman, 814 F. Supp. at 606. The jury also awarded punitive damages, but on appeal they 
were set aside as non-recoverable in a Warsaw Convention Case. Id. See In re Korean Airlines 
Disaster, 932 F.2d 1475, 1490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). 
592 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. 592,598 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
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suffering accompanied by physical injury, and logically must be 
permitted by Floyd.,,593 
The logic behind the third approach is best illustrated by 
the comments of the court in In re Air Crash Disaster Near 
H 1 1 H ··594 ono u u, awall : 
"The Convention itself does not specify the elements of damages which a plaintiff 
might recover under Article 17. Instead, 'commentators and case law are in accord 
that the Convention leaves the measure of damages to the intemallaw of parties to the 
Convention. ",595 
Grafted onto the common law tradition, and recognizing 
the Warsaw Convention's adoption of "intemallaw" with respect 
to the measure of damages, Article 17 must be read to create a 
cause of action which encompasses the remedies traditionally 
provided by common law in personal injury actions, wrongful 
death actions, and survival actions.596 
Although there is little federal common law on emotional 
distress, federal courts have indicated that emotional distress 
damages would be allowed for distress about the plane crash, 
not just the distress about the injury.597 This approach --
593 See also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 807 F. Supp. 1073 (SD.N.Y. 1992). 
594 783 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
595 Id. at 1264 (quoting In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267, 1283 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991)). 
596 Id. at 1265. 
597 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 667 (N.D. Cal. 1994). See, e.g., Hall v. 
Ochs, 817 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1987) (allowing emotional distress damages for the trauma involved 
in a racially motivated arrest, not just for the minor injuries); Lentz v. MN Eastern Grace, CIv 
No. 85-1078-FR, (D. Or. Dec. 2,1988) (awarding emotional distress damages for a seaman's 
discomfort around boats after an accident in which his boat was hit, although he suffered only 
bumps and bruises in the accident). Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 667. 
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analogizing to other areas of federal common law IS 
unsatisfactory because of the umqueness of the Warsaw 
Convention's exclusion of recovery for pure emotional 
distress.598 
4. Allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from 
a bodily injury. 
Under the fourth approach, emotional distress flowing from 
the bodily injury is an element of damages allowed for the 
bodily injury. Thus, damages are allowed for emotional distress 
598 See Dafna Yoran, Comment, Recovery of Emotional Damages Under Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention: The American Versus the Israeli Approach, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 811, 814 (1992). 
The US Supreme Court in Floyd stated, "We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the 
Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case and the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Rosman v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., which held that purely psychic trauma is not compensable under 
Article 17." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 534. The Court also noted, "The only reports of French cases we 
did find that used the term 'lesion corporelle' are relatively recent and involve physical injuries 
caused by automobile accidents and other incidents. These cases tend to support the conclusion 
that, in French legal usage, the term 'lesion corporelle' refers only to physical injuries." Id. 
(footnote omitted). Then, the Court dismissed the fact that in 1929 France, unlike many other 
countries, permitted recovery for mental distress. Id. at 539. The Court found that "this general 
proposition of French tort law does not demonstrate that the specific phrase chosen by the 
contracting parties-- 'lesion corporelle'--covers purely psychic injury." Id. To follow up on this, the 
court stated its task: "'to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared 
expectations of the contracting parties.'" Id. at 540 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 
(1985)). 
See also Dale M. Eaton, Note, Recovery for Purely Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw 
Convention: Narrow Construction of Lesion Corporelle in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 1993 
WIS. L. REV. 563, 569. The Floyd Court explained: In 1951, a committee composed of 20 
Warsaw Convention signatories met in Madrid and adopted a proposal to substitute "affection 
corporeUe" for "lesion corporelle" in Article 17. The French delegate to the committee proposed 
this substitution because, in his view, the word "lesion" was too narrow, in that it "presupposed a 
rupture in the tissue, or a dissolution in continuity" which might not cover an injury such as 
mental illness or lung congestion caused by the breakdown in the heating apparatus of the aircraft. 
The United States delegate opposed this change if it "implied the inclusion of mental injury or 
emotional disturbances or upsets which were not connected with or the result of bodily injury," but 
the committee adopted it nonetheless. Although the committee's proposed amendment was never 
subsequently implemented, its discussion and vote in Madrid suggest that, in the view of the 20 
signatories on the committee, "lesion corporelle" in Article 17 had a distinctively physical scope. 
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 546-47. 
See also Luis F. Ras, Warsaw's Wingspan Over State Laws: Towards a Streamlined System of 
Recovery, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 587 (1994). Addressed the question of whether the Warsaw 
Convention provides the exclusive cause of action for injuries sustained during international 
flight. 
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only to the extent the emotional distress is caused by the bodily 
injury. A passenger may, therefore, recover for fear related to his 
broken leg, but not for fear related to the plane crash. Under this 
approach, emotional distress can also have a separate role as the 
causal link between the accident and the bodily injury; a 
passenger may, for example, recover for a heart attack caused by 
the distress of the plane crash.599 
In Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 6oo, the court adopted 
this approach. Jack involved the aborted takeoff and crash of 
TWA Flight 843 when departing New York's John F. Kennedy 
Airport for San Francisco. 601 All the passengers survived 
despite the fact that fire completely destroyed the plane. During 
the aborted takeoff and evacuation, many of the passengers 
suffered minor physical injuries; many were traumatized by the 
accident. The passengers filed suit, seeking damages for 
physical injuries and emotional distress, and TWA filed motions 
for summary judgment. 
599 The comments of the court in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (Ct. App. 
N.Y. 1974), help to illustrate the reasoning behind this position: The compensable injuries must be 
'bodily' injuries but there may be an intermediate causal link which is 'mental' between the 
cause--the accident-- and the effect--the 'bodily injury'. And once that predicate of liability-- the 
'bodily injury'--is established, then the damages sustained as a result of the 'bodily injury' are 
compensable including mental suffering .... However, only the damages flowing from the 'bodily 
injury', whatever the causal link, are compensable .... We hold, therefore, that defendant is liable 
for plaintiffs palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by the psychic trauma of 
the hijacking, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries, but not for the trauma as 
such or for the nonbodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma. 
600 854 F. Supp. at 654. 
601 The case fell under the Warsaw Convention because many of the passengers held tickets for 
international flights. 
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The court held that the plaintiffs with impact injuries could 
recover for their impact injuries, the emotional distress flowing 
from their impact injuries and any physical manifestations of 
their emotional distress. Further, the court decided that the 
plaintiffs with physical manifestations could recover for the 
manifestations and any distress flowing from the manifestations, 
but that they could not recover damages for the emotional 
distress that led to the manifestations. The court was careful to 
note that, in both instances, the emotional distress was limited to 
the distress about the physical impact or manifestation (the 
bodily injury) and that recovery was not allowed for the distress 
about the accident itself. 602 
Of the four approaches discussed above, this fourth one is 
the most desirable for a number of reasons. First, this approach 
prevents serious inequities among the passengers subject to the 
Warsaw Convention. Getting scratched on the way down an 
evacuation slide should not enable one passenger to obtain a 
much greater recovery than an unscratched fellow passenger 
who was equally terrified by the plane crash, and the fourth 
approach achieves this result. And, this approach is consistent 
602 TWA's motion for summary judgment was granted as to the 27 plaintiffs who complained of 
psychic trauma but did not complain of impact injuries or physical manifestations of emotional 
distress; TWA's motion for summary judgment was denied as to the 33 plaintiffs who claimed 
impact injuries and/or physical manifestation of their emotional distress. See Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 
668. 
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with the intentions of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention by 
making passengers' recoveries more reasonable and predictable. 
This approach also allows for greater recovery with more severe 
injuries, presuming that more distress flows from more serious 
injuries. Further, this approach even permits recovery in 
wrongful death cases.603 
The fourth approach does, however, have one drawback. 
The difficulty is that emotional damages might not be allowed in 
a case like that involving the Korean Air Lines plane that was 
shot down in Soviet airspace. For, if no impact injuries were 
suffered until the plane hit the water, no recovery would be 
allowed for the ten or eleven minutes of pre-crash terror. 
The author believes that the numerous benefits of the fourth 
approach outweigh its one drawback. Courts should, therefore, 
adopt it and allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing 
from a bodily injury. 
In a more recent case, In re Air Crash at Little Rock, 
Arkansas604, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a jury verdict in favor 
of passenger damages in the amount of $6.5 million605 for a 
603 Survivors may recover for physical manifestations of their grief at the loss of a loved one. 
604 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, 291 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 2002). 
605 International Air Transport Association (illATA") inter-carrier agreements entered into by 
America made the action a contract, rather than tort action. The agreements serve to waive the 
Warsaw Convention's liability limits. So, while the action was brought under Article 17, the 
liability limits of Article 17 were not applicable, h<::nce the large jury verdict. Id. at 506-07 fn. 2. 
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claim ansmg under the Warsaw Convention. The passenger 
suffered physical injury (punctured leg, traumatic quadriceps 
tendinitis) during an air crash in Little Rock, Arkansas. 606 
Nearly a year later, she sought treatment from a psychiatrist for 
her psychic harm. She was diagnosed with PTSD and depression, 
and her psychiatrist testified that her leg injuries were a factor in 
her PTSD and depression, although later admitted that the 
passenger would likely have suffered from PTSD regardless of 
the physical injury. While testimony was offered that PTSD 
causes physical injury to the brain, no testimony was offered to 
show damage to the passenger's brain. Indeed, no diagnostic 
medical tests were performed. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit 
reversed the district court's ruling that any physical injury is 
sufficient to trigger recovery of emotional damages, regardless 
of their cause, and followed what it termed the more 
"mainstream" view that "damages for mental injury must 
proximately flow from physical injuries caused by the 
accident." 607 The Fifth Circuit found that the approach was 
"consistent with Floyd, yet provides full compensation for the 
victim within the bounds established by the Warsaw 
606 Although the passenger was on a domestic flight, she was returning home from a trip to 
Germany. Id. at 506. 
607 Id, at 510. 
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C . ,,608 onventlOn. 
In its holding, the court drew a line between the emotional 
injuries that were directly caused by the passenger's physical 
injuries to her legs and those that were directly caused by the 
accident--the damages were compensable in the first case, but 
not in the second.609 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
October of 2002.610 
4-7. International approaches 
While the United States is the primary source of aviation 
law decisions under the Warsaw Convention, few other 
countries have addressed the issue of recovery for purely 
emotional damages (but not emotional damages accompanied 
with physical injuries, which issue leaved unanswered outside 
the US) under the Warsaw Convention. Those countries that 
have addressed the issue almost uniformly adopted the view that 
no such recovery is available. 
For UK, in King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.,611 the House 
of Lords dealt with two cases where passengers suffered 
608 Id. 
609 Id. at 511-12. 
610 537 U.S. 974 (2002). 
611 King v. Bristow Helicopters, Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 745, (H.L. 2002). 
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psychiatric injury with no physical injury as a result of accidents 
on board aircraft. In the first case,612 plaintiff King was a 
passenger on a helicopter transporting workers off of a North 
Sea oil platform. Both of the helicopter's engines failed suddenly, 
causing the aircraft to plunge thirty-five feet back onto the 
oilrig's deck. King suffered post traumatic stress disorder with 
symptoms such as insomnia, nightmares, anxiety, and a fear of 
flying. He claimed the accident also caused or contributed to an 
existing peptic ulcer. In the second case,613 the plaintiff was an 
underage girl, Morris, traveling unaccompanied from Kuala 
Lumpur to Amsterdam, who was sexually assaulted by a male 
passenger sitting next to her. She presented evidence at trial that 
she suffered from clinical depression consisting of a single 
episode of a major depressive illness. She claimed only mental 
anguish damages. 614 The House of Lords heard a consolidated 
appeal because the same legal issue was presented in both 
cases.
615 
The House of Lords held that compensation could be 
awarded for physical manifestations of a mental injury so long 
as a casual link can be established by showing that the mental 
612 rd. (citing King v. Bristow, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 95 (2001)). 
613 rd. (citing Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Q.B. 100 (C.A. 2002)). 
614 rd. at 746. 
615 rd. at 747. 
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injury causing the physical symptoms itself was caused by the 
accident. However, no recovery is available for mental injury 
absent physical symptoms. In this consolidated appeal, the 
holding meant that plaintiff King could recover only for his 
ulcer, and plaintiff Morris was entirely denied recovery. 
In their analysis, their Lordships turned to the leading 
authorities from the United States. In particular, they followed 
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd616 and EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. 
Tseng617 , but paid close attention Weaver v. Delta Airlines, 
Inc.618 Lord Steyn noted that, in addition to any legal rationale 
for not following Weaver, the policy reason for not following 
Weaver was that "the extension of the Warsaw system to include 
mental injury and illnesses is too controversial to command 
sufficient international support. ,,619 This rationale for rejecting 
Weaver is important in that their Lordships expressed a strong 
preference in establishing international uniformity in Warsaw 
Convention interpretation. 62o Lord Hobhouse disagreed and 
thought Weaver was correctly decided and naturally followed 
from Floyd.621 Lord Hope took a third position. He suggested 
616 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533 (1991). 
617 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 155. 
618 Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
619 King, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 755. 
620 Id. at 748. 
621 Id. at 783-84. 
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that bodily injury is that which is capable of being demonstrated 
by a physical examination using the most sophisticated means 
available. 622 He then stated that he did not think such an 
examination happened in Weaver and, in fact, that no evidence 
of a physical injury had been presented at all in that case. Based 
on these differing viewpoints, the United Kingdom's position 
regarding Weaver is unclear. 
The House of Lords had been previously confronted with 
the issue of damages for purely mental injuries in Sidhu v. 
British Airways623. That case involved a consolidated appeal 
arising from passengers being taken hostage in Kuwait by 
invading Iraqis during the first Gulf War. The plaintiffs claimed 
to have suffered psychological and bodily injury including 
weight loss, eczema and excessive menstrual bleeding.624 In the 
trial, however, plaintiffs submitted that their claims likely did 
not fall into the category of "bodily injury" as their claims were 
for psychological injury. Before the House of Lords, plaintiffs 
suggested that psychological injury should provide for 
recovery.625 Their Lordships regarded the issue as not germane 
to their decision and avoided discussion of the issue. 626 
622 Id. at 771. 
623 Sidhu v. British Airways, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76 (1997). 
624 Id. at 77. The other consolidated plaintiff alleged only psychological injury. 
625 Id. at 80. 
626 The issue was whether damage suffered in the· course ofintemational carriage by air is 
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Interestingly, it appears that the type of physical injury claimed 
in Sidhu would have allowed for recovery under the standard set 
forth by the House of Lords in King. 
Australia has also had the opportunity to decide whether 
recovery should be allowed for purely mental damages. In 
Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd. 627, the Court of Appeal 
of New South Wales dealt with a plaintiff who claimed mental 
anguish arising from an in-flight tum-back after an engine 
fire. 628 Following Floyd, the court held that the term "bodily 
injury" did not include purely psychological injury, but noted 
that the decision in Floyd "left open the possibility that recovery 
be available where psychological injury is accompanied by 
h . I" ,,629 P YSlca InJury. 
The only case supporting recovery for mental anguish 
without physical symptoms was handed down by the Israel 
Supreme Court.630 In Daddon, the Israel Supreme Court was 
confronted with claims by passengers alleging mental anguish 
damages suffered while being held captive by hijackers. 631 The 
court reached the conclusion that mental anguish absent any 
governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention. The House of Lords held that it was and 
dismissed the case on limitations grounds. See Sidhu, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 87. 
627 Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 140 F.L.R. 318 (1997). 
628 Id. at 319. 
629 Id. at 323. 
630 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 770 (citing Daddon v. Air France, 1 S.&B. Av. R. 141 (1984)). 
631 Id.at769. 
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physical injury should be considered "bodily injury" under the 
Warsaw Convention because at the time of drafting, unlike today, 
mental anguish either was not actionable or the possibility of 
mental anguish without physical harm had simply not been 
contemplated. This approach has been criticized as 
impermissibly seeking to develop the meaning of the phrase 
"bodily injury" by judicial policy in light of subsequent legal 
and medical advances instead of interpreting the Convention as 
written. 632 To date, no other jurisdictions have followed 
Daddon. 
4-8. Conclusion 
While there is very little disagreement about the literal 
translation of "lesion corporelle," its meaning and application in 
the context of a variety of mental or psychic injuries is less clear. 
There is widespread disagreement about whether - and to what 
extent - the term encompasses emotional injury. Court decisions 
since Floyd allow recovery for a range of claims involving 
emotional injury under Article 17; in some cases there is no 
recovery, while in others there is full recovery, depending on the 
632 Id. at 770. 
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allegations and the nexus between the alleged injury and any 
related or accompanying physical injury. Courts are in 
agreement that pure emotional injury is not compensable under 
the Convention.633 Most courts agree that emotional injury is 
not compensable in those cases where it has resulted only in 
physical manifestations such as weight loss or sleeplessness. At 
the same time, most courts generally agree that emotional injury 
is compensable if it proximately flows from a physical injury. 
The troubling cases are those involving emotional injury 
accompanied by unrelated physical injury, i.e., where the 
physical injury has not been shown to have caused the emotional 
injury. These cases are typically resolved on a case-by-case 
basis. There is no consistent rule to guide the parties, although 
the trend in the decisions seems to disfavor recovery for 
emotional injury with unrelated physical harm. Thus, the case 
law suggests that a plaintiff is more likely to prevail if he or she 
can allege and prove a link between the physical and mental 
InJunes. 
In the future, certain advances in medicine may blur, or 
perhaps even clarify, the distinction between purely "physic" 
and physical injury. Currently, the majority of courts have not 
633 See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 530; Rosman, 214 N.E.2d at 848; Fishman, 132 F.3d at 140; Croucher, 
111 F. Supp. 2d at 501. 
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accepted that PTSD alone can be characterized as a physical 
injury. Defendants should expect, however, even under the new 
Montreal Convention of 1999, that plaintiffs will continue to 
push the envelope with the backing of experts and application of 
advances in science and medicine for more rulings to the effect 
that PTSD is itself a physical injury or lesion corporelle. On the 
other hand, although science may change or advance, the 
analysis of facts in cases involving a claim of emotional injury 
is unlikely to change significantly with the introduction of the 
Montreal Convention. Accordingly, parties involved in future 
cases with claims of mental injuries must be well-versed in the 
body of case law cited in this chapter. As discussed herein, the 
application of the "lesion corporelle" concept in context of 
allegations of emotional harm is not entirely resolved and is an 




The Warsaw - Montreal System and China 
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I 
5-1. Introductory note 
CAAC634 was established in the year of 1950 as the central 
~---'------' 
administrative body of civil aviation in China. It has developed 
rapidly since the Chinese Reformation in 1980.635 Today, China 
has more than one hundred international flight lines covenng 
almost the entire world. 
Compared to the high speed development of the Chinese 
civil aviation industry, Chinese legislation has not kept up with 
the pace. China only has "Civil Avia1!Q1:!1'!w of China (1995)", ,// 
',.-_.-------- ---- --_._--_ ... _._--_.-- _ .. --_.-
promulgated on October 30 1995 and effective as of March 1, 
I,F 
1996, which is out of date. Importantly, does not deal with the 4-
~ 
issue of international airlines' liability to passengers. Only in 
one article of the "Civil Aviation Law of China", Article 184 ~ .------- .. "~., 
provides: 
"Where the provisions of international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's 
Republic of China ... the provisions of that international treaty shall apply ... " 
However, this provides no means to interpret an 
international convention. This situation creates uncertainty for 
Chinese courts, airlines, lawyers. No one is clear what exactly 
the law is, or how to apply international conventions when deal 
634 Civil Aviation Administration of China, now known as General Administration of Civil 
Aviation of China. 
635 Before Chinese Reformation, CAAC was state-owned property, even under the military 
organization system. 
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with international issues. Fortunately, this is not a dead end, for 
the Civil Aviation Law of China, Article 184 paragraph 2 
provides: 
"In respect of cases which are not provided by the law of the P.R. China or by the 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the P.R. China, international 
practices may apply." 
This constitutes the foundation of the present dissertation. 
Examining the cases around the world in this area will solve or 
at least provide references to legal problems in China. 
The problems have been clearly pointed out in recent air 
disasters at Pusan Airport in South Korea on April 5, 2002 and 
.---- -----.------- -----_._----------
over the sea near Dalian, Cbina on May 7, 2002 have raised 
~r ___ • __ ~ ___________ ~ _____ • ___ _ 
questions about how compensation claims are handled in China. 
Though China is a contracting party to relevant international 
conventions636 and has enacted domestic laws and regulations 
governing compensation for passengers killed or injured in air 
accidents, d~_~~~ts in the country's legislation have been revealed. 
How to apply the articles of the international conventions and 
domestic laws to the air calamities that have occurred in 
different jurisdictions, and how to determine the damages are 
serious challenges faced by China's judges when claims for 
compensation are brought to trial. 
636 China made the accession to the Warsaw Convention 1929 on 20/07/58, so the convention 
came into force in China on 18/1 0/58. 
China made the accession to the Hague Protocol 1955 on 20/08/75, so the protocol came into 
force in China on 18/11/75. 
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Since China is a contracting party to both the Warsaw 
Convention, signed October 1929, and the 1955 Hague Protocol 
'- '1 --1 
that amended the Warsaw Convention. In accordance with 
article 1 of the conventions, these conventions apply to 
i!!t~DJ(l!Lo1).(;lLcaniages, which is defined as: 
"any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the parties, the place of 
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage 
or a transshipment, are situated either within the territory of two High Contracting 
Parties or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed 
stopping place within the territory of another state, even if that state is not a High 
Contracting party.,,637 
So, in case of an aircraft that departed from within China 
and suffered air crash in a state of destination which is a 
signatory country of eith~TJh~JY,!~~a~ ~onvention or the Hague 
Protocol, the relevant convention shall apply to the 
compensation arising from the air accident. 
The Chinese Aviation Law expressly introduces the 
concept of 'i!l~ternational carria~e' as it is used in the 
conventions, and thus the Chinese law also distinguishes 
between international and non-international carriage. For 
-- - -" -_.----"- .---~ .. -.~---.-~---~.-~------
international flights to or from China, the conventions will 
prevail, and the local rules will deal with ~0I?-~~nt~!:!l:~~~~!!al 
flights. 
637 See Warsaw Convention 1929, Article 1. 
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For domestic carriage, Article 128 of the Chinese Aviation 
Law stipulates: 'The limits of carrier's liability in domestic air 
transport shall be formulated by the competent civil aviation 
authority under the State Council and put in force after being 
approved by the State Council.' This is a delegated legislation 
clause. However, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAAC) did not 
formulate a new regulation as per the law on this matter but let 
the pre-existing 'The Provisional Regulations on Compensation 
to Passenger Killed or Injured in Domestic Air Transport' (that 
entered into force January 1, 1994) continues to apply. Under 
these regulations, air carrier's liability for passengers is limited 
to Rmb70,000 (about US$8,400). For checked baggage, 
according to the revised 'Domestic Transport of Passengers and 
Baggage by China Civil Aviation Rules' formulated by CAAC 
on June 28, 1996, the limitation is Rmb50 (US$6) per kilo, and 
for carry-on baggage is at Rmb2,000 (US$240). 
The air carrier's liability to passengers under Warsaw 
Convention is 125,000 French francs and Hague Protocol 
doubled this to 250,000 francs. The Chinese Aviation Law 
introduces the Special Drawing Right (SDR) contained in 
Montreal Additional Protocol No.2, 1975, rather than the French 






carrier's limits on passenger liability for international flights at 
16,600 SDR, on checked baggage at 17 SDR per kilo and 
carry-on baggage at 332 SDR for each passenger. 
Over the past three decades, civil aviation industry around 
the world have seen higher limits in air carriers' liability. Since 
the lATA Intercarrier Agreement (IIA) of 1995, supplemented 
by the measures to implement the lATA Intercarrier Agreement 
(MIA), many airlines in developed countries have incorporated 
new limits into their Conditions of Carriage and increase the 
ceiling to 100,000 SDR. In 1998, EC regulation on air carrier 
liability entered into force. Airlines form Japan, meanwhile, 
lifted the limits voluntarily. The Montreal Convention came into 
being in 1999.638 
All of these efforts aim to modernize the Warsaw system 
with higher limits, and ultimately aim to abolish the limits. 
When looking at China's liability limitation regulations, we find 
that the limit for domestic carriage (Rmb70,000) is much lower 
than the international limit of 100,000 SDR, and even lower 
than the original Warsaw system. China's calculation was based 
on the economic situation in 1993, but with fast GDP growth 
638 China has ratified the Montreal Convention 1999 on 01106/05, so the convention came into 
force in China on 31107/05. 
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) 
over the past decade and taking inflation into account the 
amount needs to be raised. A positive sign that things are 
changing is China Northern Airline's increase of the limited 
amount for families of the Dalian (May 7, 2002) crash victims 
killed to Rmb 133,000 (US$16,000) per passenger; with 
additional compensation (for checked and carry-on baggage), 
the amount in total will be about Rmb194,000 (US$23,458). 
This roughly equals the level of Hague Protocol and the amount 
for international flights under the Chinese aviation law. It is 
believed this compensation policy has been approved by the 
CAAC. 
Therefore, under the framework of China's aviation 
legislation, there exist five regimes that govern carrier's limits 
for passenger liability: the Warsaw convention 1929, the Hague 
Protocol 1955, the Montreal Convention 1999, the Chinese 
Aviation Law for international carriage and the CAAC rules for 
domestic carriage. 
5-2. How to interpret "Accident" in China? 
Beside the problem of "how much" an international aIr 
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carner should liable to its passengers, how to interpret the 
international conventions is another major problem, especially 
the pre-conditions of a carrier should liable in the crucial Article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 and the Montreal 
Convention 1999. 
Article 17 of the conventions require there is an "accident" 
to trigger the airline's liability, however, no definition of 
"accident" has been given in the conventions. 
The theory that the goal in the interpretation of any 
convention is to effectuate the intent of the parties is also 
accepted in China. According to the Vienna Convention,639 'a 
treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in light of its object and purpose. ,640 The basic rules include 
the need to uphold the purposes of the treaty and give 
meaningful effect to the signature or intent behind the treaty. 
Notions of liberality and good faith 641 are also commonly 
invoked. 
Notably, the draft convention initially presented to the 
Warsaw delegation by CITEJA made air carriers liable 'in the 
639 Viellila Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Viellila Convention]. 
640 Viellila Convention, supra note 639, art. 32. 
641 Id. 
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case of death, wounding or any other bodily injury suffered by a 
traveler,' 'in the case of loss, damage or destruction of goods or 
baggage,' or 'the case of delay suffered by a traveler, goods, or 
baggage.' The liability scheme did not textually include any 
requirement of causation and made no mention or reference to 
'accident.' Liability was likewise the same for personal injuries 
and damage to goods or baggage.642 
The minutes to the Convention establish that the term 
'accident' itself was never discussed, but simply appeared in 
final form as revised by the drafting committee at the 
Convention.643 While there is no information as to why or when 
this occurred, the wording remains exactly the same today as it 
was then. 
Surely Warsaw Convention Article 17 is 'stark and 
undefined.' The plain or ordinary meaning of 'accident' or, 
'l'accident', is certainly similar under both English and French 
usage, and references an unexpected, fortuitous, or untoward 
event or happening. What it includes within its ambit, however, 
remains in question. 
642 See International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions, Second International 
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes, Oct. 4- 12, Warsaw 1929, at 264-265 (R. 
Horner ed. & D. Legrez transl., 1975) [[hereinafter 1929 Warsaw Minutes], (listing liability of the 
carrier as adopted by CITEJA in May 1928). 
643 See 1929 Warsaw Minutes, supra note 642, at 267 (using the term 'accident' in discussing the 
liability of third party carriers). 
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Fortunately, followed the basic principles, there is one 
universal accepted definition of "accident" generally, which 
given by the US Supreme Court in Air France v Saks,644 where 
Ms. Saks was a passenger on an international flight between 
France and Los Angeles, California. 645 As the aircraft 
descended, Ms. Saks felt extreme pressure and pain in her left 
ear
646 
and suffered permanent deafness as a result.647 Ms. Saks 
claimed that the normal pressurization changes during descent 
caused her deafness and constituted an accident under Article 
17.648 She argued that "accident" should be defined as a "hazard 
of air travel," and that her injury had indeed been caused by 
such a hazard. The US Supreme Court rej ected her claim and in 
this landmark case, defined "accident" as an "unexpected or 
unusual event or happening external to passenger". 
This definition has been accepted by UK, in the case of 
Chaudhari v British Airways plc,649 the UK Court of Appeal 
determined that a passenger, who was already suffering from a 
left-sided paralysis and who was injured when he fell as he tried 
to leave his seat, did not suffer an "accident" that fell within 
644 470 U.S. 392, 105 S. Ct. 1338,84 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1985). 
645 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 394. 
646 See id. 
647 Id. 
648 See id, at 395. 
649 [1997] Times 7 May 1997 (Apr. 16, 1997). 
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Article 17 of the Convention. Leggatt LJ emphasized that the 
word "accident" focused attention on the cause, rather than the 
effect of the accident, and should be contrasted with Article 18 
of the Convention (covering loss and damage to baggage) which 
refers to the "occurrence" which caused the damage. The word 
"accident" was not to be construed by reference to the 
passenger's peculiar condition, but was properly to be defined as 
something external to the passenger. 
This definition has also been accepted by Australia, in the 
case of Povey v Qantas Airways Ltd 650, the High Court of 
Australia held that "accident" is a concept which invites two 
questions: first, what happened on board (or during embarking 
or disembarking) that caused the injury of which complaint is 
made, and secondly, was what happened unusual or unexpected. 
Same as Canada, in the case of Quinn v. Canadian Airlines 
Int'l Ltd. 651, Canadian court relying on Saks' holding that 
turbulence was not considered an accident under the Warsaw 
Convention. 
China has not encountered a trail case concerned with the 
definition of "accident" in Article 17 of Warsaw Convention. 
650 2005 WL 1460709 (HCA 2005), affirming QANTAS Ltd v. Povey, 2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 
2003), Special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (HCA 2004) and Affirmed by, 2005 
WL 1460709 (HCA 2005). 
651 [1994] 18 O.R.3d 326. 
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The reason is due to the extremely unwillingness of prosecution, 
Chinese people rarely sue in courts, the quantity of cases (at 
least in this area) is so limited, this is particularly true when 
compare with the US legal practice. However, there is no reason 
to reject the worldwide accepted definition in Saks, the only 
doubt as to this worldwide standard interpretation of "accident" 
in the Warsaw Convention is the "external" requirement. Will 
China accept the "external" requirement? The most likely 
answer will be affirmative. 
Prior to the decision of the US Supreme Court in Saks, a 
number of courts expressed the view that an "accident," as that 
term is used in Article 17, must be an unexpected or unusual 
happening without requiring the event to be external to the 
passenger. 652 And the Australia Povey case expressed this 
concern as well. Some experts argue that the US Supreme Court 
insisted that the "accident" must be external, however, there is 
not a lot of textual support in the Warsaw Convention for this 
conclusion. On the contrary, the text of Article 17 uses the word 
"accident" as the necessary cause of the "damage so sustained." 
Thus, arguably, if such "damage" were sustained by an internal 
"accident" (should that be possible) so long as it happened "on 
652 See Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see also 
Rullman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 445, 471 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup 1983). 
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board the aircraft" or "in the course of' the specified 
"operations," that would be enough. Under this view, the 
happening or event in such special and temporal circumstances 
would be sufficient to attract the liability of the carrier. 
By aware that even in the Saks, why an event must be 
"external" to qualify as an "accident" has not been clearly 
reasoned. There are some positive aspects under this approach, 
this "external" prerequisite of Article 17 accident arises from the 
court's desire to reduce the trouble of proof, which Chinese 
courts usually welcome, since under the modem science, it is 
extremely difficult to prove "internal accident" which connects 
to the air travel, such as the DVT cases. 
The next issue is should China interpret "accident" broadly 
or narrowly? The most likely answer is broadly. Given the 
significant exclusivity of the Warsaw and the Montreal 
conventions, the world, include China, certainly under the 
pressure of interpret the word "accident" broadly since recovery 
for personal injury in the scope of international air carriage if 
not allowed under Article 17 of the Conventions, is not available 
at all. This is more so that in light of the traditions of Chinese 
~ laws, regulations, and policies always encourage comfort the 
j people. The question usually will be "how much is j 329 
j 
appropriate?" rather than "will that be an accident?". 
Based on the issues discussed so far, the following will be a 
detailed examination of what will constitute "accident" under 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal 
Convention in China, or will not. 
1. Can intentional misconduct constitute an "accident" 
within the meaning of Article in China? The answer IS 
affirmative. There is nothing in the Warsaw Convention and the 
Montreal Convention exclude intentional misconduct to be an 
"accident", instead, according to the inter-relationship of the 
Article 17 and Article 25 653, intentional misconduct will 
definitely fall in the scope of Article 17's "accident". 
2. Whether inaction may constitute an "accident" within 
the meaning of Article in China? The Chinese approach would 
be pure inaction will not be an "accident" but an event lead by 
an inaction could be an "accident". 
In the case of Olympic Airways v Husain 654, the US 
Supreme Court held that the term accident is not limited to 
653 Warsaw Convention 1929, Article 25 provides: 
"(1) The carrier shall not be entitle to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which 
exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default 
on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered 
to be equivalent to willful misconduct; 
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage 
is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his 
employment." 
654 540 U.S. 644, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004). 
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affirmative acts. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the 
court rejected the defendant airline's argument that a flight 
attendant's failure to act, by refusing to assist a passenger 
sensitive to second-hand cigarette smoke in moving farther from 
the smoking section, could not constitute an "accident" because 
it was not an affirmative act. The court declared that the relevant 
"accident" inquiry was whether there was an unexpected or 
unusual event or happening and the rejection of an explicit 
request for assistance would be an event or happening under the 
ordinary and usual meaning of those terms. Moreover, the court 
thought that Article 25, providing that Article 22's liability cap 
does not apply in the event of willful misconduct or such default 
[emphasis added by the court] on the carrier's part that may be 
the equivalent of willful misconduct, suggested that an airline's 
inaction could be the basis of liability. 
Chinese courts will hardly accept this case. It is true that 
rej ection of a request can be considered an event, but inaction 
itself would not be. Inaction itself is nothing, not even an event, 
how could it be an accident? The US Supreme Court conclusion 
that an airline's pure inaction could be the basis of liability 
would most likely not be acceptable in China. 
3. Should service of food or beverages could be an 
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"accident" in China? Normally, the answer will be yes. In one 
complaint to Eastern Airline, a passenger flew from Hong Kong 
to Shanghai, one hour after disembarkation, he felt very 
uncomfortable and was diagnosed with food poisoning. The 
airline agreed that if the food poisoning was caused by the food 
during the flight, it is an accident for which the airline should 
liable. However, in this complaint, the passenger failed to prove 
that his food poisoning was caused by the in flight meal. 
4. Can detention or search of a passenger be an "accident" 
in China? Probably yes, the reasonable expectation is that courts 
will interpret detention or search of passenger as a Warsaw 
Convention Article 17' s "accident" as long as the detention or 
search is unexpected or unusual. If the detention or search is a 
normal or routine one according to the airport or airline security 
procedures, then there will be no accident. 
5. Can removal of passenger from aircraft be an accident in 
China? There is no clear answer, a court has to look into every 
case's facts. Normally, a court will focus on whether the 
removal is justified, if yes, it is the passenger's responsibility to 
follow the removal order, if the passenger refuses to be removed 
and caused injury to himself during the force removal, the 
airline should not liable. On the contrary, if the removal is not 
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justified, it is an unexpected and unusual event, then airline 
should liable to the injury to the passenger. 
6. Can a passenger's pre-existing medical condition be an 
accident in China? Probably not, because if the passenger is 
aware of his medical condition, such as heart disease, he should 
know that may cause damage during international flight, there 
will be no unexpected or unusual event external to the passenger, 
then there will be no accident. Even if the passenger is not 
aware of his medical condition, the problem is already there, this 
could not trigger the airline's liability. Since there is no case in 
China concentrate on this issue, the following US case may 
provide reference. 
In Ra;cooar v. Air India Ltd. 655, the US court held that the 
death of a passenger, who suffered a heart attack during layover 
in an airport transit lounge utilized by several carriers and 
restricted to passengers who cleared customs and security 
checks, was not the result of an "accident" under Article 17 
--- ---~ ... ------
because a heart attack, under the definition of that term by the 
r-·-------~ __ 
Supreme Court in Saks, was not an event external to the 
passenger. 
655 89 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. N.Y. 2000). 
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7. Can a carrier's personnel response to passenger's 
medical emergency be an accident in China? The answer is yes. 
In an unreported complaint to Air China, one passenger felt 
uncomfortable during an international flight, the air stewardess 
offered him airsickness medicine, after the flight arrived at its 
destination, the passenger suffered medicine hypersusceptibility. 
The airline agreed that this is an accident under the Warsaw 
Convention Article 17 and paid the passenger compensation. 
Similarly, in one US case, Fishman by Fishman v Delta 
Airlines, Inc. 656, the US court adopted the same approach. The 
court of appeals held that the scalding of a child by a stewardess 
attempting to alleviate the passenger's earache was caused by an 
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention. On the defendant carrier's international flight from 
Tel Aviv, Israel to New York City, the child, who had a cold, 
suffered from the change of air pressure. The stewardess 
suggested that a cup containing a warm cloth be placed over the 
ear and, when the poultice was applied to the child's ear, 
scalding water in the cup dripped on the child's neck and 
shoulder, causing bums. 




In an effort to take their claim outside the Warsaw 
Convention and avoid the result of the district court's ruling, 
dismissal of the claims because the two-year limitations period 
for bringing suit under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention 
had expired, the plaintiffs attempted to cast their claims chiefly 
in terms of the tortious refusal of medical care that happened 
afterward and argued that the claims did not arise out of the 
normal operation of aircraft, and in any event were not 
accidental in nature. The appellate court approved the district 
court's reasoning that the underpinning of the claims was the 
scalding of the child by the flight attendant, an unexpected event 
that was external to both plaintiffs. Although the plaintiffs 
contended that the child suffered serial colds and ear infections 
and had narrow eustachian tubes, all of which predisposed her to 
earaches caused by a change of pressure on the aircraft, the 
appellate court agreed with the district court's reasoning that the 
injury in the instant case was not the child's earache, but rather 
the application of scalding water to treat it. The appellate court 
thus found that, although the earache was caused by a change in 
air pressure, which was part of the normal operation of the 
aircraft and not an accident, all the harm alleged by the plaintiffs 





5-3. How should the phrase "From Embarking to 
Disembarking" be interpreted in China? 
After analyzing how to interpret "accident" in China, the 
next issue is how to interpret "from embarking to disembarking" 
in China. This is the second pre-condition to trigger an aIr 
carrier's liability under the Warsaw-Montreal system. 
It makes no difference that the negligence occurred or that 
the carriage contract was formed prior to embarkation, for the 
Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention Article 17 
refer to the place where the accident causing injury must Lrci/V/ 
. -
occurred in order for that article to cover the case and establish 
the pres~mption 9fJi~l>iliJy_for the injury. The actual, ultimate 
-.. --~- ---" - --------- .... ----~-- -.-----
cause of the accident is irrelevant for purposes of Article 17. As 
long as, and only if, the accident which caused the injury 'took 
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the 
operations of embarking or disembarking,' the action is covered 
by Article 17.657 
The general understanding of the scope of "from 
embarking to disembarking" is narrower than from the moment 




IVC.;:::.t ''yt.-/U~l I} 
) the passenger entered the airport of departure until the passenger 
.) left the terminal at his destination; but broader than from when 
I 
~ 
the passenger entered the aircraft until exiting the aircraft. 
At the 1929 Warsaw Conference, the delegates were faced 
with two general proposals concerning the extent of carrier 
liability. One point of view was that liability attached from the 
moment the passenger entered the air terminal and extended 
until the passenger left the terminal at his destination. A more 
restrictive view was advanced which would have extended 
liability from the time the passenger boarded the aircraft until 
the time of deplaning. The broader plan of liability was rejected 
in favor of the language presently contained in Article 17.658 
Perhaps the restrictive one toO. 659 The equivalent phrase of 
Article 17 in the French text reads: "Au cours de toutes 
operations d'embarquement et de debarquement'l • It is thus plain 
that the draftsman contemplated that the process of 
disembarking, as well as that of embarking, may in some 
circumstances be capable of including at least some activities 
beyond the mere actual assent or descent of the steps of an 
658 For useful background discussion of the views expressed at the 1929 Conference, see Martinez 
Hernandez v Air France (1976, CAl Puerto Rico) 545 F2d 279, cert den 430 US 950, 51 LEd 800, 
97 S Ct 1592. Infra. 
See also Note: Warsaw Convention--Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Injuries Sustained Within 
a Tenninal. 45 Fordham L Rev 369. 
659 See Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1975, CA2 NY) 528 F2d 31,36 ALR Fed 477, cert den 
429 US 890, 50 LEd 172, 97 S Ct 246, reh den 429 US 1124, 51 LEd 574, 97 S Ct 1162. Infra. 
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aircraft or use of an equivalent device. Problems, however, may 
arise in determining what other location should be treated as the 
point where the process of embarkation begins or the process of 
disembarking ends. 
Since the Guatemala Conference, in 1971, the use of the 
words "embarking" and "disembarking" were re-examined in the 
light of the absolute liability regime which had been established 
by the Montreal Interim Agreement, but it was apparently the 
consensus of opinion of the delegates that the wording needed 
no change.66o Even in the new Montreal Convention 1999, the 
words are still the same. 
There are three major approaches about this issue around 
the world today, namely the location test, the aviation risk test, 
and the tripartite test. 
1. The location test. In UK, the determine factor is the 
location. In Adalia v Air Canada661 , the English Court of Appeal 
expressed the opinion that location is the crucial factor, if not the 
only factor to determine the extent of from embarking to 
disembarking. 
The plaintiff arrived at Heathrow Airport from Toronto and 
660 As to discussion of "embarking" and "disembarking" by the delegates of the Guatemala 
Conference, see Minutes of the International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City (1971), 
ICAO Document 9040--LC/167-1, pp 31 et seq. 
661 Adatia v Air Canada, May 21, 1992. Lloyds Aviation Law, vol. 11, No. 13, July 1, 1992. 
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suffered injury on the moving walkway while proceeding from 
the aircraft to the immigration and customs hall. The English 
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the County Court that 
the plaintiff had not suffered the injury in the course of 
disembarkation. 
As the judge said, the point to be resolved was whether the 
plaintiff's injuries, which sustained on the travelator, were 
caused "in the course of any of the operations of 
disembarking" . There was no English authority which 
specifically deals with the meaning of those words. In the 
absence of such authority, the judge concluded: "One has to 
construe them in their ordinary English meaning and 
disembarking, either from a ship or aircraft, in my judgment 
means leaving the ship or aircraft and actually stepping on to 
dry land or that part of the non-movable part of the airfield or 
aerodrome or terminal." The judge derived support for this 
conclusion from an American authority, MacDonald v Air 
Canada.662 
As is pointed out In Shawcross 663 modem conditions 
governIng embarkation and disembarkation at different 
international airports may well differ widely. The courts should 
662 MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1970). 
663 This case law is helpfully analysed in paragraphs 155, 155.1 and 1552. of Shaw cross & 
Beaumont on Air Law (4th Edition). 
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be cautious before placing a gloss on the words of Article 17 and 
that in any case the ultimate question is whether, on the wording 
of that Article, the passenger's movements through airport 
procedures (including his physical location) indicates that he 
was at the relevant time engaged upon the operation of 
embarking upon or disembarking from the particular flight in 
question. 
2. Aviation risk test. The civil law jurisdictions' courts 
when deal with the issue of the scope of "from embarking to 
disembarking" frequently pay some regard to the question 
whether the relevant accident related to the activity of aviation, 
in another word, whether there is any aviation risk. They also 
attach considerable importance to the question whether at the 
relevant time the passenger was under the control of the carrier. 
In Mache v Cie Air France664 , the French court held that 
the physical injuries received as a result of the passenger falling 
into a manhole when crossing the apron to customs did not take 
I place in the course of disembarkation since there is no aviation 
( risk. 
In Air-Inter v. Sage et al. 665 , where a passenger slipped and 
fell in an airport entrance hall, while he was in front of the 
664 17 RFDA353, 20 RFDA228, (1966); 21 RFDA 343, (1967); 24 RFDA 311, (1970) Cour de 
Cassation. 
665 Cour d' Appel de Lyon (France), February 10,1976; RFDA 266. 
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check-in counter before proceeding to the departure lounge. The 
fall was caused by the passenger slipping over a pool of whisky 
split on the ground by a previous traveler. The French court held 
that the fall could not be blamed on the carrier, since the airport 
entrance hall is a public place and not subject to the carrier's 
control and management. Consequently, the preparatory stage of 
air transport could not be considered as having commenced. 
In Consorts Zaoui v. Aeroport de Paris666, the French Court 
of Appeal has, for good reason, rejected the request for 
compensation from an airline for injuries sustained by 
passengers who used the escalator situated in the airport 
entrance hall; it noted that the people applying for compensation 
were, at the time when the accident occurred, in airport 
buildings used by different airline companies and where the 
carrier's agents had not yet taken over responsibility for those 
persons. 
In Blumenfeld v BEA 667, unlike the French approach 
illustrated above, the German court adopted a rather extensive 
interpretation as to the Warsaw Convention Article 17. In this 
case, an aircraft of the defendant airline had been unable to take 
off on schedule due to thick fog, so the passengers had to wait 
666 Cour de Cassation (Ire Ch. Civ.), May 18, 1976; [1976] RFDA 394. 
667 (Federal Republic of Germany), March 11, 1961; [1962] ZLW 78. 
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for some time. When the flight was finally called the plaintiff, 
who alone with other passengers hurried down the steps of the 
air terminal building in order to board the aircraft, slipped and 
fell; she boarded the aircraft with bruises on her leg and ankle. 
The plaintiff then claimed and received compensation for the 
accident, because the court ruled that when the airline company 
calls its passengers to board the aircraft it takes full charge of 
the passengers. 
In Adler v Austrian Airlines 668, the Brussels Court of 
Appeal held that where the passenger who slipped on ice 
disembarking from a bus in order to embark on the aircraft was 
in the course of embarking. 
3. The tripartite test. Taking the position that the physical 
location of a passenger was not a sufficient sole criterion on 
which to determine whether a passenger was in the course of 
"embarking" or "disembarking" within the meaning of Article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention, the US courts will look at the 
following factors: the location, the activity of the passenger, and 
the control over the passenger by the carrier. 
In Dav v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 669, where injured 
passengers and the executrix of a passenger who died in a 
668 [1986] 1 S & B A v R VIII191 (Brussels CA). 
669 Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1975, CA2 NY) 528 F2d 31, 36ALR Fed 477, cert den 429 
US 890, 50 LEd 172, 97 S Ct 246, reh den 429 US· 1124, 51 LEd 574,97 S Ct 1162. 
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terrorist attack, filed an action against airline company in which 
they claimed that the TWA was liable for the injuries and the 
death under the Warsaw Convention. The TWA contended that 
the application of Article 17 should be determined by reference 
only to the area where the accident occurred. Liability under the 
Convention should not attach while the passenger is inside the 
terminal building. The very earliest time at which liability can 
commence is when the passenger steps through the terminal 
gate. 
The facts disclose that at the time of the terrorist attack, the 
~ plaintiffs had already surrendered their tickets, passed through 
passport control, and entered the area reserved exclusively for 
those about to depart on international flights. They were 
assembled at the departure gate, ready to proceed to the aircraft. 
The passengers were not free agents roaming at will through the 
terminal. They were required to stand in line at the direction of 
TWA's agents for the purpose of undergoing a weapons search 
which was a prerequisite to boarding. The US Supreme Court 
held that whether one looks to the passengers' activity (which 
was a condition to embarkation), to the restriction of their 
movements, to the imminence of boarding, or even to their 
position adjacent to the terminal gate, driven to the conclusion 
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that the plaintiffs were 'in the course of embarking.' 
The US Supreme Court believes a relatively broad 
construction of Article 17, affording protection to the plaintiffs 
under the Warsaw liability umbrella, is in harm0ny with modem 
theories of accident cost allocation. The airlines are in a position 
to distribute among all passengers what would otherwise be a 
crushing burden upon those few unfortunate enough to become 
'accident' victims. 670 Equally important, this interpretation 
fosters the goal of accident prevention. 671 The airlines, in 
marked contrast to individual passengers, are in a better posture 
to persuade, pressure or, if need be, compensate airport 
managers to adopt more stringent security measures against 
terrorist attacks. 
The US Supreme Court believes that the Warsaw drafters 
wished to create a system of liability rules that would cover all 
the hazards of air travel. 672 The rigid location-based rule 
suggested by TWA would ill serve that goal. Under TWA's test, 
many claims relating to liability for the hazards of flying would 
be excluded from the Warsaw system and would be governed by 
local law. Rather than serving the drafters' intent of creating an 
670 See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents at 39--45 (1970). 
671 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569--70 (9th Cir. 1974). 
672 See Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention, 7 J. Air. L. 
1, 20 (1936); Calkins, The Cause of Action under .the Warsaw Convention, 26 J.Air.L. 217 (1959). 
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inclusive system, TWA's proposal would frustrate it. 
Moreover, the US Supreme Court also believes that the 
result it has reached furthers the intent of the Warsaw drafters in 
a broader sense. The Warsaw delegates knew that, in the years to 
come, civil aviation would change in ways that they could not 
foresee. They wished to design a system of air law that would be 
both durable and flexible enough to keep pace with these 
changes. 
Having analyzed the three major approaches about the 
scope of "from embarking to disembarking", then which one 
should China adopt, I believe is the tripartite approach. While 
there appears to be no relevant Chinese authority, the problem 
has given rise to extensive case law in other jurisdictions. The 
object of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention 
as thereby described is "the unification of certain rules relating 
to international carriage by air". So far as possible, therefore, in 
interpreting and applying Article 17, should have due regard to 
the case law in other jurisdictions. This view also supported by 
Chinese Aviation Law Article 184.673 
Beside the advantages of the tripartite approach which 
discussed above, let us analyzing the other two approaches in 
673 The Civil Aviation Law of China Article 184 provides: "In respect of cases which are not 
provided by the law of the P.R. China or by the international treaty concluded or acceded to by the 
P.R. China, international practices may apply." 
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the view of why they are not the best. The location approach is 
too hidebound which could not catch up with the modem change 
of embarking or disembarking a flight. Such as the situations in 
the Day case, it is really hard to disagree that the passenger were 
embarking, I could not even answer a simple question, if they 
were not embarking, what were they doing? The aviation risk 
approach has its disadvantages too. Aviation risk is relative, but 
not decisive. As one passenger walking on the steps of a life 
shaft which connect with the aircraft, the real risk is people 
walking on steps may fall down, rather than any risk of fly in the 
air, will a passenger who fall down on a life shaft which connect 
with the aircraft not embarking? The answer is no. 
5-4. How to interpret "Bodily Injury" in China? 
The final issue is how to interpret "bodily injury" in China, 
which is the third pre-condition to trigger an air carrier's 
liability under the Warsaw-Montreal system. In[afllother word;-
y~ ,j' (;-C~t·L 
I wi1l7mental distress included in the word @tl"bodily injury'iin 
China? 
Whether 'bodily injury' encompasses emotional distress 
under the Warsaw - Montreal liability regime is one of the 
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heaviest debated topics within the field. Courts have attempted 
for years to interpret and solidify the meaning of ambiguous 
phrasing and terminology, and the debate has yet to be resolved. 
A number of decisions around the world except one 
decision in Israel have held that there can be no recovery for 
purely mental injuries. For example, in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. 
Floyd674, the US Supreme Court not only rejected the view that 
there can be any recovery for purely mental injuries under the 
limited liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention,675 but 
also concluded that unless a passenger was made to "suffer 
death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury," an 
air carrier could not be held liable.676 The case was brought by 
passengers of an Eastern Airlines flight from Miami to the 
Bahamas. Shortly after takeoff, one of the engines lost oil 
pressure and, as part of the normal emergency protocol, the 
flight crew shut down the engine and returned to Miami. The 
two remaining engines then failed, and the flight crew informed 
the passengers that the plane would be "ditched" in the Atlantic 
Ocean. As the plane was descending, the crew was able to 
674 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). 
675 See Terrafranca v. Virgin AtIantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(characterizing the plaintiff's injuries as "purely psychic injuries that do not qualify as bodily 
injuries under the Warsaw Convention"); Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 
178 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (absent any "physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or any alteration in 
the structure of an internal organ, then any subsequent shortness of breath, sleeplessness, or 
inability to concentrate may safely be characterized as psychosomatic and is not compensable"). 
676 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552. 
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restart one of the engines and the plane landed safely at Miami 
International Airport.677 The passengers brought suit to recover 
damages solely for their mental distress. The district court 
concluded that pure psychic injury was not compensable under 
the Warsaw Convention. 678 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, 
holding that the phrase "lesion corporelle" encompassed "purely 
emotional distress. ,,679 By applying long-accepted methods of 
treaty interpretation, considering the text of the treaty, its context, 
as well as the "history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the 
practical construction adopted by the parties." The US Supreme 
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, ultimately holding that 
recovery for pure psychic injury was not permitted under the 
Warsaw Convention. 
In King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.,680 the UK House of 
Lords dealt with two cases where passengers suffered 
psychiatric injury with no physical injury as a result of accidents 
on board aircraft. In the first case,681 plaintiff King was a 
passenger on a helicopter transporting workers off of a North 
Sea oil platform. Both of the helicopter's engines failed suddenly, 
677 Id. 
678 In re E. Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5, 1983,629 F. Supp. 307 
~S.D. Fla. 1986). 
79 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480. 
680 King v. Bristow Helicopters, Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 745, (H.L. 2002). 
681 Id. (citing King v. Bristow, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 95 (2001)). 
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causIng the aircraft to plunge thirty-five feet back onto the 
oilrig's deck. King suffered post traumatic stress disorder with 
symptoms such as insomnia, nightmares, anxiety, and a fear of 
flying. He claimed the accident also caused or contributed to an 
existing peptic ulcer. In the second case,682 the plaintiff was an 
underage girl, Morris, traveling unaccompanied from Kuala 
Lumpur to Amsterdam, who was sexually assaulted by a male 
passenger sitting next to her. She presented evidence at trial that 
she suffered from clinical depression consisting of a single 
episode of a major depressive illness. She claimed only mental 
~ anguish damages. 683 The House of Lords held that 
compensation could be awarded for physical manifestations of a 
mental injury so long as a casual link can be established by 
showing that the mental injury causing the physical symptoms 
itself was caused by the accident. However, no recovery IS 
available for mental injury absent physical symptoms. 
Australia has also had the opportunity to decide whether 
recovery should be allowed for purely mental damages. In 
Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd. 684, the Court of Appeal 
of New South Wales dealt with a plaintiff who claimed mental 
anguish arising from an in-flight tum-back after an engme 
682 Id. (citing Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Q.B. 100 (C.A. 2002)). 
683 Id. at 746. 
684 Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 140 F.L.R. 318 (1997). 
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fire. 685 Following Floyd, the court held that the term "bodily 
injury" did not include purely psychological injury, but noted 
that the decision in Floyd "left open the possibility that recovery 
be available where psychological injury is accompanied by 
physical injury. ,,686 
The only case supporting recovery for mental anguish 
without physical symptoms was handed down by the Israel 
Supreme Court.687 In Daddon, the Israel Supreme Court was 
confronted with claims by passengers alleging mental anguish 
damages suffered while being held captive by hijackers.688 The 
~ court reached the conclusion that mental anguish absent any 
physical injury should be considered "bodily injury" under the 
Warsaw Convention because at the time of drafting, unlike today, 
mental anguish either was not actionable or the possibility of 
mental anguish without physical harm had simply not been 
contemplated. This approach has been criticized as 
impermissibly seeking to develop the meaning of the phrase 
"bodily injury" by judicial policy in light of subsequent legal 
and medical advances instead of interpreting the Convention as 
written. 689 To date, no other jurisdictions have followed 
685 Id. at 319. 
686 Id. at 323. 
687 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 770 (citing Daddon v. Air France, 1 S.&B. Av. R. 141 (1984)). 
688 Id. at 769. 
689 Id. at 770. 
350 
Daddon. 
China certainly will not allow recovery for purely mental 
injuries under the Warsaw-Montreal liability regime, because if 
the contracting parties of the Conventions wish to do so, they 
will expressly incorporate the word "mental injury" in the 
Article 17, instead, the words "bodily injury" have remained the 
same since 1929. For my own opinion, contrary to Israel 
Supreme Court's reasoning, supra, if the Conventions would 
allow recovery for pure mental injury, a lot of countries will not 
sign it. The following example will be clear reference. 
Early drafts of the Montreal Convention 1999 Article 17 
would have expressly included liability for mental injury. 690 
Later drafts even introduced the element of personal injury 
designed to encompass both physical and mental injuries.691 For 
example, the provision (then Article 16) of the first draft of the 
Montreal Convention corresponding to Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention read: 
"The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury or mental 
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the damage 
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations 
of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury 
resulted solely from the state of health ofthe passenger.,,692 
690 Blanca I. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law, 66 J. Air L. & Com. 21, 
36 (2000). 
691 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Distress in Aviation Claims-- Emergent Trends, 65 J. Air L. 
& Com. 225, 225 (2000). 
692 Id. at 226-27 (quoting Report of the Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consolidation of the 
Warsaw System, Aviation Q., July 1997, at 286, 313) (emphasis added). 
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Other drafts of the convention even included the term 
"personal injury"; however, after further deliberations, the ICAO 
removed both "mental injury" and "personal injury" from the 
provision, choosing, instead, to leave the language virtually 
unchanged. 
Having solved the problem of pure mental distress, the next 
question is whether mental distress accompanied by bodily 
injury is recoverable. There are four approaches: 
1. Disallow recovery for emotional distress accompanied 
by bodily injury. Under this approach, an injured passenger 
could recover only pecuniary loss, such as medical expenses and 
lost income. Denying emotional distress damages is appropriate 
in light of the state of the law in many countries at the time of 
Warsaw Convention. 693 And, because this approach is so 
restrictive on passengers' rights, it furthers the pro-airline 
industry goals of the Convention.694 However, this approach is 
unacceptable because it provides such minimal compensation 
for passengers who may have suffered traumatic injuries, either 
physical or mental. The drafters of the Warsaw Convention 
attempted to strike a balance between passengers and airlines; 
this approach is too one sided. Further, even though many 
693 In Floyd, the Court noted that" such a remedy was unknown in many, if not most, jurisdictions 
in 1929." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 545. 




jurisdictions denied recovery for mental distress in 1929, the 
number of the countries which do not recognize recovery for 
mental distress nowadays is limited since most of the countries 
adopt the theory that mental distress, like physical injuries, is 
recoverable. 
2. Allow recovery for all emotional distress, as long as a 
bodily injury occurs. This approach is to allow recovery for all 
emotional distress, as long as a bodily injury occurs, regardless 
of the connection between the distress and the bodily injury. 
Thus, a passenger with a scratched arm could recover for the 
trauma and fear due to the plane crash; the bodily injury opens 
the door to liability for emotional distress. 
This approach is consistent with a broad reading of Article 
17's imposition of liability for "damage sustained in the event 
of ... bodily injury. ,,695 Significantly, the drafters did not use 
the phrase "damage caused by ... bodily injury," which would 
have served as a signal that any mental distress must be 
connected to the bodily injury. 
However, this approach is undesirable for three reasons. 
First of all, this approach treats mental distress as an 
independent cause of action, which is inconsistent with 




precedent that dictates that the Warsaw Convention creates a 
cause of action, not just a limit on remedies.696 Secondly, this 
approach treats mental distress as damages resulting from the 
accident, not the injury.697 And, thirdly, this approach create 
significant unfair. One passenger luckily scratched his finger 
would obtain a much greater recovery than an unscratched 
fellow passenger who was equally terrified by the plane crash. 
3. Allow emotional distress as damages for bodily injury, 
including distress about the accident. Emotional distress is 
considered an element of the damages for bodily injury under 
the third approach. Under this approach, the distress does not 
need to be about the injury to be compensable. This approach is 
different from the second approach in that the distress must 
occur at the same time or later than the bodily injury; one cannot, 
therefore, recover for the fear before the impact and bodily 
injury under the second approach, but one can recover it under 
the third one. Only some US courts adopted this approach, and 
696 The dispute did not arise until the 1970s because courts did not originally view the Warsaw 
Convention as creating a cause of action. See Sheila Wallace Hohnes, Casenote, 58 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 1205, 1207 (1993). Rather, courts frrst interpreted the Convention as simply limiting 
monetary damages on otherwise applicable law. Id. Courts thus viewed the treaty as creating only 
a presumption ofliability, instead of an independent cause of action. Id. at 1209-10. It was not 
until the late 1970s that courts began to construe the Warsaw Convention as the "universal source 
ofa right of action." Id. at 1210 (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 
919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979». 
697 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 666. This is problematic under the wording of Article 17 of the 
Convention and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985), 
where the Court noted that "'the text of Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the 
passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury.'" Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 
666 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 398). 
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these courts went too far. In my opinion, this approach is very 
close to allow pure mental injuries which definitely against the 
contracting states' intention of the Warsaw Convention and the 
Montreal Convention. 
4. Allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from 
a bodily injury. Under this approach, emotional distress flowing 
from the bodily injury is an element of damages allowed for the 
bodily injury. Thus, damages are allowed for emotional distress 
only to the extent the emotional distress is caused by the bodily 
injury. A passenger may, therefore, recover for fear related to his 
broken leg, but not for fear related to the plane crash. Under this 
approach, emotional distress can also have a separate role as the 
causal link between the accident and the bodily injury; a 
passenger may, for example, recover for a heart attack caused by 
the distress of the plane crash.698 
Of the four approaches discussed, China should adopt the 
fourth one for a number of reasons. First, this approach prevents 
serious inequities among the passengers subject to the Warsaw 
698 The comments of the court in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (Ct. App. 
N.Y. 1974), help to illustrate the reasoning behind this position: The compensable injuries must be 
'bodily' injuries but there may be an intermediate causal link which is 'mental' between the 
cause--the accident-- and the effect--the 'bodily injury'. And once that predicate of liability-- the 
. 'bodily injury'--is established, then the damages sustained as a result of the 'bodily injury' are 
, compensable including mental suffering .... However, only the damages flowing from the 'bodily 
\ injury', whatever the causal link, are compensable .... We hold, therefore, that defendant is liable 
for plaintiffs palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by the psychic trauma of 
the hijacking, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries, but not for the trauma as 
such or for the nonbodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma. 
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Convention. Such as getting scratched on the way down an 
evacuation slide should not enable one passenger to obtain a 
much greater recovery than an unscratched fellow passenger 
who was equally terrified by the plane crash. And, this approach 
is consistent with the intentions of the drafters of the Warsaw 
Convention by making passengers' recoveries more reasonable 
and predictable. This approach also allows for greater recovery 
with more severe injuries, presuming that more distress flows 
from more serious injuries. Further, this approach even permits 
recovery in wrongful death cases.699 
Further more, let us analyze this issue in a simple way 
which is usually overlooked by some experts. Disallow recovery 
for emotional distress accompanied by bodily injury is against 
the modem understanding of a bodily injury is not fully 
recovered if the mental distress of that injury has not been 
compensated. Allow recovery for all emotional distress as long 
as a bodily injury occurs would create significant unfair. Allow 
emotional distress as damages for bodily injury, including 
distress about the accident is went too far against the contracting 
states' intention. Then what is left and the reasonable approach 
is allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from a 
699 Survivors may recover for physical manifestations of their grief at the loss of a loved one. 
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bodily injury. 
5-5. Conclusion note 
As a successful international convention regulating aIr 
carrier's liability around the world, the Warsaw Convention and 
the Montreal Convention will play a very important role in air 
transport. Chinese aviation law regulations need to be 
modernized to correspond with global developments In the 
industry. As a first target, the low limitation of air damage 
~ recovery needs change, and more detailed implementing 
regulations are needed to determine the extent and quantum of 
damagt:(s caused by air accident. China needs to unify limits on 
liability regarding international carriage with those existing in 
other countries. This will certainly benefit both the aviation and 
insurance industries. 
Apart from the problem of low limitation, another 
important task is to clarify the interpretation of Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention 1929 and the Montreal Convention 1999, 
which is crucial to international air carrier's liability to 
passengers. This is the main purpose of the present dissertation. 
By suggesting that (1) China should interpret "accident" 
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broadly to provide more, but reasonable protections to 
passengers; (2) China should adopt tripartite approach to 
interpret "from embarking to disembarking" to catch up with 
modem changes of civil aviation, and (3) China should not 
allow recovery for pure mental injuries but only to allow 
recovery of mental distress which flowing from a bodily injury 
to best serve the purpose of the Conventions. The author wishes 
to clarify some uncertainties of legal practice in the area of 
international air carrier's liability to passengers in China. 
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